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PREFACE
I first became interested in the topic of CIA involvement in Chile as an undergraduate in
a core humanities course on ethics at Queens University of Charlotte. I had to write a
paper and the topic intrigued me. Like many who have written on the subject, what I first
wanted to know was whether the US could be held responsible for the 1973 coup. What I
discovered was that in a strictly technical sense, though the CIA manipulated the political
situation in Chile, the Agency was not directly involved in the kidnapping attempt on
General Schneider or the successful coup three years later, and so I concluded in my
paper.
As I began to think about my graduate thesis project, I discovered that my initial question
was neither very interesting nor very useful.
First, it’s an unresolveable question. The CIA was not directly involved in the major
events of 1970 and 1973 in Chile, but the US Government certainly did what policy
makers perceived was necessary to encourage both actions. It is impossible to determine,
however, what would have happened had the US refrained from using its covert powers
of influence.
Second, there can be little practical application derived from determining whether the US
can be held responsible for the events of 1970 and 1973 in Chile. What could be gained
by simply passing judgment? Not much. There is a more interesting question, a
question with more possibilities for future practical application: how did the United
States find itself acting in a matter fundamentally discordant with core American political
values? That is the subject of this thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY, AND SOURCES
“I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country
go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people.”
~ Henry Kissinger, June 27, 19701
I.

INTRODUCTION
For decades, the Cold War brought the threat of nuclear conflict. The two

dominant world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were ideologically
opposed and saw each other’s nuclear capabilities as a threat to their respective national
security. Though the United States and Soviet Union never met in open war, their
conflict spilled over into the third world. As several leftist political movements
developed in Latin America, US policy makers feared the domino effect, in which one
country after another would fall to socialism or communism and thus fall under potential
Soviet influence. Policy makers perceived a socialist/communist Latin America as a
threat and devised various strategies to reverse the Latin American leftward trend and
“contain” the spread of socialism/communism – ideas which became blended in the
collective American consciousness - to as few countries as possible.
Chile was one of the countries where the political Left was best established in
Latin America. For decades it demonstrated a substantial following. A coalition of the
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Henry Kissinger, quoted in Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy
Toward Latin America, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 349. Kissinger’s comment was made
during a 40 Committee meeting on June 27, 1970: “The Chairman’s comment was, I don’t see why we
need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.” NARA,
“Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee 27 June 170 [sic],” June 29, 1970, U.S. Department of State,
Freedom of Information Act, State Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pnara3/00009A43.pdf.
The meeting minutes appear to be more of a memorandum of conversation than a transcript. “I don’t see
why…” seems to be a direct quote from Kissinger, whereas “The Chairman’s comment was,” acting as the
meeting minutes author’s own introduction to Kissinger’s comment, based on the author’s similar treatment
of other statements made by meeting attendees. The existence of these meeting notes gives this quote by
Kissinger more validity than another quote attributed to him - “Chile is a dagger pointed at the heart of
Antarctica” - as I discuss later in this chapter.
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Communist and Socialist Parties and others had come close to winning the presidency in
the past. The Chilean Left began to develop in the early 1910s. The Worker’s Socialist
Party (POS), founded in 1912 and led by Luís Emilio Recabarren, “quickly developed a
small but vibrant national organization”2 that stretched the length of the country. In
1922, the POS became the Communist Party which maintained a presence in government
for several decades, excepting a period when the party was officially outlawed from 1948
to 1958. The Socialist party was founded in 1933 after the demise of Chile’s twelve-day
“Socialist Republic.” Left minded groups put off by the Communist Party’s “ideological
orthodoxy, organizational rigidity, and international loyalties,”3 found a home in the
Socialist Party. The Socialist, Communist, and Radical Parties banded together in 1938
to form the Popular Front coalition, advancing the representation of the Socialist and
Communist Parties in the Chilean Congress and in the Cabinet. The Socialist Party,
though weakened during the 1940s and early 1950s by “a series of divisions,”4
maintained a presence in the government even during the decade of the Communist
Party’s “clandestinity.”5
In the 1950s, the Socialist party split into two factions, one in support of the
dictator Carlos Ibáñez, the other, led by Salvador Allende, seeking to “rebuild an
alliance” with the illegal Communist Party.6 The Socialist party came together again in
1957 and, with the re-legalization of the Communist party in 1958, very nearly won the
Presidential election in 1958, with Allende as the coalition’s candidate. As the peasantry

2

Kenneth Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and
Peru, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 86.
3
Ibid, 87.
4
Ibid, 88.
5
Ibid, 86-89.
6
Allende was then a senator. See Roberts, Deepening Democracy, 89.

3
became politically active and the urban poor population increased in the 1960s, the base
of support for the Left grew, strengthening the chance of success in the next presidential
race.7 Allende received a slightly smaller percentage of the vote in 1970 than he did in
1964, but, with a three-way division among competing coalitions, the race was close
enough to send the decision for the presidency to the Chilean Congress, per a provision in
the Chilean constitution. Allende won, but more because of Congressional
disenchantment with the Right than a love for the Left, as discussed in Chapters Three
and Four of this thesis.
Covert action in opposition to Salvador Allende’s campaign was the Nixon
Administration’s response to the threat of socialist government in Chile. The prospect of
the election of Allende caused a frenzy among the chief architects of US foreign policy.
Government documents from several agencies (CIA, DOS, and DOD, among others)
demonstrate that the CIA, at the behest of policy makers in Washington, led a campaign
to keep Salvador Allende out of the executive office. Once Allende was elected, policy
makers pursued a policy of economic warfare in an attempt to destabilize Allende’s
government while the CIA kept tabs on the Chilean military, discreetly encouraging a
coup without committing US assistance or active participation in such a move.
In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger argues that Salvador Allende was bent on
undermining Chilean democracy by establishing a socialist state which, by its nature,
would be hostile to US interests in the hemisphere. He justifies the US Government’s
involvement in Chilean politics by insisting that our national security was at stake. Policy
makers’ real motives were more complicated, as I discuss further below. But the
oppressive regime that came to power as a result of the coup in 1973 presented a threat of
7

Ibid, 88-94.
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a different sort. Not only did the coup itself undermine Chile’s democratic tradition, it
also used disappearance, torture, and murder to root out those deemed subversives by the
regime, creating a culture of fear in which basic human and democratic rights were
oppressed. Declassified US Government documents indicate that policy makers in
Washington were well aware of the activities of that regime. Our continued support of
military dictator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte was at variance with the foundational
principles of American society and damaged both the domestic and international
reputation of the United States Government.
According to Samuel Huntington’s theory of a peculiarly American struggle to
maintain “Creedal” purity in policy and government, the American polity cycles through
periods of complacency and passionate attachment to American political values. The US
Government must, at times, set principles aside in favor of addressing the realities of
difficult policy situations; the American public will allow divergence from the Creed in
such cases. The gap between policy and principle continues to widen until there is such a
state of divergence from principle that it is no longer possible for the public to dismiss or
ignore the discrepancy. American society then enters a period of “Creedal Passion,”
forcing the Government to return, at least in part, to foundational principles.
In Huntington’s estimation, then, domestic politics would eventually recover from
the excesses of the Nixon Government and there would be at least some measure of
restoration of political values to American government. In the case of the Nixon
Administration, the Creedal phase was already in progress, initiated by the Vietnam War
and added to by the Watergate scandal. Revelations of CIA misdeeds, including action in
Chile, kicked Creedal Passion into high gear, resulting in the Congressional and
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executive ordered investigations of the Intelligence Community. The legislation of
greater checks on Intelligence Community activity at least in part renewed faith in the US
Government’s adherence to fundamental principles.
Recognition of such a cycle, however, does not diminish the short-term domestic
impact a deviation from principle will have on the legitimacy of the Government and,
thus, the effectiveness of an administration. Furthermore, US actions abroad seem to
linger on the world stage, continuing to affect how the international community perceives
the United States. How we conduct ourselves on the international stage matters, and our
international stature will not always protect us from the consequences of mistakes. It is
therefore helpful to understand how and why the Nixon Administration found itself
undermining Chilean democracy and why both the Nixon and Ford Administrations
found themselves supporting a dictator. Such is the purpose of this thesis.
II.

THE WHY AND THE HOW
Most studies of US involvement in Chile in the early 1970s center around the

debate over the degree of responsibility of the Nixon Administration compared to internal
pressures that instigated the 1973 military coup that ousted Salvador Allende. The goal
of this study, as stated above, is less to assess the degree of US responsibility and more
to examine the characteristics of the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford
Administrations that first led the US Government to involve itself in Chile and then to
continue its involvement once Pinochet had solidified his position as dictator. My
research revealed two questions central to the debate among policy makers about the
situation in Chile: what to do – to intervene or not to intervene – and how to do it. The
below table outlines the core points of my argument.
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Table 1.1 Strategic Calculations Affecting Policy toward Chile, 1970 to September 1973
Two Questions:

Strategic Calculations

Outcome

1. Need to maintain the world balance of power
What to do in Chile

How to do it

2. Traditional ethnocentric attitude toward Latin America
3. Fear of the perception of US weakness by countries on
the international stage

1. Domestic public resistance to the costs of overt military
conflict
2. Weakening US economy (slow growth, rising
unemployment, etc)
3. The desire to avoid political costs of departure from
principles of "self-determination and free election"

The perceived need to
intervene

Use of covert means
(i.e., the CIA)

4. Nixon and Kissinger's centralized, covert policy style

Discussions about what to do in Chile were framed largely in terms of the
perceived need to maintain the world balance of power. Traditional US ethnocentrism
was re-articulated as a belief in the necessary subordination of the domestic politics of
third world nations to the need for a power balance among the principal nations of the
world. Third, there was a sense among policy makers at the highest levels that US
willingness to act was being tested. If we failed to act, the international community
would regard us as weak and might have taken advantage of that weakness to challenge
our leadership. As for the means, lack of public support for overt military intervention,
reduced resources, and the desire to avoid the political costs of appearing hypocritical –
the Nixon Administration was already “strongly on record in support of selfdetermination and respect for free election”8 - made the use of covert means attractive.
The centralization of the policy making process made it possible for Nixon and Kissinger

8

The White House, “Memorandum of Conversation, ‘NSC Meeting, November 6 – Chile,’”
November 5, 1970, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 121.
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to bypass the 40 Committee’s indecisiveness and take a more targeted approach to policy
toward Chile. I elaborate on those points and discuss competing hypotheses in Chapter
Two.
A third question I asked was why the Ford Administration continued to support
Augusto Pinochet when it became clear that the policies of his government were
fundamentally discordant with our core values. It may be better to ask why the Ford
Administration did not seek to influence the Pinochet regime in spite of both domestic
and international pressure to do so. A similar table of strategic calculations is helpful
here as well.
Table 1.2 Strategic Calculations Affecting US Policy toward the Pinochet Regime
Two Questions

Strategic Calculations

Outcome

1. World balance of power not threatened

What to do about Chile?

2. Pinochet government friendly to US and
open to US influence

Continue to support Pinochet

3. Pinochet government presented no
challenge to US authority in the region

1. Domestic pressure to censure the regime
could be managed
What were the consequences
for policy?

2. International pressure to censure the
regime could be managed

Deepened discrepancy
between public rhetoric and
actual policy

3. Kissinger's continued control over policy
and his covert policy style

I elaborate on these points as well in Chapter Two, but very briefly, I found that
policy makers continued to support Pinochet because his government did not pose the
same threat the Nixon Administration had felt with the prospect of an Allende
presidency. Additionally, Pinochet’s regime was friendly to the United States and open
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to US influence. Furthermore, the new Chilean Government presented no challenge to
US authority in the region. Kissinger in particular was loath to criticize a government
friendly to US interests; putting up with human rights violations was an acceptable price
to pay. The Ford Administration could not, however, simply ignore the issue of human
rights. Domestic and international pressure to address Chile’s human rights record forced
Kissinger to manage the tension by adjusting public rhetoric regarding policy toward
Chile. His continued control over the foreign policy process, furthermore, allowed him to
continue the Administration’s policy of support for Pinochet, deepening the discrepancy
between public rhetoric and policy, as was characteristic of the Nixon Administration.
III.

METHODOLOGY

The nature of the subject and sources available indicated that the use of
qualitative-historical methods of analysis would be most appropriate, using a variation on
Theory-Guided Process-Tracing. I use theory to inform the tracing of a process through a
narrative of events, in this thesis, using my theory of the why and the how to inform a
study of the process that led to deepened involvement in Chile in the early 1970s and
support of the Pinochet regime after the 1973 coup through a narrative of related events.9
The sample consists of one case study, using both primary and secondary sources
to reconstruct, interpret, and evaluate events. Primary documents consist of memoirs of
key US policy makers, official government reports (the Church Report and the Hinchey
Report), speeches, television interviews, and other archival materials, including
9

For a discussion of Theory-Guided Process-Tracing, see Tulia G. Falleti, “Theory-Guided
Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics: Something Old, Something New,” in The Newsletter of American
Political Science Association Organized Section in Comparative Politics 17, no 1 (Winter 2006): 9-14,
http://nd.edu/~apsacp/documents/APSA-CPWinter2006Issue.pdf. See also Randall Strahan, “Causal
Process Analysis and the Agency of Leaders in the U.S. House,” (presentation, Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 30-September 2, 2007.

9
memoranda, “telecons,”10 briefings, etc. I collected archival material chiefly from the
Department of State’s own collection, available online, and from the National Security
Archive, based out of The George Washington University. The Department of State’s
collection is quite extensive. Seven agencies contributed to the collection: The
Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the National Archives and Records Administration. There were three separate
releases of information (Tranche I, Tranche II, and Tranche III) covering this time period.
Not all agencies have released three sets of documents, though most have done so. The
National Security Archive at The George Washington University, in addition to the
documents available on its website,11 has established The Digital National Security
Archive,12 a catalogued, searchable online database of all the documents in the National
Security Archive’s collection from which I collected Kissinger “telecons” related to US
involvement in Chile.
In a few instances, I utilized speeches and television interviews available through
The American Presidency Project,13 a searchable online database of messages, public
papers, and other documents of US presidents based out of the University of California at
Santa Barbara. Nixontapes.org, established by Luke A. Nichter, Richard A. Moss, and
Anand Toprani, constitutes “the most complete digital tape collection in existence”14 of
the thousands of hours of tape recorded meetings during Nixon’s presidency. The editors

10

Transcripts of telephone conversations.
The National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/.
12
The Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/marketing/index.jsp.
13
The American Presidency Project, http://www.americanpresidency.org.
14
NixonTapes.org, http://nixontapes.org/about.html.
11
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have separated out those meetings in which policy toward Chile was discussed and have
transcribed many of the conversations in that sub-collection.
In order to make the project manageable, I limited the time span under study from
1970 through 1976, with a brief review of CIA involvement in the late 1950s and 1960s.
The bulk of the documents available refers to the period up to the coup and the few days
following. The documentary record is much thinner for the time period covering the
Ford Administration (1974-1976). What evidence there is suggests that the direction of
foreign policy toward Chile once Ford took office did not alter significantly, except as it
was affected by the Church Committee proceedings and subsequent reports. My analysis
of the period between 1974 and 1976 thus focuses chiefly on the political fall-out in
Washington after the CIA’s involvement in Chile became public knowledge and the
effect that the Church Committee’s review of the CIA’s activities had on US interactions
with the Pinochet regime.
IV.

DATA ANALYSIS

My thesis draws on five types of data: government documents (primary sources);
the memoirs and diaries of key individuals (also primary sources); secondary sources that
discuss the history of US involvement in Latin America; secondary sources that discuss
US Cold War foreign policy; and secondary sources that discuss developments in Chile
during the Allende government.
The first category of primary sources, the documentary record that includes
official cables, communiqués, telecons, memorandums, etc, allows us to reconstruct the
chronology of events to demonstrate what events influenced decisions and, in turn, who
was responsible for decisions that influenced later events. It also reveals the debates and
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dissent within the different departments and agencies involved in activities in Chile.
Such a detailed chronological overview grounds in hard evidence arguments about the
direction of influence and responsibility. The documentary record, however, does not
produce a complete narrative of events. In those cases, I relied on secondary sources to
fill the gaps. Those secondary sources provide background information on events that
occurred in Chile that are not adequately described by official US government
documents, such as the effects of Allende’s economic program on the Chilean economy,
the resulting political upheaval, etc.
Second, I worked with memoirs and other apologetic primary sources. Memoirs
by policy architects in particular can be considered a form of “perpetrator testimony.”
The terms “perpetrator testimony” and “survivor testimony” traditionally belong to the
field of Holocaust history, but are useful in other lines of historical inquiry as well.
Memoirs and other apologetic sources provide information, in the actors’ own words,
about the unfolding of historical events. The nature of perpetrator testimony is inherently
problematic. Though it may seem on the surface that the testimony of individuals
directly involved in a particular act or set of actions is authoritative, many historians
dismiss perpetrator testimony as a useful source of information, arguing that perpetrator
testimony is so tainted by the desire of the perpetrator to minimize his role in the criminal
or questionable acts committed that the evidence given by the perpetrator is virtually
useless. But Christopher Browning, in Collected Memories: Holocaust History and
Postwar Testimony argues that, though much of perpetrator testimony is less than
accurate, it is still highly useful when evaluated critically.

12
Browning establishes four criteria or “tests” for determining the validity of
perpetrator testimonies (both within the context of a trial and without): “The self-interest
test;” “the vividness test;” “the possibility test;” and “the probability test.”15
Corresponding to the first test, a perpetrator will sometimes offer incriminating evidence
against himself or herself when it was in his or her own self-interest to do so. In other
words, when a perpetrator can offer something beyond flat out denial of participation in
the activities under review, he or she is likely telling the truth. A perpetrator may offer
self-incriminating testimony, at least a partial truth, to establish that he or she was not
involved in more sinister activities.16
Browning’s second test operates on the observation that accounts of events given
that are the most detailed and vivid are likely those which contain the most factual truth.
Put more simply, the less detailed a perpetrator’s lies are, the less a court, jury, or review
panel will be able to disprove them. Thus, the more detailed the testimony, the less likely
it is that a perpetrator is lying, at least about the factual information given.
Browning’s third test is built on the argument that there is no reason to entirely
discard the testimony a perpetrator gives when there is little or no contradictory
documentation. If a perpetrator gives evidence indicating he was in one location, for
example, and there is no documentation to prove otherwise, it must be determined that it
is possible the perpetrator is telling the truth. In the fourth test, Browning assumes that
when a perpetrator’s testimony is corroborated by other evidence (documentation, etc) his
or her testimony “can be viewed not only as possible but also as probable.”17

15

Christopher R. Browning, Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony,
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 11-12.
16
Ibid, 11.
17
Ibid, 12.
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The basic thrust of Browning’s argument about using perpetrator testimony is
that, in the absence of “smoking gun” documentation, the historian must devise ways to
critically examine and use the evidence available, even if that evidence is highly
problematic, as with perpetrator testimony. A few other tips Browning offers are first, to
look for the consistencies within different accounts of the same event, and second, to look
for alternative explanations when the key details of different accounts don’t match, such
as the time or place of a particular event. I kept those observations and cautions in mind
as I worked with the memoirs of Kissinger and Nixon, both of whom may be considered
“perpetrators” of the Allende overthrow and demise of Chilean democracy.
My thesis draws on three sets of secondary sources as well. The first consists of
works by experts in the history of US involvement in Latin America who have invested
many years studying and analyzing the events in Chile. Because of their zeal for the truth
and their desire for justice, the authors of this set of sources often become dogmatically
attached to one extreme view or another, which causes them, at times, to argue beyond
the evidence they cite. The challenge is to extract the information they present and to
determine what is useful and insightful in their arguments. The second set of secondary
sources were those that I utilized to fill in the gaps in the documentary record, as I
discussed above.
The last set of secondary sources are works by experts in US foreign policy who
have spent years studying the formation and effects of US foreign policy during the Cold
War. These sources provide historical insight into the workings of the policy making
process to inform a discussion of policy trends during the Nixon and Ford
Administrations, including both new and inherited trends. They are valuable sources in

14
that they allow us to situate policy toward Chile within the larger scheme of US foreign
policy but are often limited in their insight into the Chilean case in particular and also
inflected with bias.
V.

Literature Review
1. Official history and critique
There are two official histories of CIA activities in Chile, the first written by the

Church Committee in 1975 and the second by official CIA historians in 2000. These two
histories do not give two different accounts of events; rather, they complement each
other. “Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, Staff Report,” more commonly referred as
The Church Report, was meant to serve as a foundation for the Senate Committee’s
public hearings,18 whose purpose was to review the activities of the US intelligence
community at home and abroad. The report became an appendix in the Church
Committee’s larger report on the hearings. The writers of the report document, fairly
dispassionately, the actions taken by the CIA between 1963 and 1973. It reveals that the
path to 1973 was increasingly marked by US interference in Chile, through economic
support to opposition groups, covert CIA activities ranging from the creation of
propaganda to the fomenting of a coup, and economic sanctions against the Allende
government after Allende achieved the presidency. The writers of the report draw
conclusions about the level of CIA involvement in Chilean politics leading up to and
during the Allende presidency, and pose some questions that set the stage for the
Committee’s hearings.

18

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Volume 7: Covert Action, Appendix A: Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, Staff Report, 94th
Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 146.
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Between June, 1999 and November, 2000, thousands of CIA and US Government
documents regarding activities in Chile were declassified.19 The CIA itself produced a
report on their actions entitled, “CIA Activities in Chile,” more commonly known as the
Hinchey Report. The report was written in response to the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000 (the Hinchey Amendment),20 and was meant to fill in the gaps in the
record of the US Government’s involvement in Chile during the Pinochet era. But the
Hinchey Report is nowhere near as thorough as the Church Report, perhaps by design.
Both reports are discussed in detail in Chapter Five of this thesis.
2. Memoirs, “Perpetrator Testimony”: Defense of US Actions in Chile
Both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger discuss US actions in Chile in their
memoirs. Nixon’s discussion of Chile in RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon is rather
short. Kissinger’s arguments echo Nixon’s, but are better articulated and more nuanced.
He goes into great detail in the three volumes of his memoirs, White House Years, Years
of Upheaval, and Years of Renewal, recounting the events that led to our involvement,
including a discussion of inter-agency politics, how the US interacted with the Allende
government, and how the intelligence investigations affected policy making and the
intelligence community.

19

James B. Foley, “U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement: Chile
Declassification Project,” June 20, 1999, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act,
http://foia.state.gov/Press/6-30-99ChilePR.asp. See also James P. Rubin, “U.S. Department of State Office
of the Spokesman Press Statement: Release of Newly Declassified and Other Documents Related to Events
in Chile Between 1968-1978,” October 8, 1999, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act,
http://foia.state.gov/Press/10-8-99ChilePR.asp. See also Richard Boucher, “U.S. Department of State
Office of the Spokesman Press Statement: Chile Declassification Project: Final Release,” November 13,
2000, U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, http://foia.state.gov/Press/11-1300ChilePR.asp.
20
Peter Kornbluh, “CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet’s Repression,” 19 September, 2000, The
National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20000919/index.html.

16
A third memoir of use to this study is The Haldeman Diaries, by Nixon’s Chief of
Staff, Richard “Bob” Haldeman. Haldeman’s published diary does not touch on Chile,
though he does briefly mention the ITT scandal.21 What his diary does provide is some
support for the observation, discussed previously, that Kissinger was a chief architect of
foreign policy during the Nixon presidency.
3. Academic and Journalistic Interpretations: Critiques of US Actions in
Chile
Peter Kornbluh, John Dinges, and J. Patrice McSherry all offer criticism of US
policy toward Chile in the 1970s. Dinges and McSherry focus specifically on Operation
Condor; Kornbluh discusses Condor but also comments on CIA actions between 1970
and 1973, as well as the activities of DINA (Chile’s secret police) before the formation of
the Condor organization. McSherry’s critique is by far the most condemnatory; she sees
US actions in Chile as part of historical conspiracy to keep Latin America subjugated to
the power of the United States. Both Kornbluh and Dinges are willing to acknowledge
some internal debate about US actions within the larger US policy making body,
especially after Chile’s human rights violations became a concern. Kristian Gustafson
differs from all three both in the aim of his analysis and in his conclusions about US
responsibility for the coup.
Kornbluh’s Pinochet File is a veritable tome of USG communiqués, memos, and
CIA reports on CIA activities surrounding the rise and fall of Salvador Allende and the
US Government’s continued relationship with first the Chilean Junta, and finally
Pinochet himself. Contrary to the claim Henry Kissinger makes in his memoirs that he
21
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called off the effort to oust Allende in mid-October 1970, Kornbluh presents evidence
that, though Kissinger may have advised the CIA to discourage one group of coup
plotters, separating one group of plotters from another was a false distinction; both or
several groups plotted together.22 Whatever the direct US participation in the actual coup
attempt was or was not, the fact is that we actively encouraged coup plotting which may
not have developed without CIA prodding. Also, the fact that the policy makers tried to
cover the CIA’s role in the 1970 coup plotting for fear that the CIA and US Government
would be implicated in the death of General Schneider suggests that policy makers knew
the actions that led to Schneider’s death were wrong.23
Dinges focuses on the Pinochet regime’s participation in and leadership of
Operation Condor. The book is an excellent source of information about the formation
and operation of Operation Condor, an integrated intelligence community formed by
South American military regimes, discussed further in Chapter Five. Dinges’ book is
especially useful in that it includes material from Dinges’ interviews with various leaders
in the US and in Latin America that were connected with Condor and US policy making
bodies in the 1970s; these are materials I would not otherwise have access to. One
drawback of Dinges’ text is that it is a highly journalistic account, and, though thoroughly
researched, Dinges’ sources are not always carefully documented, making it difficult to
corroborate Dinges’ evidence.
Dinges discusses only briefly US involvement in Chile before the formation of
Operation Condor. The information he provides on the course of events from 1970 on is
much less detailed than Kornbluh’s, but Dinges does comment that US policy makers
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“sent an unequivocal sign to the most extreme rightist forces that democracy could be
sacrificed in the cause of ideological warfare.”24 His chief aim is to determine the extent
to which the United States was aware of and involved in Operation Condor. He
documents at length the amount of information the US Government had about the
organization’s assassination plots. Dinges concludes that US policy makers were happy
to assist in the creation of an integrated intelligence community in Latin America, and
that those policy makers were willing to accept some human rights abuses. When it
became apparent that the organization was planning operations outside of Latin America
– in Europe and the United States - however, US policy makers changed their tune. The
messages the US Government sent to Chile and other Condor countries were, therefore,
inconsistent. The effect of all the “red light/green light” messages US officials sent to
Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Brazil was understandable confusion
about what the US position actually was on the organization’s purpose and actions.25
McSherry, in Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin
America, does not discuss the 1973 Chilean coup. Like Dinges, her concern is the US
Government’s role in the creation and development of Operation Condor. She argues that
the Unites States supported the organization from its inception, in a deliberate and sinister
attempt to deepen the subjugation of the general populace in the various Latin American
countries in order to maintain US hegemony in the region through the USG’s
relationships with Latin American dictatorial regimes. The rise of counter-insurgency
methods of warfare “transformed the nature of state and society just as conventional,
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‘industrial’ warfare had done in the early twentieth century.”26 The creation of a
“parastatal” network, or a “shadow state apparatus” enabled Latin American dictatorships
to conduct clandestine, virtually untraceable operations against the very civilians those
states were mandated to protect, thereby creating an atmosphere of terror and instilling a
paralyzing fear among the general populace. McSherry also argues that the United States
played a much more integral role in the growth and expansion of Operation Condor than
other sources commonly acknowledge.
McSherry notes, as does Kornbluh, that Condortel, the organization’s main
communications system, was located in the Panama Canal Zone on the US military
base,27 but McSherry seems to infer more from that fact than does Kornbluh. Perhaps
Kornbluh was holding back, only mentioning Condortel in passing, but McSherry views
that particular connection between the US military and Operation Condor as irrefutable
evidence that the United States knew exactly what Condor was up to, and, by allowing
Condor to use the Panama Canal base for Condortel’s center of command, was explicitly
encouraging Condor’s various acts and objectives.28
What seems to be missing from McSherry’s argument and explanation of events
is an acknowledgement of the US Government’s opposition to the expansion of Condor’s
activities beyond the borders of Latin America. Common to the arguments of all three
authors is a sense of dissatisfaction with US support of Chile and Operation Condor,
given the obvious human rights abuses being committed on Latin American soil. None
of them absolve the United States of responsibility for the coup or for Condor.
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In Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Kristian Gustafson
takes a slightly different approach in his analysis of US action in Chile than Kornbluh,
Dinges, and McSherry. Gustafson, a former officer of the Canadian Army that now
lectures on intelligence and security at Brunel University,29 neither vilifies nor excuses
US policy makers for their actions in Chile, maintaining that “the truth is somewhere in
between” the arguments that the US Government was “criminal[ly] imperialist” and that
“the United States did nothing wrong.”30 But Gustafson’s primary objective is not to
assign blame for the coup or to gauge the amount of US responsibility for the events of
1970. His goal is to draw some lessons about the effectiveness of covert operations and
the utility of the CIA as a policy tool that might inform future use of covert action via the
CIA by the US Government. He does this by first establishing a coherent narrative of US
actions in Chile. Whereas my thesis primarily addresses the Nixon and Ford
Administrations’ involvement, Gustafson’s analysis stretches from CIA involvement in
the lead up to the 1964 Chilean presidential election through the coup in 1973 and into
1974.31
One important claim Gustafson makes is that “U.S. actions in Chile [were]
essentially a single campaign from 1963 to 1973.”32 He is, to my knowledge, the only
published source making that claim. He also contends that the CIA is not “an allpowerful ‘dark force,’” but that it is necessarily restrained by “the demands and
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constraints of operating covertly, and the consequences of being caught.”33 For similar
reasons, covert action has a limited ability to change the internal political landscape of a
foreign state, contrary to the beliefs of some American executives (notably, Nixon).34 He
further asserts that “harmonious interdepartmental relations” are the best guarantee of the
success of any covert action plan. Finally, he argues that the American executive should
not have “unfettered presidential authority to order covert action.”35 A “formalized
approval process” for covert action is a necessary restraint that “impos[es] needed checks
on the extent, proportionality, and morality of operations.”36
4. Explanations of Foreign Policy Making in the 1970s
Saul Landau, John Lewis Gaddis, and James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver
present in depth analyses of the Nixon Administration, its characteristics, and its policy
making processes. John Mearsheimer and Michael Lind offer general theories of US
interaction with other nations, particularly addressing the pursuit of hegemony. Lars
Schoultz discusses US policy toward Latin America since the early years of the American
republic. Finally, Michael Hunt analyzes the effect that racism and ethnocentrism have
had on US foreign policy toward the third world.
In The Dangerous Doctrine: National Security and U.S. Foreign Policy, Landau
argues that the Nixon Doctrine was characterized by an obsession with US national
security, a concern for the appearance of strength to mask the declining real power of the
United States, and rigid anticommunist public rhetoric in spite of the relaxation of
ideological tensions between the US and the two major communist powers. When
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discussing the Ford Administration, Landau argues that it did not break significantly with
the foreign policy doctrine Nixon and Kissinger had formed: “President Ford and
Secretary of State Kissinger continued to pursue détente in practice and anticommunism
in ideology as basic US national security policy. At the same time that Ford and
Kissinger parleyed with the Soviets and Chinese, they continued to foster dictatorship
throughout the Third World.”37 Under Ford, the US “exported” the idea of the national
security as the paramount policy concern to third world nations; Landau uses as an
example the formation of Operation Condor by the Southern Cone countries with the
blessing and assistance of the US.38
Gaddis argues in Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American
National Security Policy During the Cold War that Nixon and Kissinger centralized
policy decision making in the White House,39 pursuing a “philosophical deepening” in
policy making, movement from “superiority” to “sufficiency” in defense policy, and
pursuit of a balance of power, multipolarity, and trilateralism rather than hegemony.40
Nixon and Kissinger, Gaddis argues, also redefined what constituted a threat, defining
threats in terms of an enemy’s actions and redefining the relationship between threats and
interests.41 Whereas previous administrations had defined US interests in terms of the
threats they perceived on the international stage, Kissinger believed it necessary to first
define what was in the US interest and then define as threat that which would endanger
those interests.
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Gaddis also notes the inconsistency between the Nixon administration’s policy
toward the developed powers and its policy toward the third world. He explains this
inconsistency as the fear that the communist movements in each of those countries would
have altered the “status quo” and may have “appeared to shift the balance of power,”42
echoing Landau’s observations on the importance of the appearance of strength to the
Nixon administration. Regarding the Ford administration, Gaddis notes that Kissinger
remained in charge of foreign policy, which helped to keep the “fundamental elements”
of Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy in tact; 43 Gaddis does not discuss the Ford
administration at length.
In United States Foreign Policy and World Order, Nathan and Oliver argue that
upon his assumption of the presidency, Richard Nixon was presented with two problems:
waning public support of the war in Vietnam,44 and a desire to preserve the United States’
“special place in the world,” despite power shifts on the international stage.45 To meet
these challenges, Nixon and Kissinger sought to construct a system of “shared
responsibilities,”46 negotiating directly with the Soviets to balance strategic power,
opening relations with China to ease military demands in Asia, and détente with the
Soviet Union. Nathan and Oliver also argue that Kissinger was the driving force behind
the development of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy.47 Stability was his chief
policy concern.48 For Kissinger, absolute peace was impossible to achieve. Policy
makers could only hope to avoid war by achieving stability through a global balance of
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power.49 Nathan and Oliver also note a difference between the public rhetoric and policy
decisions of the Nixon administration50 and observe that the Nixon administration was
“almost paranoid” about its public appearance.51 Nathan and Oliver make little mention
of the Ford administration and what they do mention is discussed only in connection with
Henry Kissinger.
Moving from the specifics of the Nixon and Ford Administrations to the greater
picture of US foreign policy making through history, John Mearsheimer and Michael
Lind address the topic of hegemony as it relates to US foreign policy strategy.
Mearsheimer lays out his theory of Offensive Realism in The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. In postulating his theory he attempts to answer two questions: “what causes
states to compete for power” and “how much power do states want.”52 His answer to the
first question is that the structure of the international system of states forces those states
into competition with one another for power for three reasons: first, there is no central
power policing the great powers; second, states invariably maintain “some offensive
military capability;” and third, states fundamentally distrust one another.53 His answer to
the second is that states want as much power as they can gather to themselves, “with
hegemony as their ultimate goal…[and] the best guarantee of [a state’s] survival,”54
which, in turn, is “the primary goal of great powers.”55
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Mearsheimer argues that global hegemony,56 the grand prize in the competition, is
nearly impossible to obtain and maintain, due chiefly to “the stopping power of
water…the difficulty of projecting power across the world’s oceans onto the territory of a
rival great power.”57 The next best thing, he states, is to obtain regional hegemony and
thwart attempts by other great powers to do the same.58 A regional hegemon feels most
secure when it is the only regional hegemon in the world and when other great powers in
close proximity to each other compete with and balance each other - taking the pressure
off the interaction of the regional hegemon with either state – and checking the
hegemonic aspirations of any other great power, reducing the need for the regional
hegemon to intervene.59 The United States, Mearsheimer contends, is the only state in
modern history to attain the lofty position of regional hegemon.60
In The American Way of Strategy, Lind argues that the goal of US foreign policy
has always been to protect American political autonomy and self-determination both
from external and internal influences, “by means of the American way of strategy.”61
The American way of strategy, Lind argues, fuses realism and liberal internationalism
which, when reduced to their fundamental principles, are not antithetical political
traditions.
In a world guided by both liberal internationalism and realism, Lind argues, the
principle of self-determination illegitimatizes empire and decreases “the threat of
international anarchy” thereby reducing the costs of maintaining national security which
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in turn “preserves the American way of life.”62 But the particular brand of American
republican liberalism is best and most easily developed in a peaceful world and, Lind
contends, “[p]eace itself must be created and maintained by power.”63
As both the ideas of empire and of a single-state world offend liberal
internationalist sensibilities, it remains that three realist “patterns of power” are the best
means of creating and maintaining peace: hegemony, both world and regional; concert of
power; and balance of power. Lind contends that the best of those tools is a concert of
power system, in which each world region is responsible for addressing its own issues
through its own economic, military, and political organizations. Regional consensus, he
argues, is much easier to obtain and maintain than world consensus.64 Lind does make
room in his concert of power for what amounts to regional hegemons – greater powers in
each region of influence that lead within their region and protect their region’s interest on
the global stage in concert with other greater powers.65 Lind’s regional leaders are
virtually indistinguishable from Mearsheimer’s regional hegemons, though Lind casts
them in a more idealistic, if not more positive, light.
Lars Schoultz, who writes chiefly of US interaction with Latin America, also
addresses the subject of hegemony as an underlying element of US policy toward the
region. In Beneath the United States, Schoultz argues that four factors color US foreign
policy decisions toward Latin America, as outlined briefly earlier in this chapter: national
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security, domestic politics, economics, and an underlying ethnocentrism.66 He also
argues that regional hegemony became, for US policy makers, a measure of US prestige
and, eventually, of US strength, on the international stage.67 In another text, National
Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America, written before the end of the
Cold War, Schoultz argues that the US’s chief concern “[s]ince the end of World War II”
has been “strategic denial…how to keep the Soviet Union out of Latin America.”68
Strategic denial of the USSR, Schoultz argues, could be seen as part of a larger pattern of
strategic denial rooted in the Monroe Doctrine, going so far as to call that strategic denial
“the Cold War corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.”69 Schoultz does briefly discuss US
involvement in Chile in the 1970s in Beneath the United States,70 but since the State
Department released documents under FOIA’s Chile Declassification Project on US
involvement in Chile after Beneath the United States was published, his knowledge of the
case is imperfect.
Michael Hunt also makes reference to North American Anglo ethnocentrism as a
foundational factor in US policy toward Latin American countries and beyond in
Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. Three distinct pictures of Latin Americans emerged in
the North American Anglo imagination in the 18th and 19th centuries, as depicted in
political cartoons: a dark, uncouth man, “fated to give way before his betters;”71 a
“white maiden” in need of “salvation or seduction;”72 and an ill-tempered and ungrateful
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black child in need of correction.73 The depictions in the political cartoons were reflected
in statements made by North American statesmen who used one or another of these
images to suit their purposes: expansion (the dark male), annexation (the white beauty),
or “the drive for hemispheric preeminence” (the black child).74 At the heart of it all was a
racism based on the simple concept that skin color was a measure of worth – mental,
physical, and social - rooted in Elizabethan attitudes toward black Africans75 which in
turn was “an extension of a variegated pattern of beliefs and practices extending back
millennia and across cultures around the globe.”76
5. Analysis of Chilean Politics During the Allende Regime
Jonathan Haslam, in The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile,
and Nathaniel Davis, in The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, provide excellent
information on what was happening on the ground in Chile during Allende’s presidency.
Haslam, in particular, provides an insightful analysis of the Allende government’s
economic policy and its effect on the Chilean economy. Davis, US Ambassador to Chile
during Allende’s time in office, also provides great insight and interesting observations.
In addition to his own memories, he occasionally provides excerpts from his family’s
journals to illustrate the atmosphere around specific events, such as the March of the Pots
and the coup in 1973. His account of the events on the day of the coup is particularly
gripping. In his discussion of Chile’s internal political and social struggle during
Allende’s time in office, Davis relies heavily on secondary sources, many of which I was
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able to access. Where possible, I have provided citation of those sources in addition to
citing Davis.
6. Observations on American Politics
In American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, Samuel Huntington argues
that Americans are a peculiar people, unique in their devotion to the “American Creed” a value-set established at the founding of the nation. American government, the Creed
states, “should be egalitarian, participatory, open, non-coercive, and responsive to the
demands of individuals and groups.”77 The perceived legitimacy of the US Government
is tied to the degree to which the USG adheres to those principles. Government must be
perceived as legitimate in order to function, but American Government can never achieve
the perfection demanded by the American Creed and is, thus, forever open to charges of
illegitimacy.78
“‘Credibility gaps,’” Huntington writes, “develop in American politics in part
because the American people believe that government ought not to do things it must do in
order to be a government and that it ought to do things it cannot do without undermining
itself as a government.”79 The American polity copes with the gap between American
ideals and the limits of American institutions (the IvI gap, as Huntington calls it) in one
of four ways. When both the “[i]ntensity of belief in ideals,” and “[p]erception of the
gap” are high,80 Americans adopt a moralistic attitude and seek to “eliminate” the gap.
When intensity of belief is low, but perception of the gap is high, Americans “resort to a
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cynical willingness to tolerate the gap.”81 When both intensity of belief and perception
of the gap are low, Americans display a marked complacency, ignoring the gap. When
intensity of belief is high but perception of the gap is low, Americans tend to “deny” the
gap “through an immense effort at ‘patriotic’ hypocrisy.”82
The pattern of periods of intensity of belief in the Creed and awareness of the gap
is cyclical, Huntington argues. Periods of Creedal complacency, then, are necessary in
order for government to function, especially “in response to the need to destroy a
traditional society or to fight against foreign enemies.”83 But those periods of
complacency require a level of cognitive dissonance in the American polity that is not
sustainable. An awareness of that dissonance will inevitably increase until there is a
widespread feeling that the dissonance cannot continue, giving rise to a period of Creedal
Passion when American ideals are highlighted and demands are again placed on
government and society to realign with the Creed.84
VI.

LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS
The study is limited chiefly by the availability of primary documents/sources. I

reconstructed events as well as possible from what has been declassified and made
available to the public with the assistance of the Congressional and CIA reports and
secondary sources. There may, however, be documents in existence that have remained
classified; the information in those documents is out of reach. Also, documentation of
clandestine activity may be purposefully vague to maintain a certain level of deniability.
Many words or lines, at times whole pages, have been redacted to maintain secrecy and
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protect individuals mentioned that might be harmed by a revelation of their involvement.
The occasional vagueness, redactions, and some ambiguity in the interpretation of
“perpetrator testimony,” as discussed above, limited at times my reconstruction of the
course of events.
Additionally, I encountered at times what may be called folk wisdom surrounding
the issue of US policy toward Chile; namely, that Henry Kissinger called Chile “a dagger
pointed at the heart of Antarctica.”85 Many secondary sources use that quote to build
85
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period in American history, creating a unique opportunity for cartographic experimentation.
Harrison was the person most responsible for sensitizing the public to geography in the 1940s….A
public hungry for information about the war tore his maps out of magazines and snatched them off
shelves and, in the process, endowed Harrison himself with the status of a minor celebrity.” See
Susan Schulten, “Richard Edes Harrison and the Challenge to American Cartography,” Imago
Mundi 50 (1998): 174-188.
The maps in Look at the World are fascinating. Harrison turned the world on its end, laid it on its side, and
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“Eight Views of the World,” series. Richard Edes Harrison, Look at the World, 52. You can view several
pages of Look at the World at “The Visual Telling of Stories,” (accessed December 30, 2011),
http://www.fulltable.com/vts/m/map/reh.htm.
What are we to make, then, of the folk wisdom surrounding the quote and its attribution to
Kissinger? I don’t think it is unlikely that he could have made such a statement at some point. He could
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their own arguments and I hoped to use it in mine. I could not however, trace the quote
to its original source. What I did find was much too interesting to leave unaddressed. I
have, thus, incorporated a discussion of that quote and its origin – or lack thereof - in an
appendix to this thesis.
VII.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

My thesis is composed of six chapters. First, this introduction includes the thesis
statement, methods and review of major sources. Chapter Two discusses theories of US
Intervention, Nixon-Kissinger and Ford-Kissinger foreign policy, the various
characteristics of the Nixon and Ford administrations that help to explain the policy
decisions made about intervention in Chile and continued relations with Pinochet despite
the obvious human rights abuses being perpetrated by the new Chilean regime.
Chapter Three briefly examines US involvement in the 1958 and 1964 Chilean
elections and takes an in-depth look at the CIA’s instigation of a coup attempt in 1970.
Also included are a review of Henry Kissinger’s version of the events of 1970, as told in
his memoirs as well as similar claims made by Richard Nixon in RN: The Memoirs of
Richard Nixon.
Chapter Four continues the narrative with an in-depth look at CIA involvement in
the course of events between October 1970 and 11 September 1973. It discusses Nixon’s
and Kissinger’s claims about the extent of US policy makers’ knowledge of and
responsibility for those events.

very well have been familiar with Harrison’s maps and was perhaps adapting a familiar phrase to a new
situation. Whatever the case, it is an interesting example of an apocryphal quotation entering the accepted
body of knowledge on a given subject.
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Chapter Five is a review of events in Washington, mostly following the coup, that
affected US interaction with Chile. It also includes a discussion of the US Government’s
knowledge of Operation Condor and its activities as well as a critique of the Ford
administration’s lack of action in the face of the obvious crimes the organization was
committing. Chapter Five also includes a review of Kissinger’s version of events, as
stated in the third volume of his memoirs, Years of Renewal, as well as a brief review of
President Ford’s discussion of Chile-related events in his own memoirs, A Time to Heal.
I utilized Browning’s perpetrator testimony tests where appropriate in evaluating the
testimony of Kissinger, Nixon, and Ford in Chapters Three through Five.
I reflect in Chapter Six on how best to evaluate US actions in Chile – in terms of
the success or failure to achieve policy goals, the impact on the US Government’s
domestic and international image, or the adherence to the fundamental principles on
which our nation was built, what Huntington calls the “American Creed.” I then consider
the application and implications of Huntington’s argument about the cyclical nature of
American domestic politics to the actions of the US Government in Chile in the early
1970s. I end with some speculations about what the outcome of US policy toward Chile
could have been had policy makers acted differently.
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CHAPTER TWO

FOREIGN POLICY MAKING DURING
THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS:
THEORIES OF US INTERVENTION
“Our main concern…[is that] the picture projected to the
world will be his [Allende’s] success.”86
~Richard Nixon, November, 1970
I.

INTRODUCTION
In order to better understand how the Nixon Administration arrived at the decision

to deepen US involvement in Chile in the 1970s, it is necessary to first explore the
Administration’s policy making process. James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, John
Lewis Gaddis, and Saul Landau generally agree that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger
were the chief architects of US foreign policy during the Nixon Administration.
Kissinger especially attempted to redefine the US approach, pushing for a “philosophical
deepening,” a shift from the pursuit of hegemony to the desire to maintain a balance of
power; the redefinition of “threats,” “interests,” and the relationship between the two; and
the shift from the pursuit of superiority to a pursuit of sufficiency.
Some elements of US foreign policy were carried over from previous
administrations, for example, a re-articulation of the belief of previous US statesmen in
the fundamental inferiority of third world peoples. Those elements were accompanied by
several characteristics unique to the Nixon Administration. Though there is some
disagreement about particulars, William Bundy, Robert Dallek, Gaddis, Landau, and Tim
Wiener agree on four points: that Nixon and Kissinger centralized the policy making
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process;87 that they had an immense concern for the international reputation of the United
States;88 that there was marked inconsistency between the Nixon Administration’s policy
toward the developed powers and policy toward the third world;89 and that the policy
making process changed very little when Ford took office, chiefly due to Henry
Kissinger’s continued control of foreign policy.90 The above noted philosophical
changes, the belief in the inferiority of third world peoples, and characteristics of the
Nixon and Ford Administrations all contributed to US policy toward Chile in the early to
mid 1970s.
I begin this chapter with a discussion of the characteristics of the Nixon and Ford
Administrations that bear on the development of policy toward Chile. A discussion of
alternative interpretations to my own follows, and I conclude with a rearticulation of my
own analysis, based on the themes developed previously in the chapter.
II.

“A PHILOSOPHICAL DEEPENING”
In US Foreign Policy and World Order, Nathan and Oliver note, as Gaddis

suggests in Strategies of Containment, that Kissinger drove the intellectual development
of the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy.91 Gaddis argues that Kissinger believed
that the United States needed a “philosophical deepening” in its policy making. There
87
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were three “prerequisites” necessary for this “deepening.” The first was a recognition
that power has a “multidimensional nature.”92 The three chief dimensions of power were
military, economic, and political. 93 A military loss could be compensated for by an
economic or political gain.94 Provided that the global balance of power remained
unchanged, this broadening of the definition of power allowed for movement away from
“a fixed to a flexible perception of interests” in foreign policy.95
A second prerequisite was a recognition that “conflict and disharmony” were
inevitable and inescapable facets of the international order.96 Pursuing peace would
weaken US resolve to address threats to US stability. Furthermore, a quest for peace
would necessarily lead to a weakening of defenses, and there would always be at least
one state willing to take advantage of those vulnerabilities. The final prerequisite was a
recognition of US limitations. Gaddis quotes Kissinger’s statement that, “No country can
act wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every moment of time.”97 It was
neither possible nor desirable to try to solve all the world’s problems. Restraint must
govern American involvement abroad.98
Nathan and Oliver argue, as does Gaddis, that international stability and
maintaining the balance of power were paramount policy concerns.99 Nathan and Oliver
cite a revealing statement by Kissinger:
“‘Whenever peace – conceived as the avoidance of war - has been the primary
objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the
92
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mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community. Whenever
the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be
compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of
forces was at least conceivable.’”100
For Kissinger, international conflict was an unavoidable aspect of the international order.
Policy makers should work to reduce the possibility of war by striving to establish and
maintain stability, which Kissinger defined as “an equilibrium of forces.”101 Stability
was the “hallmark of successful diplomacy,” and the best means of maintaining stability
was to distribute power among several regional authorities.102
Gaddis also discusses Nixon’s and Kissinger’s redefinition of what constituted a
threat. Previous administrations defined threats in terms of an enemy’s ideology –
ideology predicted behavior. The Nixon Administration began to define threats in terms
of an enemy’s actions – future actions could be predicted by analyzing previous behavior.
Gaddis cites Kissinger’s statement in 1969: “‘[W]e have no permanent enemies…we will
judge other countries, including Communist countries…on the basis of their actions and
not on the basis of their domestic ideology.’”103 It was not, then, the Soviet Union’s
ideology but its “combination of hostility and capability that existed in [its] foreign
policy” that constituted the threat the Soviet Union posed to the United States.104
Gaddis argues as well that Nixon and Kissinger redefined the relationship of
threats and interests. Previous administrations allowed perceived threats to define policy
100
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interests, specifically the threat of communism. As Gaddis observes, “‘Containing
communism’ had become an interest in and of itself, without regard to the precise way in
which communism as a unified force might endanger American security.”105 Nixon and
Kissinger, however, focused on defining what they believed to be the national interest
and then defined as threats that which would jeopardize that interest. This reconceptualization allowed the United States much more freedom in terms of diplomatic
relations with communist countries. “[T]he United States could feasibly work with states
of differing, even antipathetic, social systems as long as they shared the American
interest in maintaining global stability.”106
The Nixon Administration also shifted policy from the unilateral action of
previous administrations and the perpetuation of the existing bi-polar power structure to a
pursuit of tri-lateralism with US allies and a pentagonal, multi-polar balance of power. 107
Kissinger also sought to move away from a need for “superiority” to “sufficiency” in
defense policy. To meet these challenges, Nixon and Kissinger pursued a system of
“shared responsibilities.”108 They believed it was necessary to build a new policy
framework, the major element of which included direct negotiations with the Soviets to
balance strategic power.
The Administration thus pursued détente with the Soviet Union and an opening of
relations with China - China’s growing influence was expected to offset the power of the
Soviet Union109 - and allowed both Western Europe and Japan to strengthen their power
regionally. The combined power of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan (tri105
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lateralism), was to balance the Soviet Union and China, in a pentagonal balance of
power, shown in Figure 2.1, below.110
Figure 2.1 Kissinger’s Pentagonal Balance of Power

The tri-lateral power relationship may be better understood as triangular in nature, as
depicted in Figure 2.2, shown below.
Figure 2.2 Kissinger’s Tri-lateral Power Relationship

It is important to note that though the US recognized that both Western Europe
and Japan could be power centers in their own right, becoming partners with the US in
the balancing of relations with the Soviet Union and China, the power that Western
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Europe and Japan wielded was economic, not military power.111 Kissinger himself said
that “It is wrong to speak of only one balance of power, for there are several which have
to be related to each other…In the military sphere, there are two superpowers [the US and
the Soviet Union]. In economic terms, there are at least five major groupings.
Politically, many more centers of influence have emerged.”112 Gaddis observes that
Nixon described those five major groupings as the countries comprising the pentagonal
power relationship he and Kissinger were pursuing.113
III.

TWO DIFFERENT FOREIGN POLICY CONSTRUCTS
Although the parameters of US foreign policy during this era seem clear, they

were not applied uniformly. The Administration appears to have had two different
foreign policy constructs: one set of policies for the developed powers and another for the
third world.114 The communist ideology the Nixon Administration tolerated in the Soviet
Union and China was not tolerated in the third world. Gaddis notes the Administration’s
policies toward Vietnam, Chile, and Angola as examples.115
There are several possible explanations for the policy inconsistency. One
approach suggests that there may have been a “perceptual lag.” Gaddis summarizes the
theory of other scholars that “Nixon and Kissinger responded to [indigenous
socialist/communist movements in the third world] with the outdated reflexes of the Cold
War, not realizing the extent to which their own policies had made that view of the world
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obsolete.”116 Another possibility was that the third world had become a “testing ground,”
for the willingness of policy makers to act. In The Dangerous Doctrine, Saul Landau
quotes a statement by Richard Nixon in 1970 before the invasion of Cambodia: “It is not
our power, but our will and character, which are being tested tonight.”117 In A Tangled
Web: the Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, William Bundy alludes to
the idea that Kissinger felt that the US was being tested, particularly in September, 1970.
The hijack by “a radical Palestinian group” of two American and one Swiss commercial
planes that were then taken to Jordan,118 “a possible Soviet submarine base in Cuba,”119
and the election of Salvador Allende in Chile “appeared to be simultaneous tests
contrived by the Soviet Union.”120 The Vietnam War and the Mayaguez incident (also in
Cambodia) were other tests that policy makers felt they had to “pass.”121
I am inclined to agree with the “testing ground” argument to an extent, but I
would argue that on a fundamental level, Nixon and Kissinger believed that all nations
were not created equal and, thus, were not entitled to equal consideration in the forming
of US foreign policy. Landau notes the revealing quote by Henry Kissinger that Seymour
Hersh provides in The Price of Power: “[T]he axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to
Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South
[the third world] is of no importance.”122 For Nixon and Kissinger, the nations of the
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world fit into one of three categories: great powers that possessed superior military
strength (the United States and the Soviet Union); lesser powers that exercised influence
through economic or political strength (countries of Western Europe and Japan, among
others); and a final group of nations (the third world) that mattered little in the grand
scheme of things.123
Among this final group there might arise the occasional regional power that the
US could use as a surrogate to exercise influence, as Nathan and Oliver observe. Third
world countries were “objects in a larger game, episodically important, but only insofar
as they impinged upon the traditional focus of the Nixon Doctrine.”124 On the whole,
however, Nixon and Kissinger seemed to see the third world largely as the rabble in need
of control, as evidenced by Kissinger’s statement about the irresponsibility of the Chilean
people in allowing a socialist leader to be elected.125
What Nixon and Kissinger would not tolerate in the third world was the
emergence of a socialist/communist regime that might have altered the “status quo” and
upset the world balance of power that they had worked so hard to promote and
maintain.126 As Gaddis observes: “[E]ach of these [socialist/communist] movements, if
allowed to proceed unopposed, would have produced changes in the status quo that might
have appeared to shift the balance of power.”127 William Bundy makes a similar
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observation: “[Nixon and Kissinger] were open-minded about China and trumpeted their
ability to discern that Nationalist factors outweighed Communist ideology in Sino-Soviet
relations. But in Chile, several Middle Eastern countries, South Asia, and Africa, any
Communist interest meant to them an early Soviet grab for power, at the expense of the
United States.”128 Any movement toward socialism/communism was interpreted as a
threat to US interests, and the administration used covert action, not diplomatic strategy,
to neutralize the socialist/communist threat in Southeast Asia,129 Latin America, and
other minor world regions.130
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL INFERIORITY OF LATIN AMERICANS
Part of the reason for this policy distinction between developed countries and the
third world was the re-articulation of a belief in the fundamental inferiority of third world
peoples. Lars Schoultz has written extensively on the superiority US statesmen have
traditionally felt toward Latin Americans. In Beneath the United States, Schoultz
concerns himself with the larger historical narrative of US foreign policy toward Latin
America. He argues that national security, domestic politics, and economics have always
guided US Latin America policy, but that the foundation of all three factors is the belief
that Latin Americans are essentially an inferior people.131 That fundamental belief,
present in some form since the early years of nationhood, continued to be the lynch-pin of
US foreign policy toward Latin America.132
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Schoultz cites many examples of this belief by key shapers of US foreign policy
in the inferiority of Latin Americans, from Alexander Scott’s observations in 1812 that
“[Venezuelans are] timid, indolent, ignorant, superstitious, and incapable of enterprise or
exertion. From the present moral and intellectual habits of all classes, I fear they have
not arrived at that point of human dignity which fits man for the enjoyment of free and
rational government,”133 to George Keenan’s statement in 1950 that “It seems unlikely
that there could be any other region of the earth in which nature and human behavior
could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the
conduct of human life than in Latin America.”134
What are the sources of this disdain for Latin America and Latin Americans?
Schoultz makes a convincing argument. He compares US sentiments toward Western
Europe to those toward Latin America. “[N]orthwestern Europe,” he argues, is perceived
as culturally sophisticated, economically developed, militarily powerful, and politically
sound (i.e. democratic). Latin America, by contrast, is perceived as culturally unrefined,
economically underdeveloped, militarily weak, and not uniformly democratic.135 In
short, “northwestern Europe [is] the cradle of the dominant North American culture.”136
Latin American culture, perceived as fundamentally different from that of North
Americans, is therefore believed to be fundamentally inferior.
That fundamental inferiority was compounded by the US officials’ hostility
toward Catholics and Catholicism. Schoultz quotes US minister to Peru, Isaac
Christiancy:
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“If there is any one thing for which you and I and the great mass of the American
people ought to be more thankful for than any other, it is that we were not born
and raised under the dominion of the catholic church, which, wherever it prevails,
makes all permanent or settled popular government impossible.”137
Disgust over miscegenation was another facet of the US attitude toward Latin Americans,
as was a dehumanization, contempt, and mistrust of Africans, indigenous people, and
Spaniards. Schoultz notes us proconsul to Latin America Joel Roberts Poinsett’s
comment that miscegenation “‘contributed to render the Mexicans a more ignorant and
debauched people than their ancestors had been.’”138 Schoultz also cites Assistant
Secretary Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson’s comment after his first visit to Latin
America: “What can you expect from the formula for this mixture: the crude brutality of
the African; the stolidity, shiftlessness and craftiness of the Indian; the cruelty and greed
of the Spaniard…”139 The fundamental otherness of Latin Americans, horror of
miscegenation, negative attitudes toward the peoples that populated Latin American
nations - Africans, indigenous people, and the Spanish – all contributed to the disdain of
US officials and the general public toward Latin America.
Michael Hunt makes a similar argument to Schoultz in Ideology and U.S. Foreign
Policy. He differs from Schoultz in that he digs deeper to find the root of Anglo North
American attitudes toward Latin American peoples that influenced US policy toward that
region. Hunt finds that the Elizabethan attitude toward black Africans as a people wholly
inferior to white Europeans140 was easily transferred by Anglo Americans to Native
North Americans. That Elizabethan attitude was itself an “extension” of attitudes toward
race and racial hierarchy that stretched “back millennia and across cultures around the
137
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globe,” as noted in Chapter One.141 The image of the Native American as a savage
provided justification for American expansion into and conquest of Native American
territory. That justification was again transferred to American policy toward “other
peoples,” Latin Americans included.142
In addition to that basic racism, North American attitudes toward the Spanish,
“baggage the English colonists brought to the New World,”143 were applied to Native
South Americans. According to the “black legend,” the Spanish were cruel, Catholic (an
object of harsh criticism in Protestant eyes), and poor governors.144 If the skin color of
Native South Americans wasn’t condemnation enough, colonization by the Spanish
debased them further. “From this [Spanish] legacy derived those qualities that
Americans most often associated with Latinos – servility, misrule, lethargy, and bigotry.”
145

US Statesmen believed that those qualities kept “Latin governments” from operating

as successful republics. Hunt quotes John Randolph, John Quincy Adams, and Thomas
Jefferson:
“You cannot make liberty out of Spanish matter.”146
“[Latin Americans] have not the first elements of good or free government.
Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education,
upon their habits, and upon all their institutions”147
“A priest-ridden people…[incapable of] maintaining a free civil government.”148
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The “black legend” informed both American foreign policy toward Latin America
and public opinion about Latin Americans. According to Hunt, three distinct stereotypes
emerged as the US began to encounter Latin Americans, noted in Chapter One:
-

The Latino as a dark-skinned brute “fated to give way before his betters,”
much like the Anglo American view of Native North Americans149

-

The Latina as a white-skinned “maiden” in need of protection, “salvation or
seduction”150

-

The Latino as a black child,151 “a prodigal and dangerous delinquent”152 in
need of “Uncle Sam’s tutelage and stern discipline”153

These images, as depicted in political cartoons and mirrored in the statements of US
Statesmen, were invoked as justification for policy decisions. The image of the darkskinned brute was useful during the period of American expansion westward into
California and Mexico. The image of the “fair-skinned and comely señorita”154 was
employed “when the times called for saving Latins from themselves or from some
outside threat.”155 The image of the obstinate black child in need of correction was
utilized when US “supposedly benevolent actions” met with “resentment and sullen
defiance.”156
Hunt links those attitudes and images to the development of the Monroe
Doctrine.157 In the context of US relations with Europe, however, James Monroe’s
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message to the US Congress on December 2, 1823 was more clearly connected to the
desire to protect the US from foreign incursion and to protect the budding economic
relationship between the US and its newly independent neighbors to the South.158 With
the restoration of the Spanish monarchy, Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy
Adams, feared that Spain, backed by the Holy Alliance, would attempt to regain control
over their former colonies. In his speech, Monroe stated unequivocally that the US
would brook no trespasses in the Americas:
“[A]s a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are
involved…the American continents, by the free and independent condition which
they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects
for future colonization by any European power…159
A similar statement later in Monroe’s speech does seem to indicate a nascent
possessiveness over Latin America, and it is perhaps from this statement that Michael
Hunt derives his argument that “the ripening claim of the United States to the role of
natural leader and policeman of an American system of states…was embodied in the
Monroe Doctrine.”160 Monroe states:
“With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not
interfered and shall not interfere, but with the Governments who have declared
their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great
consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any
interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other
manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”161
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That possessiveness grew throughout the next eighty years, developed into a paternalistic
attitude toward Latin America, and ultimately led to the Roosevelt Administration’s idea
that the US must necessarily be the policing power in the Americas.162
Concerned once again about European involvement in Latin America, this time
over Britain’s and Germany’s intervention in Venezuela in order to recover debts owed,
Secretary of State and former Secretary of War, Elihu Root, declared that the US “[could
not] ignore [its] duty” and policeman of the hemisphere.163 Venezuela had refused to
play by the rules that governed the interplay between sovereign states. Such conduct
could not, and would not be borne, and none but the US would shoulder the burden of
enforcing those rules, as was its duty.
Roosevelt’s Fourth Annual Message to Congress on December 6, 1904 formally
stated what is known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Portions of the
statement very nearly quote Elihu Root verbatim:
“It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any
projects as regards the other nations of the western Hemisphere save such
as are for their welfare…Any country whose people conduct themselves
well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows
how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political
matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no
interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an
impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized
society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by
some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the
United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States,
however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to
the exercise of an international police power…It is a mere truisim to say
that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to
maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the
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right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of
making good use of it.”164
Roosevelt reiterated those sentiments in his Fifth Annual Message to Congress:
“In some state unable to keep order among its own people, unable to
secure justice from outsiders, and unwilling to do justice to those outsiders
who treat it well, may result in our having to take action to protect our
rights ….We must ourselves in good faith try to help upward toward peace
and order those of our sister republics which need such help. Just as there
has been a gradual growth of the ethical element in the relations of one
individual to another, so we are, even though slowly, more and more
coming to recognize the duty of bearing one another’s burdens, not only as
among individuals, but also as among nations.”165
We can see in Roosevelt’s speeches the possessiveness of the Monroe Doctrine
developing into paternalism. The United States was to be the enlightened teacher and
policeman of the hemisphere, benevolently bestowing favor and assistance to those Latin
American nations that behaved “civilly,” and chastening those that did not. Freedom
required responsibility and those Latin American nations who behaved irresponsibly must
submit to the tutelage and policing of the United States. A similar attitude was also
expressed in the Nixon Administration, as in Kissinger’s observations about the
“irresponsibility” of the Chilean people.166 If the Chileans wouldn’t take care of their
own political problems, the US Government would show them how to do it.
V.

CONCERN FOR PUBLIC IMAGE
Another characteristic of the Nixon Administration was a concern for the public

image of the US. The delicate balance of power depended greatly on the international
community’s perception of US strength, or so both Nixon and Kissinger felt. They were
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thus deeply concerned with the US Government’s international reputation as a great
power. Landau argues that the Nixon Administration sought to maintain the appearance
of great strength to cloak the declining real power of the United States.167 Gaddis
contends that though the Nixon Administration generally rose above ideological
differences with communist nations in favor of preserving the balance of power, “the
administration was not prepared to tolerate further victories for communism…The
dangers of humiliation, of conveying the appearance of weakness to real adversaries,
were too great to permit acquiescence in the triumph even of hypothetical adversaries.”168
He also cites a revealing statement by Henry Kissinger, given to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in 1974: “[while] a decisive advantage is hard to calculate, the
appearance of inferiority – whatever its actual significance – can have serious political
consequences.”169 Nixon and Kissinger were also concerned with the Administration’s
domestic public image. Nathan and Oliver observe that the Nixon Administration was
“almost paranoid” about its public appearance, noting the Administration’s fear of a
right-wing backlash of opinion if the war in Vietnam were lost.170
Lars Schoultz presents a convincing argument about the historical concern for the
reputation of the United States in regard to its relations with Latin America. Schoultz
argues that Latin American countries do not themselves present a threat to national
security. Rather, concerns about national security are based on the fear that strong
nations outside the region may, if allowed to gain control over a portion of the region, use
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Latin America as a base from which to attack or threaten the United States.171 These
concerns have inspired the United States to pursue a policy of “strategic denial” in regard
to Latin America, ensuring that no enemy can gain a foothold in the region. Schoultz is
not the first scholar to make the “strategic denial” argument,172 but he adds the element of
a quest for regional hegemony. Schoultz observes that, once attained, regional hegemony
in Latin America became symbolic as gauge of US status among the international
community. Initially, the concern over maintaining hegemony was linked simply to the
prestige of the United States on the international stage. During the Cold War, this
concern about prestige shifted to a concern over credibility and the appearance of
strength. As Schoultz observes, the “‘loss’ [of regional hegemony] would be interpreted
around the world as a sign of U.S. weakness.”173
John Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics and Michael Lind in
The American Way of Strategy make similar arguments. Mearsheimer argues that,
though world hegemony is “virtually impossible for any state to achieve,”174 great powers
strive to achieve, and then maintain, regional hegemony for the better security of their
states.175 Similarly, Lind argues that “reasonable fear” – the fear that “other great
powers” would pursue tactics that directly or indirectly threaten the security of the United
States inspires the drive to achieve and maintain hegemony.176 Lind also echoes
Mearsheimer in his assertion that global hegemony, were it even attainable, is
unsustainable economically and “sacrifices too much of the liberty of American citizens,”
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as noted in Chapter One. Common to both is the principle that the desire for power

encourages a state to seek a preponderance of regional power when hegemony on a
global scale is unachievable. That principle can certainly be seen in US relations with
Latin America, particularly in light of Schoultz’s analysis. Having achieved regional
hegemony, the maintenance of power was of paramount concern.
Schoultz’s, Mearsheimer’s, and Lind’s arguments lead to the conclusion that US
national security would be jeopardized by the weakening of regional hegemony,
diminishing the perception of US strength and influence. But why would a
democratically elected socialist in Chile constitute such an erosion of hegemony in the
region? It certainly cannot have been due to the way in which Allende came to power.
The USG had committed itself publically to supporting democracy in the Americas and
one cannot dispute that Allende was elected by the people. The USG had also, however,
committed itself to keeping socialism/communism in the Americas from spreading
beyond Cuba, counting the rise of any new socialist/communist government in Latin
America as a gain for the Soviet Union. Having made that commitment, there was little
room for the US to back down from what was necessarily perceived as a challenge.
VI.

CENTRALIZATION OF THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS
In Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, Robert Dallek notes that, “On the

administration’s third day in the office, Henry [Kissinger] began implementing Nixon’s
plan to ensure White House dominance of foreign policy.”178 Kissinger established his
offices in the West Wing’s basement, “from which he could have easy access to the
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president.”179 Decision making was to be centralized. In Legacy of Ashes: The History
of the CIA, Tim Weiner cites Richard Helms in a 1988 interview between Helms and Dr.
Stanley I. Kutler: “Richard Nixon never trusted anybody.”180 Helms went on to complain
that Nixon had no confidence in the competency of the various departments and agencies
at his disposal, including the Air Force, the State Department, and the CIA.181 Weiner
also cites Thomas Hughes’s comment that “Both [Nixon and Kissinger] were incurably
covert.” Bundy notes Nixon’s “unshakeable bent to deceive,” and that “[Nixon’s] taste
for acting secretly was obsessive.”182
Gaddis offers an explanation that goes beyond personality - that centralization
was necessary in order to achieve the Administration’s foreign policy objectives: “To a
remarkable extent, they succeeded [in achieving their goals], but only by concentrating
power in the White House to a degree unprecedented since the wartime administration of
Franklin D. Roosevelt.” 183 Saul Landau maintains that in order to limit opposition to his
policy decisions, Nixon created a “private national security apparatus” that bypassed the
established bureaucracy which continued to view the Cold War in rigid ideological terms.
“Nixon created a special finance committee with its own funds, the Finance Committee to
Reelect the President, headed by commerce secretary Maurice Stans, a White Housecontrolled political grouping independent of the Republican party…and, finally, a secret
foreign policy apparatus headed by Kissinger and designed to circumvent the clumsy and
stagnant national security bureaucracy.”184 Weiner himself argues that, “[Nixon and
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Kissinger] had reached an understanding: they alone would conceive, command, and
control clandestine operations.”185 Centralization allowed Nixon and Kissinger to realize
their policy goals by streamlining decision making and limiting dissent.
Kissinger acknowledges Nixon’s desire to work around the bureaucracy in his
memoirs,186 a notion he himself found not only attractive but necessary. In “Bureaucracy
and Policy Making: The Effect of Insiders and Outsiders on the Policy Process,” an essay
presented at UCLA in 1968, Kissinger argues that the bureaucratic process leads to
fragmented policy, isolation of executives from the information they need to make
decisions, as well as reliance on “experts” that may manipulate the information on which
a decision is made and on “administrative consensus” in decision making rather than an
executive’s own reasoning and conviction.
He also argues that it is virtually impossible for policy makers to “plan ahead”
and address future policy decisions because they spend the majority of their time
addressing existing problems. The bureaucratic policy making process becomes so
arduous that once a decision is made and policy is put into action, it is very difficult to
revisit the issue. Furthermore, the difficulties of working within the bureaucracy cause
some executives to limit decision making to a very small group, not open to the scrutiny
of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, in those cases, continues to operate in ignorance,
“sending out cables” inconsistent with actual policy because they know no better.187 That
is exactly the scenario that developed as Nixon and Kissinger centralized the policy
making process, particularly in regard to Chile policy. Nixon and Kissinger were firmly
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in the driver’s seat of the policy making process while the Department of State, Edward
Korry, and his staff at the US Embassy continued in ignorance, “sending out cables”
inconsistent with the Administration’s objective.
VII.

DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECTING US POLICY TOWARD CHILE

Both Landau and Schoultz note that the various military entanglements in which
the US had been involved during the Cold War had reduced public support for overt
military action.188 Support for the Korean War fluctuated between 50 and 80 percent
throughout the early 1950s.189 Support for the Vietnam War also fluctuated slightly, but
generally decreased between the mid 1960s and early 1970s, reaching an all time low of
40 percent in January 1973. It is important to note that dissatisfaction with the Vietnam
War slightly decreased between 1969 and 1970, but began to increase again in the second
half of 1970, a critical period in US efforts in Chile.190 With public support for large
scale conflict increasingly strained by the Vietnam War, it was unlikely there would be
much support for additional overt military action elsewhere.
Economic resources were also strained. The world economy in the 1970s was in
recession and the United States was not unaffected.191 Important to note are the decrease
in GDP growth and increase in inflation during some key years of US action in Chile.
The 3.1 annual percent change in GDP between 1968 and 1969 drooped to 0.2% between
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1969 and 1970; the inflation rate increased to 5.7%. GDP experienced negative growth
between 1973 and 1974; inflation jumped to 11% in the same period, the highest rate in
the decade between 1965 and 1975 (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3 US Economic Indicators, 1965-1976
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Additionally, the unemployment rate, which had remained fairly stable between
1967 and mid 1969, climbed to 6.1% in December 1970, a seventy-four percent increase
from December of the previous year. Unemployment remained close to 6.0% throughout
1971.192
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Figure 2.4 US Unemployment Rate, August 1969 to December 1971
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Covert action thus became increasingly attractive as a tool for implementing
policy: it was cheap, compared to large scale military action; it was efficient (maximizing
results with reduced means); and it was, by nature, secret – the public didn’t have a
chance to dissent. This movement toward the use of covert action was an existing policy
trend, noted by some scholars as beginning as a result of the Korean War in the 1950s.194
Others note that low-level violence became ever more appealing after the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962.195 Whenever the trend began, it was only exacerbated by the war in
Vietnam.196
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The CIA is exempt from disclosing budget information under the Freedom of
Information Act,197 so it is impossible to compare total CIA spending to total military
spending during the Cold war. We can, however, compare spending on CIA activities in
Chile198 to spending on two major military conflicts during the Cold War: the Korean
War and the Vietnam War. To achieve its goal in Korea, the US government spent $30
billion,199 deployed 326,683 men in 1951 and did not decrease that number until 1954,
when troop deployment dropped to 225,590.200 The Korean War resulted in 36,574 US
in-theater deaths.201 In Vietnam, the US government spent $111 billion,202 deployed
537,000 troops in 1968, the greatest number of troops deployed to Vietnam between 1950
and 1974,203 and lost 58,220 soldiers in-theater.
By comparison, to achieve its goal in Chile, the US Government spent just over
$6 million, decreased troop deployment to Chile to 29 troops in 1971, and lost no soldiers
in combat. There is no way to tell how many CIA operatives were involved in the
Santiago Station’s activities, though it is certain that the number is far below that of troop
deployment during the Korean and Vietnam Wars; perhaps in the hundreds, perhaps less.
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Clearly, using the CIA to achieve a policy goal was significantly cheaper, and more
efficient, using fewer US human resources than larger-scale military conflict.
In addition to the lower costs, there were also fewer political risks associated with
this strategy. Since, as we shall see in Chapter Three, knowledge of the CIA’s more
sensitive activities in Chile was limited to very few individuals outside the Agency, there
was little chance for the larger policy making community, let alone the public, to dissent.
There were, after all, several precedents for successful CIA intervention in
another nation’s politics. In 1953, the CIA successfully manipulated the political
situation in Iran that eventually resulted in the coup that removed Prime Minister
Mohammad Mossadeq from power.204 Immediately following the coup in Iran, the CIA
turned their attention on the Jacobo Arbenz government in Guatemala. After weeks of
psychological warfare and violence, Arbenz stepped down on June 27, 1954.205
The Kennnedy Administration authorized the disastrous attempted invasion on
Cuba in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs, organized by the CIA, 206 and urged the Agency in 1962
to build an intelligence network in Cuba through which they could affect the demise of
the Castro regime.207 Though the Bay of Pigs debacle cannot be counted as a successful
intervention, it nevertheless set important precedent. The CIA was also involved with the
1963 coup in South Vietnam that toppled the Diem regime.208 Moreover, the CIA had
lately been successful in its covert action program in influence the 1964 presidential
election in Chile. Covert action was an excellent means of quietly addressing situations
potentially embarrassing to the reputation of the US, such as the rise of a second
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communist state in Latin America, a region over which the US had traditionally enjoyed
a comfortable political and military dominance.
VIII. FOREIGN POLICY MAKING DURING THE FORD ADMINISTRATION
Gaddis and Landau agree that the Ford Administration did not break significantly
with the foreign policy doctrine Nixon and Kissinger had formed. Though he does not
discuss the Ford Administration at length, Gaddis does note that Kissinger remained in
charge of foreign policy, which helped to keep the “fundamental elements” of NixonKissinger foreign policy intact.209 In The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and
American Foreign Policy, Jussi Hanhimäki observes that, “Ford was convinced that
Kissinger was a genius. As a result, the running of foreign policy tilted even further into
Kissinger’s hands after August 9, 1974.”210
Landau argues that President Ford and Kissinger, who remained Secretary of
State, continued to pursue détente in practice while using anticommunist rhetoric
publically as a basic US national security policy. Under Ford, US policy makers
“exported” the idea of national security as the paramount policy concern to third world
nations; Landau uses as an example the formation of Operation Condor by the Southern
Cone countries with the blessing and assistance of the United States.211
Under the Ford Administration, chief foreign policy makers, along with the CIA
and other intelligence gathering institutions, underwent great scrutiny by three different
investigative committees: the Rockefeller Commission, Church Committee, and Pike
Committee. But the investigations of all three committees, especially the Church
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Committee, had a greater effect on the Administration’s public rhetoric about foreign
policy than its actual policy. The curious discrepancy between public rhetoric and policy
practice had been present while Nixon was in a power, but it was deepened as a result of
the investigations and the subsequent increase in Congressional oversight of US covert
action.212 As noted in Chapter One, Landau observes that “[a]t the same time that Ford
and Kissinger parleyed with the Soviets and Chinese, they continued to foster
dictatorship throughout the Third World.”213 Henry Kissinger’s speech to the OAS in
June, 1976,214 and his private conversation with General Augusto Pinochet prior to the
speech is an excellent example. Kissinger jealously guarded his control over the policy
making process and, though forced to pay public lip service to human rights in his
speech, he affirmed US support of the Pinochet’s government in private.215
IX.

ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
How does the above discussion help us understand why Nixon and Kissinger

pursued a deepened involvement in Chilean politics in the early 1970s? What was the
motivation for US action in Chile? There are several competing hypotheses: that it was
merely traditional US anti-communist ideology that served as the impetus for action; that
the CIA was a rogue institution, acting of its own accord; that the US was promoting
democracy in Chile by supporting opposition political parties; that US economic interests
were jeopardized by Allende’s rise to power. Other arguments highlight the potential that
US domestic politics, ethnocentrism, and a quest for hegemony played a role. US
national security interests are also cited, as socialist/communist governments in Latin
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America posed a threat to national security. Finally, one scholar argues that US action in
Chile in the 1970s was the natural outgrowth of CIA intervention in the 1960s. I discuss
my own interpretation in detail in the concluding section of this chapter.
It is tempting to explain away US involvement in Chile in the 1970s by attributing
the impetus for action to anti-communist ideology. On the surface, this seems to be a
logical argument; it fits in nicely with generalizations about US foreign policy during the
course of the Cold War. We have already discussed the “philosophical deepening” of
foreign policy that developed during the Nixon Administration, part of which was the
movement away from ideological motivations as the source of any policy decision.
Salvador Allende’s offense was not simply that he was a socialist.
The language we find, however, in the documentary record is peppered with
references to socialism and communism. We cannot, therefore, fully dismiss the idea that
ideology played some role in the decision to intervene in Chile. Indeed, it may be
evidence of the US ethnocentric attitude toward Latin America that precluded US policy
makers from extending the same considerations they gave to the governments and
peoples of great powers to the governments and peoples of Latin America.
Another possible interpretation of US intervention in Chile is that the CIA was a
rogue institution acting without the approval of a higher authority. After the CIA’s
activities in Chile, among other matters, were exposed by Seymour Hersh in a series of
articles in the New York Times, both Representative Otis Pike and Senator Frank Church
suspected that the CIA was acting without a government mandate. Each went on to chair
a committee (the Pike Committee and the Church Committee) to investigate that charge
and other concerns about the way in which the US Intelligence Community (IC) went
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about its business.216 The documents made available through the Chile Documentation
Project, however, show, as the Church Committee ultimately concluded, that though the
40 Committee may not have been in control of CIA operations in Chile, the executive
branch was directing the CIA’s activities.217 Henry Kissinger claims in his memoirs that
at one point the CIA did act without the authority of the executive branch, but the
documents available do not support his claim, as I discuss in Chapter Three.218
Kissinger also claims that US policy makers desired only to promote democracy.
He argues that it was our responsibility to intervene to support the “democratic
counterweight” to Allende.219 This seems to me an empty claim. The US, via the CIA,
did funnel support to El Mercurio, a newspaper the CIA had used extensively as an outlet
for their anti-Allende propaganda campaign, and to the PDC (Partido Demócrata
Cristiano), an opposition political party to Allende, as it had done in Europe after World
War II in efforts to keep communist candidates from winning elections.220 But, as I
discuss later in this thesis, US policy makers’ motives for action in Chile were neither so
noble, nor so simple as supporting democracy.221
Furthermore, Allende was himself a democratically elected president. His
government generally operated within constitutional parameters giving him quite limited
authority. Furthermore, Allende did not have a firmly established popular mandate. A
document dated January 3, 1970 observes that “Chileans have a pathologic fear of a
216

Gerald K. Haines, “The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA: Looking for a Rogue
Elephant,” Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, (accessed January 2, 2011),
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/
winter98_99/art07.html.
217
“Church Report,” 52. Chapters Three, Four, and Five of this thesis discuss the documents
mentioned.
218
Kissinger, White House Years, 675-676.
219
Ibid, 659.
220
Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 29-33.
221
See Chapter Four.

65
‘Communist Government’ but are easily lulled by a benign concept such as Popular
Unity...”222 As Allende had won only a plurality in the 1970 election and his coalition
represented only a minority in Congress, he was bound to be plagued by opposition
forces that would more than likely have kept his plans for a communist revolution in
Chile in check. How then could he have represented a threat to democracy at home or a
threat to regional stability in Latin America? US policy makers had little need to
intervene to buttress the “democratic counterweight” to the Allende regime.
Lubna Qureshi argues in Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende that the impetus for action
in Chile was protection of US business interests, 223 “threatened by…President Salvador
Allende’s expropriation policies in Chile.”224 Lars Schoultz would agree that economic
interests at least played a partial role in the actions of the US government, as they have in
other US policy decisions regarding Latin America.225 Certainly the scandal over the
alleged use of funds from the International Telephone and Telegraph Company to finance
CIA operations in Chile demonstrates that US businesses operating in Chile were
concerned about the direction in which Allende would take the country. 226 In the case of
ITT, however, US policy makers were unwilling to strongly associate with the
corporation. Policy makers allowed the CIA Station in Santiago to assist the corporation
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in making the connections that would help ITT funnel money to the candidate it was
supporting, but policy makers would not allow the CIA to be the funnel, as ITT had
requested.227 US corporate concerns, at least, did not appear to be a strong enough
impetus for involvement. Kissinger himself denies that economic interests influenced
policy. The greatest policy concern, he claims, was US security interests.228 But though
business interests were not the reason policy makers decided to intervene, economics
certainly figured into the decision to use covert means instead of overt military
intervention. The budget deficit resulting from the billions wasted in the unsuccessful
Vietnam War reduced the monetary resources the Nixon Administration had at its
disposal. As discussed above, covert action was cheaper and more efficient than large
scale military intervention.
Kissinger himself cites security interests as a major reason for intervention in
Chile. A third world communist state was open to Soviet influence and a potential base
from which to launch an attack on the US or its allies. The existence of a second
communist/socialist government in Latin America was a frightening prospect. “Allende,”
Kissinger writes in his memoirs, wanted to establish an “irreversible dictatorship and a
permanent challenge to our position in the Western Hemisphere.”229 He argues that the
chance of Allende and Chile igniting a communist revolution in Latin America was
greater than that of Cuba because Chile was part of the mainland of the continent.230 He
also argues that there is evidence to suggest that Allende wanted to create a training
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ground for revolutionaries in Chile.231 Chile, therefore, presented a viable threat to US
national security. Kissinger’s claims in White House Years lead ultimately to the
argument that he was afraid of the domino effect.232 But Kissinger had earlier stated that
Chile was of very little strategic importance in the grand scheme of world politics.233 In
fact, until it seemed a strong possibility that Allende might be elected president of Chile,
neither Nixon nor Kissinger appeared, from the documentary record, to be overly
concerned about events in Chile.
Finally, Kristian Gustafson argues that US involvement in Chile was one long
campaign from 1958 to 1976; US policy under the Nixon Administration was simply part
of the perpetual motion of the covert action machine in Chile. There are merits to that
argument – he accomplishes his purpose of providing an analysis of covert action policy
from which he derives practical suggestions for the future use of covert action. But that
analysis does not explain the violence of Nixon’s response to news that Salvador Allende
might very well win the election. Whether the US Government via the CIA had been
involved previously in Chile or not, I contend that the Nixon Administration would still
have intervened. Existing CIA operations in Chile were simply a convenient mechanism
for enacting policy.
X.

CONCLUSION
What, then, explains the Nixon Administration’s involvement in Chile? It is

helpful here to return to themes outlines in the first Strategic Calculations table from
Chapter One.234 Nearly every scholar of foreign policy during the Nixon Administration
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notes that there was marked inconsistency between policies of détente and more open
relations with the established and emerging communist powers, on the one hand, and
policies toward the third world, which appeared to be characterized by rigid Cold War
anti-communism, on the other. Why did Chile become one of those “episodically
important” nations of which James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver write? I would argue
that a re-articulation of traditional US ethnocentrism toward Latin America, which
defined Latin America as incapable of managing its own affairs and in need of US
direction, gave policy makers a sense that they had the right, perhaps even the duty, to
intervene.
For all Nixon’s and Kissinger’s willingness to pursue détente with the Soviet
Union and open relations with China, they had little respect for the Chilean people’s right
to govern themselves. With little respect for Chileans’ right to elect leaders of their
choice, the situation in Chile could be interpreted as simply another test of US resolve.
Would policy makers rise to the challenge and prevent another communist state from
emerging in Latin America? Chile did not, itself, pose a security threat.
Because the US had publicly defined the Chilean left as an enemy, however, the
election of Allende would send a signal to US allies and enemies alike that the US was
losing its influence over Latin America, a blow to the prestige of the United States and a
possible invitation to enemy states to set up shop very close to home; too close for
comfort. Chile became one of those “episodically important” nations because political
developments in Chile threatened to destabilize the world balance of power, the
maintenance of which was Nixon’s and Kissinger’s chief goal. That blow to US prestige
was a concern in itself, considering the Nixon Administration’s obsession with its public
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image on the international stage. As real power was reduced for lack of resources, the
appearance of strength was of the utmost importance in deterring aggression and
maintaining the world balance of power. Together these themes gave rise to the notion
that we should be involved in Chile.
Domestic politics played a role in determining the means employed to achieve the
Nixon Administration’s goal. As Schoultz argues, the attitudes and pressures of the
voting public and of the US Congress affect the way policy decisions toward Latin
America are made. In the case of Chile, public attitudes toward the Vietnam War, the
Watergate scandal, and later the Congressional intelligence investigations all affected US
policy toward Chile. Additionally, the Administration was afraid of the political
ramifications of acting in violation of principles they supported in public statements –
“self-determination and respect for free election.”235 Those factors, coupled with reduced
resources, as discussed in section VII of this chapter, made covert action via the CIA an
attractive option for implementation of policy.
Furthermore, the centralization of the policy making process limited dissent and
made possible a more proactive approach than the 40 Committee had been willing to
take. One might argue that welcoming dissenting voices in the policy process would not
necessarily have produced different results, but, as detailed further in Chapter Three, had
the 40 Committee remained in control of policy, the death of Schneider could potentially
have been avoided and the choice of the Chilean Congress may have been different. We
cannot know whether the Chilean Congress would have chosen Allende had there been
no attempted coup, but the death of General Schneider, which Chilean Congressmen
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blamed on radical right-wing groups, hardened their resolve not to be influenced and to
choose the left-wing candidate to spite the radical right-wing actors.
Beyond the Allende problem, why did the Ford Administration, and Kissinger
specifically, persist in supporting the Pinochet regime despite numerous reports of the
Chilean Government’s human rights abuses? As I suggested in Chapter One, it may be
better to ask why the Ford Administration did not intervene when both domestic and
international pressure groups thought it not only appropriate but necessary for the US to
do so. The history of US involvement in Chile in the 1960s and early 1970s shows that
policy makers were clearly not averse to intervening in Chile’s internal politics. What,
then, could be the reason?
The strategic calculations that influenced the perceived need to intervene in the
early 1970s were mirrored in the factors contributing to US continued support of the
Pinochet regime. It is helpful here, as well, to return to the themes of the second
Strategic Calculations table from Chapter One.236 Kissinger’s primary concern
throughout his career as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State was that the
delicate balance of power he worked so diligently to establish not be compromised. The
Pinochet government was conservative and therefore, in contrast to the Allende regime,
was not a threat to that balance. Furthermore, Pinochet’s government was friendly to the
US Government and thereby open to US influence, leaving traditional US ethnocentric,
paternalistic feathers unruffled. Finally, as the Government of Chile was once again
underneath the protective wing of the United States, the Pinochet regime presented no
challenge to the perception of US strength on the international stage. In Kissinger’s eyes,
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there was little incentive to censure Pinochet when all of Kissinger’s and Nixon’s fears
about the Allende government had been assuaged with the September 11 coup.
But pressure from the US Congress and the international community to address
the issue of human rights with Pinochet’s regime required a response. Kissinger, who
remained in control of foreign policy during Ford’s presidency reverted to the practice,
characteristic of the Nixon Administration, of publically stating one policy while
pursuing exactly the opposite behind closed doors. Kissinger thus paid public lip service
to the human rights cause, most notably in his speech to the OAS in June 1976. In
private, however, he told Pinochet that nothing really had changed. The documentary
record, discussed at length in the following chapters, provides a narrative in which the
above themes can be seen in action.
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CHAPTER THREE
BUILD-UP TO A COUP
“The problem is how to bring about his downfall.”
~ Undersecretary of State John N. Irwin, II,
November 6, 1970237
I.

INTRODUCTION
Though Allende had been defeated in three previous presidential elections - 1952,

1958 and 1964 - he was chosen to represent the Unidad Popular in 1970. Jorge
Alessandri represented the conservative National Party. Radomiro Tomic represented the
Christian Democrats. Not long into the race, the CIA considered Alessandri the only
viable opposition to Allende; Tomic simply did not have enough support. On election
day in September, Allende received the plurality, 36.3% of the vote. The Chilean
Constitution required that the decision for the presidency be sent to congress when no
candidate received a clear majority of the vote; their decision, then, was between the top
two candidates, Allende and Alessandri. Traditionally, Congress chose the candidate the
received the greatest percentage of the popular vote. The CIA pulled out all the stops, on
Nixon’s orders, to keep that from happening.
In the months preceding the election, CIA operations in Chile eventually
developed into two “Tracks,” discussed in detail in this chapter. Very briefly, Track I
involved money spent to influence the election politically – an anti-Allende propaganda
campaign and the attempted bribing of Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende if
the decision went to Congress. Track II, at Nixon’s request, involved goading the
military into action against Allende. Track I was reviewed and sanctioned by the 40
Committee in the Department of State, with the knowledge of Edward Korry, then US
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Ambassador to Chile, and others in the larger policy making body. Knowledge of Track
II was much more limited. Only Nixon, Kissinger, a few close advisors, and the CIA
were aware of Track II.
Pulling the essential information out of literally thousands of documents to create
a coherent narrative of the evolution of US policy toward Chile and the progression of
CIA operations in the lead up to the election is no easy task. But, as I reviewed the
documentation of US actions in Chile covering the period between January and October
of 1970, several patterns or themes emerged. The first point of interest was that though I
knew Henry Kissinger to be a member of first the 303 Committee and later the 40
Committee, he did not seem to be the driving force behind policy toward Chile until midsummer 1970 when it became apparent that the election of Salvador Allende was a
distinct possibility. Likewise, there is very little documentation about President Nixon’s
hand in US foreign policy toward Chile until September 1970.
The decline of Ambassador Edward Korry’s influence is another trend I noted. In
early 1970, the 40 Committee and the CIA greatly valued Korry’s opinion. Thomas
Powers notes that Korry had assisted the CIA with a delicate problem early on in his time
as Ambassador to Chile, and enjoyed a cordial working relationship with the CIA Station
in Santiago.238 But as 1970 progressed, Korry failed to deliver on his promise to bring
Chilean President Eduardo Frei into line with US plans, and as Korry’s reporting became
increasingly long-winded and erratic, confidence in the Ambassador’s assessment of
developments in Chilean politics and his estimation of US ability to influence the
elections waned.
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Another theme I observed was that policy makers from the various agencies,
many of which fed into the 40 Committee, had widely disparate views of what the US
position should be toward Chile. As a result, policy was significantly more cautious at
the beginning of 1970 than it became after Nixon’s September 15 meeting, which
resulted in the establishment of Track II of covert action in Chile. The caution of the
303 Committee, and later the 40 Committee, may have undermined the success of US
plans for keeping Allende out of power, as Kissinger himself argues in his memoirs.
It was Nixon’s consternation over what he felt was insufficient coordination and
resolve on the part all the agencies involved in US efforts in Chile that led to the
centralization of decision making about Chile, reflective of the general trend of the Nixon
Administration’s foreign policy process. When Nixon and Kissinger centralized decision
making on action in Chile, policy making became stronger, more decisive, and more
cohesive. The dissenting voices that had limited action in Chile were cut out of the
process. It was by then, however, too late for Track II to succeed in keeping Allende out
of power. But CIA Headquarters remained positive. After Allende’s inauguration, CIA
headquarters cabled to the CIA Station in Santiago encouraging the Station that though
the goal of keeping Allende out of power had not been realized, they were nearer to
goading the military into action than they had been just a few short months before.
II.

THE UNITED STATES IN CHILE, 1958 TO 1970
I expected to find evidence that the CIA had been involved in the Chilean

elections in 1958, in which Salvador Allende lost to Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez.239
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What I found was little mention and no evidence of such involvement. According to
Peter Kornbluh, the CIA did not become involved in Chilean politics until after the 1958
election. Kornbluh argues that Allende’s near win in 1958 prompted the Kennedy
Administration to intervene in Chile.240 Kristian Gustafson echoes Kornbluh in Hostile
Intent.
“The shock of Allende’s strong campaign in 1958…was doubly sharp because it
was unexpected…During the 1958 election campaign, the United States, for the
first time since the 1879-84 War of the Pacific, had to pay close attention to Chile
because from seemingly out of nowhere the Communist-Socialist popular front
under Senator Allende had become poised – perhaps – for a win. What was going
on?”241
What was going on, Gustafson argues, was that “Chile had changed.”242 While wealth
grew, so did the gap between the rich and the poor. Roughly one third of the Chilean
population held the majority of the wealth.243 “[S]ocial stratification and inequitable
wealth distribution contributed to the rise of a number of Marxist parties such as the
Socialists and Communists.”244
The US responded by supporting Chile’s political center. Gustafson notes that
Walter Howe, US Ambassador to Chile in 1958 suggested that “the political pendulum
has swung as far to the right in Chile as it is likely to go, and that the return swing is
likely to be evidenced in…the presidential election of 1964.”245 The country’s strong
democratic tradition made Chile the perfect poster child for the Kennedy
Administration’s Alliance for Progress, a massive campaign to encourage democracy in

Left in Chile,” The Socialist Register 6 (1969): 226, http://socialistregister.com/index.php/
srv/article/view/5285/2186.
240
Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 3.
241
Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 20-21.
242
Ibid, 21.
243
Ibid, 21.
244
Ibid, 21.
245
Walter Howe in Gustafson, Hostile Intent, 23.

76
Latin America through “social and economic support.”246 With the strength of the
political left’s campaign for the 1958 election, the upcoming 1964 presidential election
became symbolically important as a gauge of the strength of Chile’s democracy and the
success of the Alliance for Progress’s program.247
In April, 1962, the Administration began funneling money to Christian Democrats
in order to accomplish three goals: “(1) To Deprive the Chilean Communist Party of
Votes…(2) To Achieve a Measure of Influence Over Christian Democratic Party
Policy…[and] (3) To Foster a Non-Communist Coalition.”248 Further support was
approved in August 1963.249 A political action program was finalized in December 1963
by the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA.250 Christian Democratic Candidate
Eduardo Frei Montalva’s campaign members requested in March 1964 that the US donate
$1 million to the campaign in order to meet the campaign budget. The Special Group –
precursor to the 303 Committee – approved the amount on April 2 with a provision that
the funding source “would be inferred” without revealing US involvement. 251 The
Special Group increased funding in May and again in July, 1964.252 All told, “[t]he CIA
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spent a total of $2.6 million directly underwriting the campaign…[and] an additional $3
million was spent on anti-Allende propaganda activities.”253
In addition to monetary support of the opposition, the CIA conducted a “massive”
propaganda campaign both within Chile and abroad. Two committees were set up, one in
Washington, DC and one in Santiago, to manage action in Chile. The Washington group
included “Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; the
Western Hemisphere Division Chief of the CIA, Desmond Fitzgerald; Ralph Dungan and
McGeorge Bundy from the White House; and the Chief of the Western Hemisphere
Division Branch Four, the branch that has jurisdiction over Chile.” 254 The Santiago
group included “the Deputy Chief of Mission, the CIA Chief of Station, and the heads of
the Political and Economic Sections, as well as the Ambassador.”255 US efforts were
rewarded when Frei won the election in 1964 with a “clear majority.”256
Though the CIA had itself doubted the effect its covert action program was
having on the presidential race, its confidence was boosted by Frei’s win.257 Gustafson
argues that US involvement in the 1964 election set an important precedent for the US
Government: “The U.S. Government…showed in general an acceptance of the idea that
the damage done to Chile by its intervention was less than the potential damage of an
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elected Marxist government.”258 It also established the USG’s relationship with the PDC
which continued into the early 1970s.259
Gustafson notes that Edward Korry brought the idea of involvement in the 1969
Chilean congressional election to the CIA in “late 1967 or early 1968.”260 The CIA
“formally suggested” involvement in May 1968. The CIA believed that involvement in
the 1969 congressional election was an important element in setting the stage for the
1970 presidential election. But, Gustafson argues, the action plan for influencing the
congressional election was “haphazard and progressed without clear executive
direction.”261 The DOS, US Embassy in Santiago, and the CIA all had different ideas
about how best to approach influencing the election. Furthermore, departments involved
in developing an action plan displayed a basic lack of understanding of Chilean politics.
Rather than support congressional candidates from more conservative parties, both the
CIA and Korry championed support of the PDC, despite evidence that the PDC was
leaning steadily leftward. Gustafson argues that support of the PDC actually undermined
the goal of US policy toward Chile by drawing votes away from more conservative
congressional candidates whose politics were more closely aligned with the US goal of
“keep[ing] the Marxists from power.”262
As the CIA and policy makers planned their approach to the next election in 1970,
they proceeded with a fair amount of caution. US involvement in the campaigning
process was limited to anti-Allende propaganda; the CIA was not authorized to endorse
or give support, financially or otherwise, to any particular candidate. On January 30,
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1970, several individuals from various Department of State offices devoted to North and
South American affairs, US Ambassador to Chile Edward M. Korry, William V. Broe,
CIA Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, and two or three more individuals whose
names have been redacted from the document held a meeting to discuss what suggestions
for CIA action in Chile should be presented to the 303 Committee.263 Several months
earlier, the 303 Committee had decided to hold off on any decision about Chile until the
Chilean parties had decided on their candidates.264 There was some talk of prominent
literary figure Pablo Neruda265 as a possible candidate in the Chilean election, but
Ambassador Korry thought that Neruda’s nomination was unlikely. The other three
candidates discussed at the meeting were eventually nominated by Chileans to represent
their parties in the 1970 election: Alessandri (PN), Tomic (PDC), and Allende (UP).
There was also some discussion about whether or not the US should throw its
support behind either Alessandri or Tomic. At that time Ambassador Korry discouraged
such action. Ironically, Korry’s reason for cautioning against supporting Alessandri was
that he felt Alessandri would “[bring] on a military government,” which, Korry argued,
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was “not in the ideal interest of the United States.”266 Korry gave three reasons the US
should not support Tomic, the second of which has been redacted:
“[F]irst, the PDC does not want [help from the United States], and that helping
them would hurt us [the US], for he feels that [redacted] and thirdly, a good case
could not be made for helping the PDC... a Tomic government would do a
number of things repugnant to the U.S., at which point the U.S. Government
would ask, why did we help Tomic?”267
Over the next few months, the CIA was unable to determine with certainty the
candidate most likely to receive a majority of the votes in the Chilean general election. In
March of 1970 the CIA reported that Alessandri was confident that he would carry more
than 50 percent of the popular vote; Frei, however, was concerned that Allende and
Alessandri would receive approximately the same number of votes.268 Interestingly,
though Alessandri was initially expected to be the front runner, a preliminary CIA report
dated January 1, 1970, predicted fairly accurately – though at that point, merely one of
several possibilities - the Chilean Congress’s election of Allende: A few months later,
the CIA predicted that Allende’s support would only grow.269
As the year progressed, plans for action in Chile developed into Project FUBELT,
a two-track plan to keep Allende out of power, outlined briefly in the introduction to this
chapter. According to Peter Kornbluh, director of the Chile Declassification Project at
The George Washington University’s National Security Archives, “FU was the CIA’s
designated cryptonym for Chile; BELT appeared to infer the political and economic
strangulation operations the CIA intended to conduct to assure Allende never reached
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Chile’s presidential office.”270 Track I, the chiefly political solution to the problem in
Chile, overseen by the 40 Committee, was divided in to two “Phases,” as recommended
by Ambassador Korry. Phase 1 was a plan to increase money spent on anti-Allende
propaganda.271 Phase 2, as both the writers of the Church Report and Peter Kornbluh
show, was a plan to bribe Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende, if the popular
election did not decide the presidency;272 Kornbluh specifies that the Congressmen to be
bribed were members of the PDC.273 Track II was the military solution to the problem in
Chile. Track II developed in response to President Nixon’s mandate to the CIA to
“prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him”274 by any means necessary.
The Departments of State and Defense and Ambassador Korry and his staff were
specifically kept out of the loop on Track II activities.275
Ambassador Korry suggested his two-phase plan for action in Chile in June. The
plan was reviewed during a 40 Committee meeting on June 18.276 The minutes for this
meeting are not available277 though I have reviewed documents that discuss the June 18
meeting and Korry’s proposal.278 The Church Report indicates that the money set aside
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for bribery was $500,000.279 Kornbluh indicates that it was $250,000; he calls it a
“contingency slush fund.” One document that is available notes that “a group of U.S. and
Chilean businessmen are contributing some $250,000 to fight the UP.”280 Lack of
reporting and redaction of key information keeps us from knowing with any certainty
how much money was set aside for Phase 2.
The 40 Committee approved Phase 1 in July, but held off on approving Phase 2
until a date that was either not specified or was redacted.281 Kornbluh notes that Phase 2
was approved but that “distribution was tabled until after the election.”282 I cannot find
any specific mention of Korry’s “Phase 2” in the 40 Committee meeting minutes I have
reviewed.283 Many of those documents are, however, highly redacted, obscuring the
issue. One document does state that “You [Ambassador Korry] have at your discretion
the contingency fund [redacted] previously requested [redacted] More can be made
available [redacted] (This fund may be dispersed as agreed between you and
[redacted].”284 Another communication to Korry indicates that the “contingency fund”
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was available to assist in the “Frei-Reelection Gambit.”285 The “contingency funds”
referred to in the documents may or may not be Korry’s Phase 2 plans; there is no way to
know with certainty. Later documents indicate that some policy makers tried to revive
the bribery plan but, at the time, the 40 Committee continued to resist arguments in favor
of Phase 2, discussed further below.
Korry was upset at having his Phase 2 plans rejected, especially after a cable from
Assistant Secretary Charles A. Meyer advising that he and others had recommended
against approving both Phases of Korry’s proposal.286 Korry was so upset that he refused
to implement Phase 1 because he equated lack of Phase 2 support with a lack of unity of
purpose between policy makers in Washington and the Embassy in Chile:287
“Because of the wide gap between your views and those expounded by me, I have
instructed without further explanation [redacted] [t]o hold in abeyance the
immplementation [sic] of the 40 Committee decision pending further consultation
with you…Having assumed tht [sic] our president and all his advisors would wish
to oppose an electoral triumph of a communist candidate…we had, I sincerely
believe, no choice than to ‘have done something’…It is because I now discover
that the assumption was wrong insofar as it concerned you and that this discovery
comes after the 40 Committee has taken its decision that I am so troubled….What
is at issue now is whether we can effectively carry out the 40 Committee decision
in view of your and the department’s strong opposition to the program. I fear we
cannot and would like to have your further comments on the problem before
making any new recommendations.”288
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It was only after Meyer cabled back, apologizing for being too blunt and assuring Korry
that they could discuss the thought process behind the decision to recommend against the
proposal via a better “medium of exchange”289 that Korry advised the CIA Station in
Santiago to proceed with Phase 1.290
As Allende’s support increased toward the middle of the summer of 1970, the US
Government strengthened its anti-Allende propaganda campaign291 but refused to throw
its support behind either Tomic or Alessandri.292 When the International Telephone and
Telegraph Company (ITT) requested that the CIA channel ITT funds to the Alessandri
campaign, US policy makers refused. They did, however, allow the CIA to advise ITT of
other ways to channel funds to Alessandri. “The writer [William Broe, Chief of CIA’s
Western Hemisphere Division] advised that we could not absorb the funds offered [by
ITT] and serve as a funding channel [to the Alessandri campaign]….The writer
volunteered to explore all possibilities for the infusion of funds into Chile, including a
discussion with Chief of Station, Santiago, so that he could advise Geneen [President of
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ITT] on the best possible method he could use if he desired to channel funds to
Alessandri.”293
In August, a CIA contact or operative whose name has been redacted cautioned
that the prospect of an Allende presidency was not being taken seriously. “Allende very
strong and being underestimated. Has large solid block of voters and two strong
candidates to right [Tomic and Alessandri] likely to divide vote that mostly went to Frei
in ’64 [election].”294 Korry reiterated again the importance of influencing the
Congressional vote.295 Later that month, President Frei told a CIA contact that he
believed that the Chilean Congress would elect Allende if he came in first in the popular
vote. “Frei said flatly that if Salvador Allende…came out ahead of independent
candidate Jorge Alessandri in the popular voge [sic], [Chilean] Congress would name
Allende president.” But Frei also believed that Alessandri “would be a sure winner if he
beat Allende by 100,000 votes on 4 September.”296 In mid-August, Kissinger and Viron
P. Vaky also attempted to revive Korry’s Phase 2 plan, even going so far as to begin to
arrange the staffing necessary to carry out the plan.297

293

Ibid.
CIA, “Allende Very Strong and Being Underestimated,” August 3, 1970, U.S. Department of
State, Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/
searchable_000093C1.pdf.
295
DOS, “Chile: Chronology from DDC Files – 1970,” October 9, 1970, U.S. Department of
State, Freedom of Information Act, State Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/StateChile3/
searchable_00009523.pdf.
296
CIA, “Chilean President Eduardo Frei,” August 25, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom
of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/
searchable_000093D0.pdf.
297
NSC, “Chile and Phase 2,” August 20, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of
Information Act, NSC Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/NSCChile3/
searchable_00009C3C.pdf.
294

86
III.

ELECTION DAY AND ITS AFTERMATH
On September 4, 1970, what the CIA had predicted was realized. Allende won

36.3% of the popular vote. The remainder was split between Tomic and Alessandri, as
noted in the introduction to this chapter.298 The decision for the presidency would go to
the Chilean Congress. There is surprisingly little documentation dated September 4. The
CIA reported the next day that Santiago was fairly calm and quiet.299 US policy makers,
however, were swift to increase funds for existing anti-Allende programs and to
authorize, and insist upon, additional covert action. Contact with members of the Chilean
military increased, a CIA task force within the Western Hemisphere Division was formed
specifically to address the situation in Chile, Track II was quickly developed and
implemented, and communication between US actors in Chile and policy makers in
Washington was tightened.
The day after the election, a telegram was sent from CIA headquarters in the US
to the station in Santiago asking for an assessment of possible means of keeping Allende
from taking office.300 Three days later, a CIA memorandum (unsigned) on the
possibilities of denying Allende the presidency noted a marked change in the attitude of
the Chilean military toward the prospect of a coup. The memorandum also outlined three
possible courses of action: congressional political action, military action, and
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propaganda. The writer or writers of the memo did note that “Any political action taken
to deny Allende the presidency must be tied to or complement Chilean initiatives.”301
There was a sense, echoed in later documents,302 that CIA efforts would not succeed if
the Chileans themselves weren’t convinced of the need to keep Allende from power or to
remove him. By September 9, the CIA had decided that the only real chance of
preventing an Allende presidency was by a military coup, “either before or immediately
after Allende’s assumption of power.”303 Two days later, a fresh anti-Allende
propaganda campaign was initiated.304
The 40 Committee, at this point, also expressed interest in a coup and requested,
by Kissinger’s orders, a “cold-blooded assessment” of the “pros and cons” both of
assisting with a coup and of “organizing an effective future Chilean opposition.”305
Three days later, Korry advised that the military was not likely to move and suggested a
“Frei Reelection Gambit.”306 A later CIA report on covert activities in Chile between
September 15 and November 3, 1970 describes the plan for Frei’s reelection:
“The basic [‘Frei-reelection gambit] consisted of marshaling enough
Congressional votes to elect [Jorge] Alessandri over Allende with the
301
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understanding Alessandri would resign immediately after inauguration and pave
the way for a special election in which Frei could legally become a
candidate…The political action program had only one purpose: to induce
President Frei to prevent Allende’s election by the Congress on 24 October and,
failing that, to support - - by benevolent neutrality at the least and conspiratorial
benediction at the most - - a military coup which would prevent Allende from
taking office on 3 November.”307
On September 14, the 40 Committee approved the “Frei Re-election Gambit” and
authorized Korry’s use of a “contingency fund.” It is possible that this contingency fund
was an authorization for Phase 2.308
The Hinchey Report indicates that on September 15, 1970 President Nixon
authorized the CIA to “prevent Allende from coming to power or unseat him.”309 To
quote the report, “The CIA was instructed to put the U.S. Government in a position to
take future advantage of either a political or military solution to the Chilean dilemma,
depending on how developments unfolded.”310 A Memorandum for the Record, dated
September 16, 1970, states that
“On this date the Director called a meeting in connection with the Chilean
situation…the Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an
Allende regime was not acceptable to the United States. The President asked the
Agency [CIA] to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The
President authorized ten million dollars for this purpose, if needed. Further, the
Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of
State or Defense.”311
Richard Helms’ handwritten note on the meeting is revealing:
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“1 in 10 chance, perhaps, but save Chile
worth spending
not concerned risks involved
no involvement of embassy
$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
full-time job - - best men we have
game plan
make the economy scream
48 hours for plan of action”312
The September 16 memo also states that Thomas Karamessines, DDP (Deputy Director
for Plans) was to lead the project from the United States, “assisted by a special task force
set up for this purpose in the Western Hemisphere Division [of the CIA].” David Atlee
Phillips was appointed to lead the WH Division task force.313 If their orders weren’t
already clear enough, a communication from Western Hemisphere Division headquarters
in the US to the Santiago Station on September 21 defines precisely the Task Force’s
goal as the pursuit of a “military solution” to the Allende problem.314 It is important to
note here the deliberate isolation of the Departments of State and Defense, including
Korry and his embassy staff from the policy making process, an indication of the Nixon
administration’s characteristic centralization of decision making. As things progressed in
Chile, Nixon and Kissinger’s grip on policy making only tightened.
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It was at this time that another version of the Frei-Reelection Gambit, involving the
military, appeared. A communication from CIA headquarters in the United States to its
Station in Santiago describes the maneuver the CIA pursued.315
“From your [Santiago Station’s] previous communications it is our understanding
that Frei should:
A. Seek resignation of Cabinet;316
B. Form new Cabinet comprised entirely of Military;
C. Frei appoints acting president
D. Frei departs from Chile
E. Chile has Military Junta which supervises new elections
F. Frei runs in new election”317
There are a few documents worthy of note regarding the second Frei Reelection
Gambit. The first is a cable ostensibly from the CIA Station in Santiago to CIA
Headquarters advising of a conversation between Ambassador Korry and two of Frei’s
Cabinet Ministers, Carlos Figueroa and Sergio Ossa. There is no clear indication from
the memorandum where the Gambit originated.318 Another CIA document indicates that
the idea began within the Chilean military.319 This document also indicates that the
Santiago Station and CIA Headquarters believed the second version of the Gambit to be
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under 40 Committee auspices. The response cable from Headquarters to Station clarifies
to the Santiago Station that Korry was not to be included on any Track II activities.320
Citing this second Frei Reelection Gambit, Peter Kornbluh argues that the goal of
both Tracks I and II of Project FUBELT was a coup. “The historical distinction between
Track I and Track II – that the first favored a constitutional approach and the second
focused on a military coup to block Allende – is inaccurate… The main difference
between the two approaches was that Track I required Frei’s participation and involved
Ambassador Korry’s efforts to pressure the Chilean president to give a green light to the
Chilean military.”321 If Kornbluh is correct, the “coup” pursued in Track I plans was the
second Frei Reelection Gambit, not quite the bloody hostile takeover generally evoked by
the word “coup.” As CIA Headquarters stated, the second Gambit worked within the
Chilean Constitutional parameters as much as possible, not out of a sense of duty to
uphold the Constitutional tradition in Chile, but because they felt it would be more
palatable to the Chilean people and, thus, more successful.322 I believe, however, that
Headquarters’ response to the Santiago Station’s cable that lumps under the Track I
mandate this second plan to reelect Frei indicates that Headquarters felt the second
Gambit was more in line with Track II. Whatever the case, CIA Headquarters was
anxious not to involve Korry in anything to do with the military. The problem with both
Gambits was that they depended on Frei to get the ball rolling and, for all his talk, Frei
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would never fully commit. When it became clear that President Frei was not going to
pursue political action with any real purpose, the plan was given up and Track I was,
from that point on, not much more than a worldwide propaganda campaign. The 40
Committee ultimately gave up on both reelection plans.
On September 17, a CIA memorandum, entitled, “Operational Planning and
Progress of Project [redacted],” details initial actions taken in connection with the
agency’s plans in Chile.323 Though the name of the “Project” has been removed from the
record, we can assume that the writer is referring to Project FUBELT. 324 It is interesting
to note that this memo and another from September 17 discuss for the first time, albeit
briefly, the possibility that plans for a military coup were actually in the works.325
The object of “Track II” of Project FUBELT was, from the beginning, to instigate
a military coup. After the WH Division’s Chile Task Force was formed at CIA
Headquarters in the US, headed by Thomas Karamessines and David Atlee Phillips,326
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they immediately sent a cable to the Santiago Station. The document seems to cover
objectives of both Tracks I and II, though neither track is mentioned by name. After
discussing the “Frei-Reelection Gambit,” the Task Force issued the following
instructions: “Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power.
Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.”327 Two
weeks later, further clarification was given: “[Redacted] instructs you to contact the
military and let them know USG wants a military solution, and that we will support them
now and later…Your efforts to prepare for future while necessary should be considered
second priority…In sum, we want you to sponsor a military move which can take place,
to the extent possible, in a climate of economic and political uncertainty. Work to that
end with references as to your charter.”328 The document gives instructions to contact the
military and use the “rumor mill” to develop a “coup climate;” it also gives further
instructions which have been redacted.
If the chief obstacle to achieving initial Track I objectives was President Frei’s
reticence to use his influence to goad the military into action, the chief obstacle to Track
II was that many prominent members of the Chilean military had a deep respect for
Chile’s democratic tradition and were loath to undermine the Chilean Constitution by
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moving forward with a military coup.329 To overcome that obstacle, the CIA decided it
was necessary to create a “coup climate,” as noted in the above paragraph. A cable from
CIA Headquarters, “Blueprint for Fomenting a Coup Climate,” states that, “…it is our
task to create such a climate climaxing with a solid pretext that will force the military
and [Frei] to take some action in the desired direction.”330 The cable also lists three
specific areas of focus: Economic Warfare, Political Warfare, and Psychological Warfare.
A number of military leaders were scrutinized as possible coup leader candidates, but
retired General Roberto Viaux was fixed on as “the only military leader of national
stature [who] appears committed to denying Allende the Presidency by force.”331 The
difficulty in working with Viaux was that, as a retired general, he was not officially in
command over any troops.332 Because Viaux did not control a significant military force,
policy makers decided to advise the General to refrain from taking any immediate
action.333
As I read through the documents that concerned Track I, I came across talking
points for and minutes from meetings of the 40 Committee. One meeting in particular,
on October 16, 1970, was attended by Ambassador Korry.334 Knowing, from earlier
documents, that the 40 Committee, Ambassador Korry, and the Departments of State and
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Defense were purposefully kept out of the loop on FUBELT’s Track II activities, I was
quite surprised to find that the Committee was briefed on the possibility of a coup;
General Robert Viaux’s name was mentioned specifically.335 Documents that predate
the general election in Chile, and certainly predate the beginning of FUBELT mention
Viaux’s name in connection with possible coup plans. Korry and the 40 Committee
would very likely have had access to that information.336
The conclusion of the Committee at the October 16, 1970 meeting indicates that,
though Committee members were aware of Viaux and the possibility of a coup, they were
clearly not aware of the CIA’s Track II activities. “The Chairman observed that there
presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the Chilean situation one way
or another. Those present concurred.”337 While the 40 Committee and the Ambassador
were fretting over their inability to influence the course of events in Chile, the CIA
Station in Santiago was busy talking to anyone and everyone in the Chilean military that
they determined would be interested in participating in a coup.
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While the CIA was working on the military covertly, Alexis Johnson and Henry
Kissinger instructed Ambassador Korry to make it absolutely clear to the military that US
support would be withdrawn if the military did nothing to prevent Allende’s ascension to
the presidency, but that previous cuts to US military aid would be reconsidered if the
Chilean military were successful in keeping Allende out of office.338 Though it seems
strange that Korry, who was to be kept out of all Track II plans, was asked to contact the
military about a coup, his mandate was limited to advising the Chilean military what the
US would do to support the military after an action against Allende, and what the US
would not do should no action be taken by military leaders. Korry replied that he felt he
had already made that point clear and advised Johnson and Kissinger that the USG should
begin to negotiate with Allende.339 In another document from the same day, Korry
argued specifically against encouraging a coup.340
Without Korry’s knowledge, coup plotting continued. All parties involved agreed
that the head of the military, General Schneider, presented an obstacle to unifying the
military against overthrowing Chilean democracy. Schneider was a staunch supporter of
the Chilean Constitution and firmly believed that the military was obligated to allow the
elected presidential candidate to take office, even if it meant allowing a socialist to attain
the presidency. CIA operatives had been keeping tabs on General Roberto Viuax’s plans
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to kidnap General Schneider,341 but by mid-October, the CIA and policy makers aware of
Track II activities concluded that Viaux’s plan was not strong enough to succeed and that
an abortive coup would be worse than no coup at all.342 Kissinger instructed the CIA to
advise Viaux to hold off until chances for a successful coup were better. The CIA was
also instructed to “continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight –
now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as
new marching orders [were] given.”343 The next day, CIA Headquarters cabled to the
Station in Santiago advising of the decision to request that Viaux halt his plans, but
reiterating that pursuing a coup was a “firm and continuing policy” of the
administration.344
After that cable, events on the ground in Chile seemed to be moving faster than
policy makers in Washington were able to respond. On the same day that a CIA
document indicates that weapons were on their way to Chile in preparation for an
imminent coup attempt,345 Kissinger, perhaps planning for the worst, cabled to Nixon
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with recommendations in preparation for an Allende presidency.346 A National Archive
and Records Administration (NARA) document indicates that an unknown Chilean
officer was requesting supplies (guns, ammunition etc).347 Headquarters cabled to the
Station in Santiago requesting that the Station explain why they were suddenly more
optimistic about a coup, and advising that high-level clearance may be needed to
proceed.348
Several things happened on October 19. The Santiago Station was advised that
they should appear surprised if the coup attempt did succeed.349 Headquarters requested
that the Station get their information ready for possible presentation to superiors
regarding coup leaders, if the coup succeeded.350 In another cable, the Station
communicated General Camilo Valenzuela’s plans to kidnap General Schneider.351 Yet
another cable indicates that there were firm plans for kidnapping Schneider.352 Another
cable from October 19 advised that the previous plan for a coup was not likely to
succeed; the leading General’s name has been redacted, so it is not clear to which plan
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this document refers. What is clear is that the situation on the ground in Santiago was
shifting very quickly.353
On October 20, CIA Headquarters advised the Santiago Station that the CIA had
done enough, that the Station should no longer seek a coup, but that Station operatives
should remain open to receiving any information or requests for help from the Chilean
military.354 On October 21, one cable indicates that the CIA was preparing for the
inauguration of Allende,355 and another indicates that machine guns were being delivered
to coup plotters.356 Three different groups of coup plotters in Chile attempted to kidnap
General Schneider.357 The first and second kidnapping attempts were unsuccessful. On
October 22,358 Schneider was fatally wounded in the third kidnapping attempt; he died of
three gunshot wounds on October 25.359 Though all three coup attempts were
unsuccessful, CIA Headquarters sent an encouraging cable to the Station in Santiago,
advising that “Station has done excellent job of guiding Chileans to point today where a
military solution is at least an option for them.”360
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Though there was no guarantee before Schneider’s death that Chilean
Congressmen would not support Allende, his election was by no means certain. The
Chilean Congress traditionally voted in the candidate who received the greatest number
of popular votes, but they were not obligated to side with the popular vote. The death of
Schneider, however, produced a reaction, undesired and unforeseen by the coup plotters,
the CIA, and the US Government. The members of the Chilean Congress elected
Allende, 153 to 42,361 not because they were clearly for him, but because they were
clearly against the disruption of Chilean democracy. It is impossible to determine
whether or not Allende’s election could have been avoided had there been no coup
attempt in 1970, but the episode does seem to indicate that the CIA, and US policy
makers, underestimated the force of Chilean democracy and the Chilean Constitution. As
Peter Kornbluh observes, “On October 24, 1970, the Chilean Congress overwhelmingly
ratified Salvador Allende as president…[T]he Schneider shooting [had] produced an
overwhelming public and political repudiation of violence and a clear reaffirmation of
Chile’s civil, constitutional tradition.”362
IV.

PERPETRATOR TESTIMONY
What account do Nixon and Kissinger give of the events leading up to the

Congressional election in 1970? Certainly, the men who made the decisions about US
involvement in Chile have direct insight into the motives behind US actions. Their
testimony is therefore quite valuable, though it behooves us as readers to be discerning in
our evaluation of that testimony since, in the case of Chile, there are grounds for
considering it to be “perpetrator testimony,” as described in Chapter One. My goal in
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applying Browning’s perpetrator testimony tests to Nixon’s and Kissinger’s account of
the Nixon Administration’s decisions about and actions in Chile is to determine the
validity of their testimony when they offer information that fills a gap in the documentary
record. Similarly, in comparing Nixon’s and Kissinger’s arguments about US motives to
the documentary record, my goal is to determine whether or not their arguments are
borne out by the evidence.
Browning’s “tests” for evaluating perpetrator testimony are difficult to apply
directly to the arguments Nixon and Kissinger make about their role in the decisions
regarding US action in Chile in 1970. The tests are meant to evaluate “factual” evidence
(actions, events, etc) neither corroborated nor disproved by documentation, and do not
lend themselves to evaluating statements or arguments about the motives or
circumstances that led to those actions or events. But the tests and the principles behind
them do help us pull out the relevant and potentially truthful information from the
testimony and discard that which seems disingenuous and perhaps meant to distract the
reader from the heart of the issue.
I discussed Nixon’s arguments from his memoirs in Chapter Two; there is no
need to repeat them here, except occasionally as they relate to Kissinger’s memoirs. I
discuss first, below, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s arguments about their movies as an
introduction to the evidence both men give to back up their claims and thereafter proceed
with analyzing relevant pieces of Kissinger’s and Nixon’s presentation of the facts.
There is not much indication that Nixon himself was deeply involved in policy making
toward Chile until September, 1970, as I noted in the introduction to this chapter. He
devotes only a small portion of his memoirs – barely two of the book’s 1,094 pages - to
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Chile and Allende.363 The only event he refers to that occurred during the time period
covered in this chapter is the famous October 15 “turning off” of CIA efforts, discussed
further below.364
Kissinger writes much more extensively about US involvement in Chile in all
three of his memoirs. He covers late 1969 to October 1970 chiefly in the first volume,
White House Years. There are three main things we can draw from White House Years:
his arguments about why the US became involved in manipulating Chilean politics in
1970 (discussed in Chapter 2), the conclusions he draws and arguments he makes about
the course of events from January to October 1970 and the level of his involvement in
decision making, and the timeline he creates of those events.
Kissinger’s first argument is that policy makers at the highest level (the White
House) did not pay enough attention to the Chilean situation early on in 1970.365 He
gives three reasons. First, he and President Nixon, with other White House-level policy
makers, were preoccupied with other concerns (the crisis in the Middle East, Cuba,
etc).366 In addition, policy makers in the White House were not made aware of “the
gravity of the situation,”367 because “the line agencies” (Department of State, CIA, etc)
could not agree about the importance and meaning of events happening on the ground.368
To compound it all, Kissinger admits that he did not know enough about Chile to
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“challenge the experts,”369 leading him to depend too heavily on advice from experts;
advice he later concluded was flawed. Overall, he gives the impression that he gave little
thought to Chile until very close to the September 4 elections and states that he “should
have been more vigilant.”370 When Nixon and Kissinger were finally made aware of the
danger, he argues, it was too late to take any very effectual action and, because the
timeline was short, “action was frantic.”371
The assessment and options paper Kissinger requested from the Senior Review
Group (discussed further below) gave Kissinger great cause for concern over Chile,
though the writers of the report seemed to dismiss the points in their assessment that
caused Kissinger to tremble:
“An entrenched Allende Government would create considerable political and
psychological losses to the U.S.:
(a) hemispheric cohesion would be threatened;
(b) a source of anti-U.S. policy would be consolidated in the hemisphere;
(c) U.S. prestige and influence would be set back with a corresponding boost
for the USSR and Marxism.”372
These were some of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s greatest fears, as I discussed in Chapter
Two of this thesis. Because Nixon was not positioned to make a decision about Chile
prior to the September 4 election, Kissinger argues, “the virulence of his reaction” to the
popular election is understandable.373
Beyond his claim that the “line agencies” kept information from White House
policy makers, Kissinger criticizes the policies those agencies did follow prior to the
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September 4 election as “minimal and ineffectual”374 and inherently problematic. He
observes that the Department of State had little enthusiasm for an anti-Allende campaign
and that lower level policy makers across the board had no “clear cut plan” to address the
Allende problem.375 The Department of State, the 303 and (later) the 40 Committees, the
Ambassador, and the CIA drug their feet for many months, proposals for action were
delayed, and funding amounts authorized for those programs were far too small to be
effective. Valuable time was thus lost, he argues, both for the planning and
implementation of action against, at that time, whatever Socialist/Communist candidate
would run in the election. Later, one proposed action plan (discussed further below) cosponsored by both the CIA and US Embassy in Chile, though first reviewed in December
1969, was not finalized for submission to the 40 Committee until March 25, 1970. In
accordance with Kissinger’s claim that high level policy makers weren’t made aware of
any planning or need for planning, he states that he and Nixon did not know that an
action plan was in the works.376
Kissinger also thought that the policy that lower level policy makers pursued was
fundamentally flawed in that they refused to authorize support to any one of Allende’s
opponents, specifically Alessandri, and that they had begun to withdraw covert support to
Chilean democratic parties in the late 1960s. As Kissinger observes, you cannot expect
to keep one candidate out of office without throwing your support behind an opposing
candidate.377 Members of the Latin American Bureau in the Department of State,
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however, did not like Alessandri enough to favor him over Allende; the Bureau favored
candidates who, like Eduardo Frei, were progressive without being socialist or
communist. Frei was comfortable, familiar, and a popular leader in Chile, but he
couldn’t legally run for a 2nd consecutive term378 and US policy makers did not want to
face the reality of having to choose the lesser of two evils, Allende’s two opponents,
Tomic and Alessandri.379 Instead of out-right support to either opposition candidate,
covert action from early to mid-1970 was limited to anti-Allende “spoiling” activity.
When the CIA/Embassy action proposal was finally approved after presentation at the
March 25th 40 Committee meeting, the approval was curtailed by caveat: the US would
not directly support Alessandri.380 Far from helping to achieve the goal of keeping
Allende out of office, Kissinger concluded, the “anti-Alessandri bias of our bureaucracy
ensured an Allende victory.”381
In addition, Kissinger argues, policy in the 1960s toward Chile was idealist and
disconnected from reality, weakening our measure of influence over Chile in 1970.382
The Latin American Bureau, Kissinger observes, chose late 1960s to withdraw “covert
support for foreign democratic parties…demoralize[ing] the very forces we wished to
encourage.”383 Because of that shift, those the US Government wished to influence in
Chile were predisposed to distrust the USG. Previous policy decisions and existing
prejudices in the agencies made it difficult to enact successful policies in 1970 which
would have accomplished the goal of keeping Allende out of office.
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Finally, Kissinger contends that the US should have spent more money sooner in
order to achieve its goal in 1970.384 The money the 40 Committee approved for “spoiling
activities” in 1970 was considerably less than what the US Government spent in 1964.385
Kissinger calls the additional funds approved for action in Chile later in 1970 “too little,”
and “too late.”386 Kissinger argues that, had he been aware of the true situation in Chile,
he would have recommended to President Nixon that the Administration “consider a
covert program of 1964 proportions.”387
The task of reviewing Kissinger’s testimony was made difficult by Kissinger’s
refusal to provide citations for the events to which he refers, arguing that the
declassification and release of classified of government documents is “distasteful.” 388 In
looking for corroborating documentation to Kissinger’s timeline, I found that all but three
of the events he refers to are supported by documentation or secondary sources. Two of
those events, to which I apply Browning’s tests, are Kissinger’s claim that he requested
an interagency situation report and options paper in July 1970 that did not involve the
CIA, and that he requested a similar paper from Ambassador Korry in September of that
year, after which he followed Korry’s recommendations.389 Though the other events he
discusses can be corroborated by documentation, there are times when Kissinger leaves
out information important to the narrative. By withholding that information, he
manipulates his readers’ perception of his involvement in the decision making on Chile.
The episodes that follow include the above mentioned events to which I apply
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Browning’s tests, and others in which Kissinger appears to have excised or forgotten
information that might cast the CIA or himself in a negative light. Though these episodes
may appear to be relatively minor events in the narrative, they do seem to indicate that
Kissinger is quite deliberately attempting to distance himself from the CIA, align himself
with non-CIA actors within the USG, cast doubt on well supported arguments, and
distract his readers with partial information.
He first states that the 303 Committee put off a decision on what to do about
Allende at a meeting in “late” 1969.390 303 Committee meeting minutes confirm that
such a decision was made on April 15, 1969, despite a recommendation for early action
by then-DCI Richard Helms. Whether or not the Committee reiterated that decision in
late 1969, as Kissinger states, cannot be verified with available documentation.391 He
then notes the changeover of the 303 Committee to the 40 Committee in February of
1970.392 In March 1970, Kissinger notes that the 40 Committee approved another small
amount of money – too little to be of much use - to support anti-Allende propaganda
efforts in Chile.393 In June, this sum was increased.394 Documentation indicates the sum
of $390,000 was approved at the June 27 1970 meeting of the 40 Committee. Kissinger
also notes that Ambassador Korry’s two-phase plan was proposed in June.395 He then
notes the 40 Committee’s request for a “cold-blooded assessment” of what it might mean,
were Allende to come to power.396 The next day, he observes, Alessandri announced he
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would comply with the Frei Reelection Gambit in which he would resign from office,
should he win, so that President Frei could legally run against Allende.397
In July, Kissinger writes that he asked for a situation report and options paper
advising on the possibility of an Allende government. An interagency group, he claims,
responded to his request. The CIA was not a part of the interagency group, Kissinger
notes, because his request had little to do with covert activity.398 This claim is
unsubstantiated, offering us a chance to apply Browning’s perpetrator testimony tests.
The self-interest test seems inapplicable here. Kissinger is not admitting to an act that
would be frowned upon to prove that he was not involved in doing something worse.
The vividness test can be applied. Kissinger’s description of his request and the response
of the interagency committee is quite vivid. In fact, Kissinger appears to quote portions
both of his request for a report and from his staff’s summary of the report, though he does
not cite any documentation. The possibility test also applies. It is quite possible that
Kissinger did request such a report and that he received a response; the request was
within the scope of his authority and a response would have been expected. But is
Kissinger’s testimony here probable? On one hand, Kissinger himself states that he knew
little about Chile and relied, at times too heavily, on the analysis and advice of others;
that would seem to indicate that the probability that Kissinger requested and received a
report, with which the CIA was not involved, was high. However, the portions of his
memoir that appear to be quotations from the responding report are quite similar, though
not identical to, a portion of a CIA intelligence memorandum from September 7, 1970,
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perhaps a month after the report.399 In Kissinger’s memoir we read (also quoted above,
but reproduced again here, for comparison):
“…the interagency group came up with a conclusion which as summarized by my
staff made it difficult to understand how our national interest was not affected:
(a) Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened;
(b) A source of anti-U.S. policy would be consolidated in the hemisphere;
(c) U.S. prestige and influence would be set back with a corresponding boost for
the USSR and Marxism.”400
From the CIA intelligence estimate we read:
“Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:
…3. An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and
psychological costs:
a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an
Allende government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that it
would create in other countries. We do not see, however, any likely threat
to the peace of the region.
b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to
the U.S. and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea.”401
It is not unusual for many documents to state the same or very similar information, so it
does not wholly discredit Kissinger’s testimony to find such a similarity between what
Kissinger states was a report in August and an intelligence estimate in early September. I
think it is more significant that Kissinger specifically states that the CIA did not
contribute to the report he requested, yet the same information, almost the same phrasing,
appears in the CIA intelligence estimate. At the very least, Kissinger may have his
timeline confused. It does seem improbable, however, that, at that stage in policy making
about Chile, the CIA would not have been a member of that interagency group, which
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may indicate that Kissinger is either providing disinformation or intentionally obscuring
the issue in order to distance himself from the CIA.
Kissinger goes on to note General Schneider’s vow on September 10 that he
would not involve the army in the election in Congress but that he would demand certain
guarantees from Allende.402 A few days later, the 40 Committee authorized Korry to
explore the possibility of the Frei Reelection Gambit in which Alessandri would resign,
and set aside $250,000 for “projects in support of it.”403 Korry was advised of the
decision the next day and was directed to “intensify contact with the military.”404 That
same day, September 15, Kissinger met with President Nixon, Richard Helms, and US
Attorney General John Mitchell. This was the meeting which, as Kissinger describes,
“…is now treated as the inception of what was later called Track II…”405
It is important to note that his phrasing here is clearly intended to cast doubt on
the established fact that the September 15 meeting was the inception of Track II. Before
the meeting Track II did not exist. Immediately following the meeting, the special group
within the CIA was established to develop Track II. Kissinger is deliberately trying to
undermine the well supported argument that the CIA coordinated their Track II efforts at
the request of the executive branch.
Also on September 15, Kissinger contends, he asked Ambassador Korry for an
options paper and that “Korry responded hopefully.” As a result, Kissinger states that he
gave an address to journalists in Chicago regarding US policy toward the Allende
government. This claim is unsubstantiated by declassified documents, so we must apply
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Browning’s tests. Once again, the self interest test does not apply because Kissinger is
not admitting to committing an illegal act or making an unpopular decision to defend
himself against more serious allegations. Kissinger’s description of his request to Korry
is rather vague. His description of Korry’s response is more detailed, but Kissinger states
that he is summarizing Korry’s response. He could be intentionally obscuring the issue,
or he could be summarizing because all of Korry’s cables, without exception, are
exasperatingly long-winded; had I been in Kissinger’s position, I would have
summarized, too.
In terms of possibility, it is indeed within the realm of possibility that there was an
exchange between Kissinger and Korry, and we know that Kissinger gave the
backgrounder to journalists.406 I would argue, however, that the probability, at least that
Kissinger responded to a request or suggestion from Korry, is not particularly high.
Kissinger was not immune to frustration. The day before Kissinger supposedly requested
the options paper from Korry, he stated in a cable that, “I simply don’t know what to
believe from Korry’s messages.”407 A few days later, Kissinger expressed even less
confidence in Korry’s assessments and promises in a conversation with British
Ambassador to the United States, John Freeman: “Frankly this is just from our
Ambassador, who seems to have lose [sic] his sanity.”408 The day after he gave the
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backgrounder to the journalists in Chicago, Kissinger expressed his concerns about Korry
to Nixon:
“- - Ambassador Korry is imaginative, but he is an “unguided missile. He is
acting now as his own project chief and is trying to construct an operation all by
himself…
- - Only Korry is doing any real reporting, and while it is voluminous, it is
inconsistent and contradictory. We cannot be sure of what the situation really is
and how much Korry is justifying or camafloughing [sic].
- - CIA…does not feel it can impose discipline on Korry. ”409
The CIA Station in Santiago was also frustrated with Korry. Thomas Powers
describes an encounter between Henry Hecksher, CIA Station Chief, and Korry, with
Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Santiago, Harry Shlaudeman, present. “One
day Hecksher – ‘this normally courteous man,’ in Korry’s words – suddenly blew up in
anger at Korry’s low-key intervention with Frei… ‘Why the hell don’t you twist Frei’s
arm?’ Hecksher shouted. ‘You’re telling Washington you’re doing it and you’re not!’”410
Clearly no one had much confidence in the Ambassador. Kissinger may have asked
Korry for an options paper, and Korry may have responded hopefully, but the idea that
Kissinger gave the backgrounder to the Chicago journalists as a result of Korry’s advice
seems rather improbable. In this episode, Kissinger seems to be attempting to give his
actions greater legitimacy by aligning himself with Korry, a non-CIA actor involved in
policy toward Chile.
On September 21, Kissinger notes that there was talk of the 2nd Frei Reelection
Gambit, which involved the military controlling the Cabinet and organizing new
elections. Kissinger then notes that Korry was authorized, sometime between September
21 and September 26 to advise “selected military leaders” that US military aid would not
409
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be negatively affected by the Chilean Military’s participation in any scheme that would
keep Allende from power.411 For several days at the end of September and beginning of
October, Kissinger was with President Nixon in Europe. 412 While he was away, the 40
Committee “concluded [that the military would only move] if they feared an economic
crisis.” 413 The Committee then gave orders to precipitate such a crisis.
The “Rube Goldberg” gambit (as Kissinger referred to either or both of the Frei
Reelection Gambits) died in October, as the PDC voted conditionally to support Allende
in the Congressional vote. “The sole remaining possibility for forestalling the accession
of Allende was a military takeover as a prelude to new elections.”414 On October 6, it
was reported at a 40 Committee meeting that Frei still had not moved415 toward “any
scheme that would result in his own reelection.”416 Nine days later, on October 15,
Kissinger reports that he “turned off” Track II. Nixon notes the same event in his
memoirs, claiming that “[i]n mid-October I was informed that our efforts were probably
not going to be successful; therefore I instructed the CIA to abandon the operation.”417
On the same day, Kissinger observes, the 40 Committee also decided to give up on its
attempt to foment a coup.418 A telecom notating a conversation between Nixon and
Kissinger is interesting:
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“P: How about Ambassador Korry. Is there anything now?
K: I saw Karamassines today. That looks hopeless. I turned it off. Nothing
would be worse than an abortive coup.
P: Just tell him to do nothing…”419
It is perhaps telling here, what Kissinger leaves out of his testimony. His purpose
here appears, again, to be to support his own argument that the Administration did not
pursue a coup in Chile by offering evidence that the Administration abandoned one coup
scenario. What he does not write is that Administration pursued other coup options.
According to the cable from CIA Headquarters to the Santiago Station after the
meeting with Karamassines, noted earlier in this chapter, it is clear that the CIA was
under the impression that they were to continue to pursue a coup, despite “turning off”
the Viaux kidnapping plan.420 Whatever the complications of the failed coup attempt of
1970, Nixon ordered continued covert involvement in the country after Allende’s
election. National Security Decision Memorandum 93 from the National Security
Council (NSC), “Policy Towards Chile,” on November 9, 1970 clearly demonstrates that
Nixon directed the CIA to continue to influence the Chilean economy and politics via
covert means:
“The President has decided that (1) the public posture of the United States will be
correct but cool…but that (2) the United States will seek to maximize pressures
on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to
implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests.”421
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Nixon cannot claim that our involvement in Chile ended in October, 1970. Even if he did
abandon direct coup plotting after Schneider’s death, he certainly didn’t abandon efforts
to destabilize the Allende government, as we shall see in the next chapter.
With Kissinger’s stubborn refusal to cite his sources, I expected to find more
instances in which his testimony was unsubstantiated by documentation. The few
instances when his claims are not substantiated seem, when you view the whole story, to
be relatively minor episodes. But, though we don’t catch him in an outright lie, he does
appear to manipulate his audience by withholding information at times, specifically in his
assertion, as in Nixon’s, that he halted CIA efforts to affect a coup in October. He indeed
instructed the CIA to advise Viaux against a coup, but neither he nor Nixon “turned off”
all CIA efforts to influence Chilean politics, which, whether explicitly stated in their
testimony or not, is what both men imply.
Kissinger’s readers would also be wise to be wary of his sympathy ploys, for
example, his assertion that his too-heavy reliance on experts jeopardized success in Chile.
Kissinger’s problem was not that he relied on the experts. He was, in some ways, the
victim of bureaucracy whose fate he bemoaned in “Bureaucracy and Policy Making,”
(discussed briefly in Chapter Two), doomed to reliance on experts because it was simply
not humanly possible to know everything.422 The problem was that he relied on the
wrong experts. As stated earlier, the CIA had warned the 303 Committee– which
Kissinger attended - in April 1969 that success in Chile depended on early involvement.
The 303 Committee, of which Kissinger was a part, dismissed the idea. In The Man Who
Kept the Secrets, Thomas Powers described DCI Richard Helms’s feelings:
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“…in Helms’s view, the failure [to keep Allende from achieving the presidency]
belonged at least equally to the [Nixon] administration, for paying no attention
when he warned the 40 Committee at least a year ahead of the election that now
was the time for the CIA to get involved, and to Ed Korry, for resisting a proAlessandri campaign down to the bitter end.”423
Kissinger’s failure, and Nixon’s, was not that they leaned too heavily on the opinion of
expert advisors, but that they failed to discern whose counsel to follow.
In spite of US plans and plotting, Allende was confirmed and inaugurated. The
question now was how the Nixon Administration would deal with the new Chilean
government.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DEALING WITH THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT
“Nixon: All’s fair on Chile. Kick ‘em in the ass. Ok?
Kissinger: Right.”424
~ October 5, 1971
I.

INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers the time period between Allende’s inauguration and the coup

in 1973. It is fitting here to address the questions that first come to mind when discussing
CIA involvement in Chile, certainly the first questions that came to my mind as an
undergraduate: Why did the coup happen? Who was responsible? Was it brought about
by external factors, i.e., was the US responsible? Or was it due to internal factors, i.e.,
did Allende bring about his own downfall? Those last two questions frame the arguments
about responsibility for the coup at either end of the spectrum. In my review of CIA,
DOS, and other agency documents, several points became plain. First, the US, though not
directly involved in coup plotting, lent its tacit support to the coup plotters in the Chilean
military establishment. Secondly, it was Nixon and Kissinger’s goal to oust Allende
from the time he took office, and great effort was made to destabilize the Allende
government through “economic strangulation…diplomatic isolation…[and] CIA
clandestine intervention.”425 Clandestine intervention included efforts to diminish
Allende’s political support, increase the CIA’s contact with members of the Chilean
military, to support non-military anti-Allende groups, and to disseminate propaganda
through media outlets. Despite those efforts, the CIA did not actively participate in the
events of September 11, 1973.
424
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The above observations lead me to the question of the motive behind reduced
involvement, especially considering the extent of anti-Allende efforts before Allende’s
inauguration. The evidence suggests that there were three reasons to maintain a low
profile. First, the apparent indecisiveness of the Chilean military did not inspire
confidence in the Nixon Administration and policy makers continued to distance the US
from the activities of the Chilean military. Secondly, high-level officials in both the State
Department and CIA felt that the coup would be successful without CIA assistance; the
documents also suggest that the State Department and CIA may have been considering a
contingency plan to assist the coup plotters if the coup appeared to be in danger of
failure. As it happened, that contingency plan was unnecessary. Allende was
overthrown, just as US policy makers had wished, with the least amount of US
involvement.
The evident tension between a distrust that the military would move and the trust
in the military’s ability to pull off a coup if they purposed to do so can be explained by
the third element: fear of exposure. US policy makers were loath the over-commit to
fostering a coup – the more effort put into laying the foundation for a coup, the greater
the risk of exposure of US involvement. However, if the military did decide to move,
US officials were confident that the Chileans could pull off a coup without US assistance;
the risks of exposure if the US became heavily involved in coup planning and execution
were great, far outweighing any benefits of direct involvement. So, the US Government
bided its time, keeping tabs on developments in Chile. Their patience was rewarded.
Allende was overthrown, just as US policy makers had wished, with the least amount of
US involvement.
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A review of the two secondary sources, Jonathan Haslam’s The Nixon
Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile, and Ambassador Nathaniel Davis’s the
Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, reveal the internal economic and political struggles
that plagued the Allende regime. Whether or not US economic action aimed at
destabilizing the Allende government had much effect, Allende’s own economic policies
significantly weakened the Chilean economy, despite initial short-term growth. Leftist
extremist activities compounded the economic crisis. The failing economy and
deteriorating political situation inspired further destabilizing political action – strikes,
demonstrations, and the like. The Chilean military, increasingly frustrated by the
building crisis in Chile, and encouraged by US tacit support for a coup, finally resolved
to move.
The above mentioned questions frame the first portion of this chapter. After
discussing US response to the Allende regime, Chile’s internal struggles under the
Allende government, and the motive behind reduced US involvement, I proceed with an
account of events on the day of the coup and end, as in Chapter Three, with a discussion
of perpetrator testimony.
II.

US RESPONSE TO ALLENDE’S ELECTION
On November 3, 1970, Salvador Allende was sworn into office as president of

Chile. Members of the foreign policy making community in the United States were
already writing briefs and options papers for action against the regime.426 On November
5, Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, wrote a briefing paper for President
Nixon in preparation for the National Security Council meeting planned for November
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6.427 Kissinger also wrote a brief for Nixon. Kissinger’s brief and the memorandum of
conversation from the November 6 meeting reveal the true reasons for US action in
Chile, whatever policy makers might have said later.
Kissinger’s statements in his brief to Nixon demonstrate that policy makers did
not believe that Chile posed a direct national security threat to the United States.
Nevertheless, he argued, “…[W]hat happens in Chile over the next six to twelve months
will have ramifications that will go far beyond just US-Chilean relations. They will have
an effect on what happens in the rest of Latin America and the developing world; on what
our future position will be in the hemisphere; and on the larger world picture, including
our relations with the USSR. They will even affect our own conception of what our role
in the world is.”428
We can see in Kissinger’s memo a hallmark of the Nixon’s Administration’s
foreign policy.429 The chief concern was that the rise of a second socialist/communist
leader in Latin America would adversely affect the reputation of the United States, which
would in turn affect its international prestige and its ability to deter aggression based on
the appearance of US strength. Chile would become, “a source of disruption in the
hemisphere…It would become part of the Soviet/Socialist world, not only
philosophically but in terms of power dynamics…the imitative spread of similar
phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our own
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position in it.”430 But Kissinger cautioned against public action against the Allende
regime.
“We are strongly on record in support of self-determination and respect for free
election…It would therefore be very costly for us to act in ways that appear to
violate those principles, and Latin Americans and others in the world will view
our policy as a test of the credibility of our rhetoric…On the other hand, our
failure to react to this situation risks being perceived in Latin America and in
Europe as indifference or impotence in the face of clearly adverse developments
in a region long considered our sphere of influence…I recommend, therefore that
you make a decision that we will oppose Allende as strongly as we can and do all
we can to keep him from consolidating power, taking care to package those
efforts in a style that gives us the appearance of reacting to his moves.”431
Kissinger was clearly aware of the costs of overtly deviating from the Administration’s
stated principles.
It was also at the November 6 NSC meeting that policy makers discussed the
prudence of a “cool but correct [public] posture” toward Allende’s government.
“Secretary Rogers: …We have severe limitations on what we can do. A strong public
posture will only strengthen his hand. We must make each decision in the future
carefully in a way that harms him most but without too much of a public posture which
would only be counterproductive. Secretary Laird: …[W]e must retain an outward
posture that is correct. We must take hard actions but not publicize them.”432 By
November 9, the “cool but correct posture” was official policy. “…[T]he President has
decided that (1) the public posture of the United States will be correct but cool, to avoid
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giving the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international
support for consolidation of the regime…”433
The Nixon Administration decided that, of all the options open to them,434 the
best way to put pressure on Allende and hopefully remove him from power was to
oppose him as strongly as possible through diplomatic, economic, and clandestine means.
To quote the Hinchey Report, "[t]he CIA was instructed to put the US Government in a
position to take future advantage of either a political or military solution to the Chilean
dilemma, depending on how developments unfolded."435
Covert Action: Approach With Caution
The clandestine program included the usual covert political action, support of
opposition groups, and propaganda campaigns.
“The [covert action] program has five principal elements: 1. Political action to
divide and weaken the Allende coalition; 2. Maintaining and enlarging contacts in
the Chilean military; 3. Providing support to non-Marxist opposition political
groups and parties; 4. Assisting certain periodicals and using other media outlets
in Chile which can speak out against the Allende Government; and 5. Using
selected media outlets [redacted] to play up Allende’s subversion of the
democratic process and involvement by Cuba and the Soviet Union in Chile.” 436
Financial support was provided to the PDC, the PN, and the PDR, “the only
serious sources of opposition,” at the time.437 Later, the CIA channeled resources to
other political opposition groups as well, such as the PIR.438

433

Henry Kissinger, “National Security Decision Memorandum 93, ‘Policy Towards Chile,’
November 9, 1970,” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 129.
434
Kissinger, Henry, “Memorandum for the President, ‘NSC Meeting, November 6—Chile,’” in
Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 121.
435
“Hinchey Report.”
436
National Security Council, “Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, SECRET ‘Covert Action
Program—Chile,’” November 25, 1970, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 133.
437
National Security Council, “Meeting Minutes, ‘Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee,
19 November 1970/Chile-Covert Action Program,” December 10, 1970, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 135.
438
CIA, “Political Action Program in Chile,” January 19, 1971, U.S. Department of State,
Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/

123
All detail regarding how the funds were allocated to those groups has been
redacted from the documents. There is one document that suggests that the CIA used its
private sector contacts in Chile to channel money to the opposition parties in Chile, but
no specifics are given.439 All monies distributed to opposition parties were given with the
approval of the 40 Committee with the goal of weakening the Unidad Popular, Allende’s
Popular Unity government.440
One propaganda outlet on which US policy makers focused their attention was El
Mercurio, “the largest independent newspaper in Chile.”441 El Mercurio had been an
outlet for the CIA’s anti-Allende propaganda throughout Allende’s presidential campaign
and beyond. Now that outlet was threatened with financial ruin, brought on by pressures
from the Allende government, and both the CIA Station Chief in Santiago and
Ambassador Korry advocated US financial support for the newspaper. US policy makers
feared that “Allende’s intense efforts to destroy El Mercurio indicate[d] that he probably
regard[ed] it as a significant barrier to his internal political strategy.”442 There was some
concern that Allende had the power to shut the paper down regardless of whether the
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United States provided the funds El Mercurio needed to remain solvent and functioning.
But two and a half weeks after the 40 Committee meeting in which financial support to El
Mercurio was discussed, Nixon approved the recommended spending $700,000 and
advised that more funds would be available to keep the paper going, if necessary,
upwards of $1,000,000.443
From late 1970 to November 1971, Santiago Station reports to Headquarters were
comprised chiefly of updates on opposition party activity in Chile. On November 9, 1971
the CIA wrote an Intelligence Information Special Report indicating that elements in the
Chilean Army, Navy, and the Carabineros (Chilean police) were planning a coup for the
spring of 1972.444 A document from November 12, 1971 reveals that CIA operatives in
the Santiago Station still believed that their mission was to actively pursue a coup.
“Taking into consideration all the caveats and limitations noted above, we conceive our
[redacted] mission as one in which we work consciously and deliberately in the direction
of a coup.”445 CIA Headquarters disagreed.
“Any discussion regarding possible [redacted] support of an attempted coup is
obviously highly sensitive. Since we do not have [redacted] approval to become
involved in any coup planning, we cannot accept your conclusion in reference A
that the [redacted] mission is to ‘work consciously and deliberately in the
direction of a coup’, nor can we authorize you to ‘talk frankly about the
mechanics of a coup’ with key commanders, because the implications of that
amount to the same.”446
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Station operatives in Santiago were directed to limit their activities to information
gathering. Without clear evidence that the military was united against Allende,
Headquarters was not willing even to broach the subject of a coup with policy makers in
Washington.
In January of 1972 the CIA had reported that Allende was losing support and that
the military was “increasingly restive,” but still not ready for a coup.447 Eight months
later, General Augusto Pinochet himself denied in September of that year that there were
any plans for a coup in the works. He did, however, reveal that “all believe overthrow
attempt can develop soon…Allende must be forced to step down or be eliminated.”448
The document which notes Pinochet’s comments also indicates that Pinochet was told by
junior US army officers that the US would support a coup in Chile.449 Despite Pinochet’s
belief of a coming coup, the CIA and policy makers in Washington were still not
convinced that it was time to take a more active role. On April 4, 1972, a CIA
memorandum stated that a confrontation was coming, but estimated that it was a year
away.450 At a US Department of State meeting about Chile in October, policy makers
were clearly not yet convinced that the Chilean military was ready for a coup: “…coup
probabilities seemed quite low at this juncture…”451 Furthermore, there wasn’t much the
United States could do to bring things to a head in Chile.
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“[T]he conclusion was that no course of action which could be taken would help
in a decisive manner to achieve the objective of removing Allende from power.
The Chilean military were the key to any coup that might develop now or in the
future.” 452
But, policy makers believed that, even if the military did decide to act, it would
likely be unnecessary to actively support the coup effort; the Chilean military was
perfectly capable of accomplishing their objective. It would, moreover, be unlikely that
the US would be asked to help. There was, then, no need for US involvement beyond
ensuring that the military knew the USG would look favorably on a coup. “[G]iven the
Chilean military capabilities of an unaided coup, any U.S. intervention or assistance in
the coup per se should be avoided.”453
US policy makers were more cautious, but policy toward Chile had not really
changed. The Nixon Administration still desired that the maximum outcome be achieved
– Allende’s overthrow – with as little effort on the part of the US as possible. But, firmly
believing that a coup would not be successful unless it were a “fundamentally Chilean”
affair, US policy makers were unwilling to expend US resources unless the Chilean
military was resolutely in support of a coup. Such was not the case until late in 1973.
The military had hesitated and vacillated for two years on the subject of a coup.
The CIA received constantly conflicting opinions from their contacts about the possibility
of an overthrow. The commanding officers of all branches of the military were more
tolerant of the Allende government than their junior officers, particularly in the Army.
The major factor keeping the Army from committing to a coup was that the Commander
in Chief of the Army, General Prats, much like General Schneider, was loyal to the
Chilean Constitution and refused to give support to a coup that would undermine Chile’s
452
453

Ibid.
Ibid.

127
long tradition of democracy. But 1973 saw the military’s gradual saturation of frustration
with the Allende regime, a frustration that eventually led to the military take-over of the
government in September.
1973 was marked by uncertainty in Chile, the political landscape changing
dramatically month by month. In January, Ambassador Korry still thought a coup was
unlikely.454 By March, the CIA believed an attempted coup probable but did not, at that
point, expect an overthrow attempt to succeed. The CIA recommended in March that the
US should “avoid encouraging the private sector to initiate action likely to produce either
an abortive coup or a bloody civil war,” and cautioned that, “We should make it clear that
we will not support a coup attempt unless it becomes clear that a coup would have the
support of most of the Armed forces as well as the CODE parties, including the PDC.”455
In April, the CIA had the impression that given the right conditions (i.e. an outright
economic and political crisis), such a coup could develop.456
By May 2, commanding officers of the military planned to express their
discontent to the Allende government, chiefly in order to keep junior officers from acting
on their own.457 The Station in Santiago pushed again for a change of policy in support
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of pursuing a coup,458 but Headquarters was still hesitant to present the coup as an option
to policy makers;459 The Nixon government, caught up in the Watergate investigations,
was not in a position to take on new foreign policy actions that would incite opposition at
home. On May 6, however, Chilean military officers were openly discussing a coup at a
dinner party.460 The pressure was building in Chile. Later in May a communiqué from
the Santiago Station to CIA Headquarters indicated that one of their military contacts
would welcome a coup. In fact, the contact estimated that plans for a coup might be
finalized by June 15, but specified that June 15 was not the date intended for action;
coup-planning was, as yet, not unified.461
On June 14, a US National Intelligence Estimate for Chile noted that Chilean
Navy and Air Force commanders were in favor of “strong measures against Allende;” the
Army, however, was still on the fence. The Intelligence Estimate also advised that the
US “lack[ed] powerful and reliable levers” for manipulating the political situation in
Chile.462 The commanding officers of the Army were loath to seriously pursue a coup
until all civil means to effect change were exhausted. But junior level officers in the
Army had reached such a level of discontent with the happenings in Chile, brought on, as
they felt, by the Allende regime, that they hosted their own rebellion and attacked La
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Moneda, the presidential palace in Santiago, on June 29.463 It is difficult to determine
why junior level officers were willing to act against Allende when higher level officers
were not. Perhaps it was the zealousness of youth, or a difference in attitudes between
the generations; younger officers may have felt less devoted to Chile’s democratic
tradition. Perhaps it was more material. Junior level officers, just starting their careers,
may not have had the means built up to ride out the economic challenges of Allende’s
presidency. Whatever the reason for the difference, it was the commanding officers of
the Army, led by General Prats, who put down the rebellion, termed “El Tancazo” (The
Tank Rebellion).464
The CIA interpreted the event as evidence that the Army was less likely than ever
to join the movement for a coup, and without the Army, the coup would be almost
certainly a failure. Despite their earlier drive to pursue a military coup, the Station in
Santiago then recommended that financial support to all opposition groups be
discontinued because it was unlikely to be effective. The PDC was unlikely to use US
funds for the purpose for which they were intended, and, after the June 29 Tancazo, the
military opposition to the Allende regime was clearly not united.465 There was no use in
wasting monetary resources
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As it turned out, the CIA’s interpretation of military sentiment after the Tancazo
was wrong. Though it was the commanding officers of the Army who had put down the
June 29 uprising it was that event which pushed those officers into serious discussion of a
coup.466 An update on the opposition forces in Chile on July 23 revealed that the UP was
planning for an “inevitable confrontation.” The party, fighting for survival, was on the
warpath in the economic sector and some party segments were arming their paramilitary
cadres. In the opposition, the Chilean trade guilds were threatening to strike, an act
“designed to provoke massive military intervention in the government of a coup.” Other
groups were threatening guerilla warfare against the government.467 Chilean truckers
also began another strike.468 Chile was truly in crisis. As the CIA had originally
predicted months earlier, despite their later expectations that a military move would not
develop, this was a crisis deep enough to trigger a coup.
By July 25, plans for a coup “lack[ed] only the identification of priority targets
and a listing of measures requiring inter-service coordination.”469 But General Prats was
still in the way. Instead of opting for a kidnapping attempt, as had occurred with General
Schneider, the other commanding Army generals simply forced Prats to resign, after
“several hundred army wives, including the wives of some generals,” demonstrated
against him with members of opposition political parties on the pavement in front of his
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house. Prats stepped down the next day, August 22. General Augusto Pinochet took his
place as Commander in Chief of the Army.470
CIA Headquarters was finally willing to suggest financial support of the private
sector in Chile in order that the strikes may continue, keeping the pressure up on both the
Allende government and the Chilean military.471 Headquarters promised the Station in
Santiago that, if necessary, they would secure the US Ambassador’s backing for support
of opposition forces in the private sector in Chile.472 The recommendation was passed on
to Henry Kissinger and Jack Kubisch on August 25. On August 29, a memorandum was
sent out detailing the 40 Committee’s approval of financial support of the opposition in
Chile, including the private sector in the amount of $1,000,000.473 Less than two weeks
later, the coup on September 11 rendered such support unnecessary.
Economic Warfare
Much has been made of economic action taken by the US against the Allende
regime, but can that action be considered economic warfare? Two days after Allende’s
inauguration, the Nixon Administration developed a plan to make economic success as
difficult as possible for the Allende regime. I believe that considering the evidence,
economic warfare was indeed the Nixon Administration’s policy. The diplomatic and
economic action plan toward Chile was outline in NSDM 93, “Policy Toward Chile,”
dated November 9, 1970. The US would adopt a “cool and correct posture” which would
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consist of efforts to ensure that other Latin American governments knew how strongly
the US opposed the Allende government and to “encourage them to adopt a similar
posture;” to “coordinate efforts” with those other Latin American governments to oppose
action by the Allende government; to “exclude,” terminat[e],” reduc[e],” and “limit”
economic aid to Chile in all forms (credit, “financial assistance,” etc) both from the US
and international sources; and to advise US firms with interests in Chile that the US
would bring pressure on the Allende regime.474
It cannot be said that the Nixon Administration’s economic policy toward Chile
merely responded to Allende’s policies as any other capitalist nation would do. NSDM
93 laid out a fairly aggressive plan of action. Nixon had demanded that the US dump a
portion of its copper holdings, “to quickly undermine the world price of copper, Chile’s
main export;”475 The Nixon Administration also maneuvered a “sufficiently malleable”
chairman into power at the Inter-American Development Bank to ensure compliance with
the Administration’s policy toward Chile.476 The White House refused to give
instructions to the US representative in the IDB regarding the US vote for loans to Chile,
indefinitely stalling the loan process. Kornbluh cites the “Status Report on U.S. Stance
on IDB Lending to Chile:
“The U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank
understands that he will remain uninstructed until further notice on
pending loans to Chile. As…an affirmative vote by the U.S. is required
for loan approval, this will effectively bar approval of the loans.” 477
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At the World Bank, US representatives manipulated Bank members sent to Chile
to evaluate Chile’s qualifications for receiving a loan.478 The US Agency for International
Development and the US Export-Import Bank were not permitted to extend new
assistance to Chile.479 The Eximbank continued to give Chile a credit rating of “D,”480
which reduced Chile’s chance of receiving loans from private US sources.481 The Church
Report offers statistics on the decrease in economic aid to Chile, depicted in Figure 4.1,
below.482
Figure 4.1 US. Economic Aid to Chile
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The Nixon Administration also advised private US businesses and labor unions
(which had ties, via “international affiliates” with Chilean labor unions)483 that the USG
did not look favorably on the new Chilean government.484 At the Paris Club debt
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negotiations in 1972 and 1973 US representatives, at the direction of President Nixon,
sought “to get broad creditor support to isolate Chile.”485 When US representatives could
not succeed in convincing the Paris Club creditors to refuse to renegotiate Chile’s debt,
“the Nixon administration,” as Kornbluh notes, “broke ranks and refused to reschedule
Chilean payments on more than $1 billion owed to U.S. government and private sector
creditors.”486 The Administration also sought to isolate Chile from its Latin American
neighbors, chiefly Argentina and Brazil, and “considered trying to expel Chile…from the
OAS.”487 Peter Kornbluh contends that the Nixon Administration’s policy of economic
strangulation destroyed the Chilean economy, destabilizing the country politically as
well. Kissinger contends that Allende’s own economic policies brought about his
downfall.488 The truth, I believe, is somewhere in between.
III.

INTERNAL FACTORS: FAILURE OF ALLENDE’S ECONOMIC PLAN AND
POLITICAL UPHEAVAL
Allende’s Economic Plan
While the USG was devising ways to injure Allende’s government economically,

the Allende government’ was struggling to maintain their internal economic restructuring
program while avoiding an economic meltdown. They were not successful beyond the
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first year. As Jonathan Haslam comments in The Nixon Administration and the Death of
Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide, Allende was not an economist and was
“content to leave [the country’s economic planning] to others.”489 He was not known
among his colleagues to be very forward thinking and, indeed, had not prepared an
economic plan before winning the election in 1970. Professor Pedro Vuskovic Bravo,
Allende’s Minister of Economy,490 was in charge of developing the economic plan
ultimately approved in November 1970 by Allende’s cabinet as the “Basic Orientation of
the Economic Programme for the Short-term.”491 Haslam describes that plan as “little but
generalizations divorced from economic and political realities”492 with “four major
objectives: increasing growth, absorbing unemployment, changing the distribution of
profit, and containing inflation.”493 The greatest flaw of the plan, according to Haslam,
was that politics were more important than sound economics: “where necessary,
economic need would give way to political need.”494 As Haslam observes:
“No thought was given to the likelihood that land reform would disrupt
production, thereby also raising inflation; that nationalized industries were bound
to press for subsidies from government to keep them afloat; that increased
demand was unlikely to increase investment in the private sector, which was more
likely to expedite profits abroad for safety; and that price controls would distort
the allocation of resources.”495
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It was politically necessary to pursue the UP’s “Basic Plan” for economic reconstruction,
but neither the adverse consequences of such a policy nor a plan for addressing those
consequences was ever considered by the Allende regime.496
In The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, Nathaniel Davis, US Ambassador to
Chile after Edward Korry’s departure, describes those consequences.497 According to
Davis, Vuskovic sought to “prime the pump” of the Chilean economy by instituting
mandatory wage increases, nationalizing firms, (financed by the Central Bank), hiring
new employees at the expense of the government, and restricting imports.
To counteract the resulting inflation, the Allende government printed more money
and granted credit via the Central Bank.498 Vuskovic’s radical plan forced private
companies into nationalization by either direct government takeover or by manipulating
private enterprise through price and credit control and government mandated wage
increases effected through the Ministry of Economy’s Directorate of Industry and
Commerce (DIRINCO). Many private companies simply could not stay in business due
to the high cost of raw materials and components, the lack of credit, and the forced
increase of wages to their employees.499 Consequently, government expenditure
increased while tax income decreased.500 Additionally, the majority of firms nationalized
began to lose money shortly after nationalization.501 Davis notes that, “[b]y November

496

Ibid, 103.
As noted in Chapter One, Davis relied heavily on secondary sources in constructing his
narrative of the political situation in Chile. Where possible, I have located and provided citation for those
sources as well.
498
Davis, Last Two Years, 81-82. See also Robert J. Alexander, The Tragedy of Chile, (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 187.
499
Davis, Last Two Years, 80.
500
Davis explains: “…private enterprises were nationalized or went out of business and…wealthy
taxpayers went abroad.” Thus, there was little money flowing in and much money flowing out of the
government’s pockets. Davis, Last Two Years, 82.
501
Alexander, Tragedy of Chile, 187.
497

137
1971 the Chilean government had spent the bulk of its foreign exchange reserves, and it
declared a moratorium on the payment of interest and principal on most of the country’s
foreign debt.”502
Chile also experienced significant food shortages in 1971, leading women to
march in protest in Santiago in the “March of the Empty Pots”503 on December 1. Davis
writes that, though the working class was represented in the march, the majority of the
participants were “women of the more prosperous suburbs.” The march, he argues, was
more of a political protest than a protest against hunger since the majority of the marchers
did not suffer the day to day effect of the food shortages.504
The Chilean economy continued to decline and in mid-1972, Vuskovic, blamed
for the crisis, resigned from his post. Allende promptly announced a new economic plan.
He declared that the plan would “rely on loans, mostly from Eastern Europe” in an
attempt to stimulate investment. Other elements of the plan included tax increases “for
the wealthy and upper middle classes” and price increases on “basic items.” The rise in
inflation due to the new policy – a two-fold increase in the month of August alone505 was to be off-set by mandatory bonuses on Chilean Independence Day, September 18.
To fund the bonuses, the government again printed more money.506 Far from
experiencing growth as a result of the new economic plan, production decreased
throughout the last months of 1972.507
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Political Unrest
The deepening economic crisis was compounded by domestic political troubles.
Leftist extremist activity and political unrest continued throughout Allende’s presidency.
The Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo (VOP) held violent demonstrations, seized
farms,508 and assassinated Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, “former vice-president and former
interior minister.”509 The Manuel Rodríguez Revolutionary Movement (MR-2)
committed acts of terrorism.510 The Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR) provoked
indigenous groups and factory workers to protest and held hostile demonstrations.511
Other extremist groups included the Movement for Unified Popular Action (MAPU, an
off-shoot of the PDC),512 the Christian Left,513 and the July 16th Command of the
National Liberation Army.514
Adding to the unrest was the emergence of three different politically charged
organizations in 1972, the focos, the campamentos, and the cordones.515 As Davis
describes:
“The focos resembled the Viet Cong – controlled areas in the Vietnam
countryside in the 1960s; in a few places the MIR rather than the government held
effective control…The campamentos were shantytowns, filled with families
living in little prefabricated or jerry-built wooden houses. They were mostly in
the suburbs of Santiago and other large towns, and the MIRistas and other left
extremists organized them into militarized hamlets….”
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The cordones were “worker-controlled industrial belts,” controlled in some cases by the
MIRistas and leftist Socialists, and in which the workers formed “communal commands”
(commandos comunales) the “nuclei” from which grassroots “mobilization of the
workers” developed separate from the efforts of the UP government.516 According to
Davis, whether Allende was for or against “[a]ll three ganglia of revolutionary
organization,” and whether the members of the focus, campamentos, or cordones were
for or against Allende and his regime is unclear. What is clear is that they “complicated
[the political] situation” in Chile.517
Cuban activity, chiefly in Santiago, was another source of political unrest. “The
[Cuban E]mbassy,” Haslam observes, “comprised forty-eight people – the Chileans had a
mere handful uncomfortably housed in Havana,” and “the Cubans in Santiago acquired
something close to carte blanche.”518 One of the Cuban Embassy officials was Allende’s
own son-in-law.519 By their own admission, Cuban intelligence officials of the Dirección
General de Inteligencia (DGI) “were enormously active”520 in Chile. Davis notes that
there were reports of arms deliveries.521 Haslam cites “a DGI defector,” who, “[a]t the
end of 1971…said that Santiago had replaced Paris as the centre for co-ordinating
liberation movements in South America,” though Haslam qualifies the statement as “yet
to be confirmed.”522 There may then be credence to Kissinger’s and Nixon’s claims that
they feared that a socialist/communist Chile would be a launching ground for
revolutionary activity in the southern cone. One could also argue that Nixon’s and
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Kissinger’s fears were self-fulfilling. Allende was already vocally opposed to American
“imperialism.” It is quite possible that the actions US policy makers took only
radicalized Allende further.
The decline of the economy and the deterioration of the political situation in Chile
eventually led to devastating workers’ strikes. A rash of strikes broke out in August and
September 1972, chiefly as a consequence of Chile’s economic deterioration. The first
strike lasted one day, August 21 1972, precipitated by the heart attack and death of a
shopkeeper who had been forced by authorities to open his store which he had closed in
protest to the government’s latest price increases. The strike and ensuing violence
resulted in the government’s call for a state of emergency in Santiago province. 523 As
Davis notes, “[s]everal weeks of intermittent street violence and flash strikes
followed.”524 Strikes occurred again in October, beginning with the truckers’ strike in
Coyhaique and eventually encompassing the “Taxi Drivers’ Unions, the Confederation of
Production, and the Sole National Confederation of small Industry and Artisanry,” as
well as various other groups of professionals.525 Allende’s Cabinet did not survive the
October strikes526 and the Chilean economy, already in poor condition, was “severely
damaged.”527 After Allende’s Cabinet resigned, the Chilean president negotiated with
military officers to fill the open posts.528 General Carlos Prats Gonzalez became Minister
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of Interior, Brigadier General Claudio Sepúlveda Donoso became Minister of Mines, and
Rear Admiral Ismael Huerta Díaz became Minister of Public Works and
Transportation.529
The Allende government had managed the economy badly for two years.
Allende’s popular support had greatly declined. The revolutionary left was fractioned.
The workers were unhappy. The people were unhappy. Though the entrance of these
military leaders into the political arena had a somewhat stabilizing effect on Chilean
politics, Davis argues that it was “[t]his vitiation of the military commitment to
noninvolvement in politics [that] ultimately weakened the barriers to a coup.” 530
IV.

SEPTEMBER 11, 1973
On August 25, a CIA document indicates that Allende believed a coup was

imminent, but does not show that the US Government had any knowledge that coup plans
were in the works.531 Three days later, the CIA heard that a secret paramilitary group
was planning a coup, but there is no indication that Chilean military was involved.532
Ten days later, on September 8 - the same day that US Ambassador Davis and Kissinger
met in Washington, DC - the CIA had news of a Navy-led coup in the works for
September 10. The Carabineros were on board. General Pinochet advised the Navy that
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the Army would not oppose the action but he could not guarantee that the Army generals
would want to participate.533
By September 10, the CIA had news that the coup had been moved to September
11, and that all three branches of the military as well as the Carabineros were planning to
take part.534 It is unclear to whom the reports were directed; they may have been internal
within the Agency or they may have been passed along to higher ranking policy makers.
There is no clear indication of whether or not the information was passed along to Nixon
and Kissinger, but it is unlikely that such information would not make its way to the
White House.
Donald Winters, a CIA operative, is quoted by Peter Kornbluh, stating, “We were
not in on planning…But our contacts with the military let them know where we stood –
that was we [sic] were not terribly happy with [the Allende] government.”535 The night
before the coup, a top Chilean coup plotter met with a member of the CIA Santiago
Station team, requesting direct involvement of the CIA in coup events; this request was
refused. “In response to [redacted] query, the [redacted] officer said that he could not
comment on the matter, that the planned action against President Allende was a Chilean
operation, and he could only promise that [redacted] question would promptly be made
known to Washington.”536 Policy makers would not commit to directly supporting the
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coup, and it was carried out on September 11, 1973 without the direct involvement of the
United States.
Nathaniel Davis gives an excellent and detailed account of the events of
September 11 that fills in some gaps in the CIA’s documentation of the event. He
indicates that there were reports of suspicious activity as early 12:00am.537 US
Government documentation describes events occurring after 8:00am. The CIA first
reported that the military had taken over a radio station. Allende, on a different station,
stated that “he was in the Moneda and was prepared to defend the government. He added
that he was waiting for the Army to do its duty and defend the country.”538
The next CIA communications indicated that the Carabineros, excepting a small
group, had left La Moneda at 9:30am. The small group was attempting to convince
Allende to resign. Just before 10:00am, “several vehicles containing Carabinero
officials” arrived at La Moneda.539 By early afternoon, Allende’s Tomás Moro residence
had been bombed “because of resistance by some elements of the Carabineros…and the
Presidential Bodyguards.”540 The CIA reported again that the Carabineros had left La
Moneda before noon. “As of 1230 hours Allende ha[s] not surrendered. The Presidential
Palace is in flames.”541 Allende’s last words, transmitted via Radio Magallanes are
poignant: “Long live Chile! Long live the people! Long live the workers! These are my
537
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last words. I am sure that my sacrifice will not be in vain; I am sure that it will at least be
a moral lesson which will punish felony, cowardice, and treason.”542 Davis writes that
Allende’s death occurred between 1:50pm and 2:20pm. 543
At 2:30pm, a DOS cable sent to Kissinger indicated that the “Armed Forces radio
network announced at 1430 whole country under control, only snipers remain in central
Santiago. States ‘high officials’ of Marxist govt [sic] under arrest, and states Moneda has
surrendered.”544 Another cable before 3:00pm advised that the military had issued an
edict via radio demanding that a long list of individuals “surrender themselves” before
6:30pm that evening. At some point on September 11, Kissinger received a report
advising that there would be a military uprising that day and requesting assurance of US
assistance, should it be necessary.545 If Kissinger or any other US official responded, the
documentation has not been released. As it happened, the Chilean military did not
require US assistance. In the span of fourteen hours, the Allende government, its leader
dead, came crashing down. It was the best of both worlds for US policy makers. Allende
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was gone, the Chilean military in control of the government was friendly to US interests,
and all had been accomplished with as little direct involvement as possible on the part of
the US.
V.

PERPETRATOR TESTIMONY
It is not difficult to guess where Nixon’s and Kissinger’s arguments about US

efforts to destabilize the Allende government lie along the spectrum of interpretations
ranging from the argument that the US was directly responsible for the fall of Allende’s
government to the argument that the US did nothing to purposefully undermine Allende.
The latter is Kissinger’s overarching claim. Nixon’s testimony about US policy during
Allende’s time in power ends with his assertion that the US did not engage in economic
warfare against the Allende regime.546 Kissinger’s continues, making note of specific
events to further bolster his arguments and build his defense. He cites both the major
events of Allende’s presidency and developments in US policy toward Chile during
Allende’s time in power. Kissinger describes in detail the specific events he believes
prompted the military to rebel, relying heavily on the 1977 work of Paul Sigmund in The
Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976.547 Those events have been
reviewed earlier in this chapter. Since Kissinger’s outline of event in Chile is based on
Sigmund’s work, and because there is little reason for Kissinger to misrepresent the
actions of the Allende regime, there is no need to review those events here.
I expected to find inconsistencies between Kissinger’s account of events and the
documentary record. What I found, noted in Chapter Three as well, was that he did not
generally lie outright in his memoirs and was, in some cases, very forthcoming. What

490.

546

Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990),

547

Paul Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende.

146
Kissinger did do was manipulate or spin the information to paint himself in a less
negative light. For the purposes of this chapter, rather than go through his memoirs point
by point, I have chosen four sub-arguments he presents in his testimony as supporting
points for his overall claim that the US Government did not seek to destabilize the
Allende government; first, that it was US policy to respond to Allende’s actions, not to
act against the Chilean Government without cause; second, that the US merely sought to
support the “democratic counterweight” to the Allende regime; third, that the US did not
engage in economic warfare against Allende’s government; last, that in the weeks
approaching September 11, 1970, “no senior [US] official considered a coup likely,”
implying that the US could therefore not be held responsible for actions of which they
had no knowledge. Below I examine evidence Kissinger offers to support those subarguments and apply Browning’s perpetrator testimony tests where appropriate. The selfinterest test, as in Chapter Three, is of less use in evaluating Kissinger’s testimony and
has therefore been excluded, excepting where noted.
US policy to respond to Allende’s actions
The first of Kissinger’s arguments to address is his claim that it was US policy to
respond to Allende’s actions, not to act against Allende without cause. To support his
argument that US policy was to respond to Allende’s actions, Kissinger notes that the
DOS released a statement in November 1970 that “left the future of US-Chile relations up
to the conduct of Allende’s government.” A NARA document titled “Public Position on
Chile,” dated November 20, 1970 supports his claim. The document indicates that the
NSC Senior Review Group prepared a statement “for use by senior US Government
officials in answering questions about Chile,” which states:
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“The new President has taken office in accordance with Chilean constitutional
procedures. We have no wish to prejudge the future of our relations with Chile
but naturally they will depend on the actions which the Chilean Government take
toward the United States and inter-American system. We will be watching the
situation carefully and be in close consultation with other members of the
OAS.”548
Kissinger later cites a television interview with Nixon in early January 1971
announcing that he “[hadn’t] given up on Chile or the Chilean People,” despite Allende’s
anti-American policies.549 The transcript of the interview is available through The
American Presidency Project.
“…we were very careful to point out that [the election of Allende] was the
decision of the people of Chile, and that therefore we accepted that decision… we
can only say that for the United States to have intervened-intervened in a free
election and to have turned it around, I think, would have had repercussions all
over Latin America that would have been far worse than what has happened in
Chile.”550
Kissinger also cites Nixon’s annual Foreign Policy Report in which he stated that
the US posture toward Chile would be guided by Chile’s actions toward the US and other
nations.551 The report is available, again, from The American Presidency Project: “[O]ur
relations [with Chile] will hinge not on their ideology but on their conduct toward the
outside world.”552 Kissinger’s evidence would be much more convincing if we did not
know that policy makers were formulating their “cool and correct posture” policy-making
plans to enact their plan for economic strangulation just after Allende’s inauguration. We
see in Nixon’s January interview the discrepancy between the Administration’s rhetoric
548
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and actual policy. We see something similar in his annual foreign policy report. Though
the Administration shied away from ideology as an impetus for action in developed or
strategically important countries, it is hard to entirely divorce ideology from the impetus
for action Chile.
“Democratic Counterweight”
The second argument to address is Kissinger’s claim that the US sought to
maintain the “democratic counterweight” to Allende by authorizing monetary support to
“opposition groups.”553 Kissinger writes that, overall, the 40 Committee approved $3.88
million to support opposition groups in 1971 and $2.54 million to support opposition
groups in 1972, though, he notes, “actual expenditures were somewhat less.”554
Kissinger also notes that the 40 Committee approved $1,427,666 in October, 1972 for
financial support “to the democratic parties for the march 1973 Congressional
elections.”555
Almost all the amounts approved are redacted from documents that contain
information about the funding approved by the 40 Committee in support of opposition
groups in Chile.556 One DOS document dated April 21, 1971, indicates that $1.24 million
had been approved on January 8.557 One amount was left un-redacted in a NSC
document from April 10, 1972; it indicates that $25,000 was a portion of funds allotted to
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Chilean political parties.558 The proposal for support for the March 1973 elections is
available, but the amounts are, again, redacted.559 As there is no “smoking gun” which
would prove or disprove Kissinger’s claims, we can apply Browning’s tests.
The self-interest test is not particularly useful, here, but the vividness, possibility,
and probability tests are. Indeed, Kissinger’s description is not particularly vivid, which,
in Browning’s estimation, calls into question the validity of this piece of testimony.
Kissinger gives amounts approved for each year without providing dates of specific
funding approvals or for which actions the funds were approved. As usual, he cites no
documentation. The Church Report gives the total amount approved by the 40
Committee throughout Allende’s presidency as “approximately $7 million,”560
confirming the possibility and probability that Kissinger is not misrepresenting the
funding amounts approved by the 40 Committee in support of Allende’s opposition.
Despite monetary support of political parties, Kissinger argues that the US had no
involvement with the strikers in Chile in August of 1972 and that the US provided no
assistance to the strikers, including financial support.561 He also notes that on August 25,
William Colby “sought to bypass the Ambassador by requesting authority for the White
House to channel some of the funds to the strikers.”562 The August 25 memorandum
from Colby to Kissinger and Jack Kubisch appears to be the document to which
Kissinger is referring. The document certainly does indicate that Ambassador Davis had
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decided against funding the strikers, and that Colby was seeking authorization from
Kissinger for private sector support.563
On August 29, Kissinger writes, the White House refused Colby’s request once
again at the recommendation of Bill Jorden, on the grounds that the risk of exposure was
high and that providing the strikers with funds might precipitate a coup.564 But later
Jorden expressed distaste at the idea of a coup, a sentiment Kissinger himself did not hold
in 1970.565 Kissinger admits that the Church Committee did “[discover] exactly one
diversion of $2,800 to striking truckers,”566 saving us the trouble of contradicting his
blanket statement that no funding was given to the strikers. That discovery is indeed
noted in the Church Report.567 There is also documentation indicating that the 40
Committee approved distribution of funds to Chile’s private sector on August 29.568
Kissinger is once again either curiously absent minded or revising history.
In addition to distancing the USG from the strikers in Chile, Kissinger notes that
policy makers had little interaction with the Chilean military and refrained from
involvement with a coup plot in May 1973. He records that he received intelligence that
the Chilean military “were plotting” on May 24, 1973. At the recommendation of
William (Bill) Jorden, the US did nothing.569 A CIA document dated May 26, 1973
confirms that “plotters [were] still working on their action plan…,” but that “…Admirals
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and Generals were under considerable pressure from subordinates to act…”570 The date
may be slightly off, but Kissinger definitely knew in May that a coup was potentially in
the works.
Kissinger also writes that “the only overture to the Chilean military during this
period,” was the sale of F-5E aircraft “to major Latin American countries, including
Chile” on May 15.571 Ostensibly quoting from his memo to Nixon on May 15, he argues:
“If we foreclose the possibility of Chile obtaining U.S. aircraft we could not only
alienate the Chilean military but also give them no alternative but to yield to
Allende’s pressure to purchase Soviet equipment with a concomitant increase in
Soviet influence.”572
His description of the event appears vivid, though, as I discovered, Kissinger’s
readers cannot entirely trust the quotes and excerpts he provides. That may be due to
sloppiness or a deliberate attempt to obscure the issue. Given the discrepancy between
another of Kissinger’s “quotations” and Ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis’s account
of the same meeting, I am inclined to believe the latter. 573 The sale of F5Es to Chile was
certainly possible; the National Museum of the US Air Force notes that Northrop F-5
series aircraft were “procured by the USAF for use by allied nations.”574 His reasoning
behind the sale lends the air of probability. There is no declassified record of that sale
available, but a Department of Defense (DOD) document dated May 18, 1973, indicates
that the Chilean military wished to purchase US air force equipment, not Soviet
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equipment.575 Furthermore, Kissinger mentions the sale in a conversation with Pinochet
in 1976, indicating that the sale would proceed unless Congress passed a bill prohibiting
assistance to Chile.576 Kissinger and Nixon would certainly have taken the opportunity to
maintain the upper hand with the Chilean military by selling them aircraft before the
Soviet Union could. It is very likely, then, that the sale did take place.
Despite the relatively small amount of money provided to the strikers, and despite
the lack of interaction with the Chilean military during this period, can Kissinger rightly
claim that maintaining the democratic counterweight to Allende’s regime was all the US
Government sought to do? His argument implies that intervention in support of
democracy is acceptable. But one could also argue that, as a rule, intervention of any sort
impinges on a state's sovereignty. Many would agree that humanitarian intervention is an
acceptable violation of that rule, but there are still the questions of determining what
constitutes humanitarian intervention, and who gets to decide when such intervention is
legitimate. Kissinger would have a difficult time proving that US action in Chile – both
before and after Allende's election - was legitimate on the humanitarian grounds of
supporting democracy in Chile. The goal of the Nixon Administration was neither so
noble, nor so simplistic. At the very least, US motives were mixed and I would argue
that policy makers, specifically Nixon and Kissinger, gave up any right to claim support
of democracy when they gave orders to seek a coup in 1970. They perceived the rise of a
second socialist-communist government in Latin America as a challenge to US resolve
and a potential threat to US interests, and a blow to the perception of US power and
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authority on the world stage. Furthermore, they knew what implications their decisions
for action would have for democracy in Chile, and they deliberately violated the
democratic principles they publically supported.577
"What we did,” Kissinger argues, “was fund free newspapers and political parties
that sought our help against a heavy-handed, calculated campaign to suppress them
before the next election."578 The US did indeed support opposition political parties in
Chile, as noted above, but the goal was to keep up the political pressure on the Allende
regime within Chile, while the US did what it could to isolate Chile economically. The
US also supported El Mercurio, a newspaper that took a decidedly anti-Allende stance.
But, noted earlier as well, El Mercurio was a propaganda outlet for the CIA, hardly a
bastion of free speech. US support of opposition political parties and media outlets did
more to further erode Chile's democratic tradition than to prop up the democratic
counterweight to Allende’s government.
Economic Warfare?
Kissinger also argues that the US Government did not engage in economic
warfare against the Allende government. He notes that humanitarian programs and “the
pipeline of existing aid commitments” continued in case Allende decided to “moderate
his course;” his assertion is in accordance with NSDM 93, noted earlier in this chapter.
Additionally, he writes that the US Government “supported” two Inter-American
Development Bank loans for $11.5 million to Chilean universities. An article by Paul
Sigmund supports his claim.579 It seems, however, that this instance was an exception to
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general US policy; NSDM 93 called for no new economic aid to Chile. Later in 1971, a
memorandum for Kissinger confirms that the US continued to withhold credit and
disbursement of loans. The memorandum also suggests using all the available red tape to
delay the processing and disbursing loans from institutions not directly under US control:
“…we should seek to obstruct and delay Chilean loan applications before the
IBRD and IDB using technical and procedural reasons to the maximum feasible
extent. Our objective would be to avoid as long as we could an unnecessary
confrontation, the likely adverse repercussions stemming from Chilean charges of
U.S. economic retaliation…The course of action which best corresponds to the
guidelines established by NSDM 93 is to allow the dynamics of Chile’s economic
failures to achieve their full effect while contributing to their momentum in ways
which do not permit the onus to fall upon us.”580
The discussion earlier in this chapter shows that the Allende government was
indeed weakened by increasingly poor economic conditions in the country, due in large
part to the government’s “inefficient administration.” But whether or not US policies had
much effect on Chilean economics and politics, the intent of those policies was certainly
to destabilize the Allende regime, confirmed by Nixon’s own words at a meeting of the
NSC on November 6, 1970.
The topic of debate at the meeting was NSSM 97, an options paper on policy
toward Chile that later became NSDM 93.581 It was at that meeting, Kissinger writes,
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that US policy toward the Allende regime was decided.582 A memorandum of
conversation from the meeting quotes Nixon: “[o]n the economic side we want [to] give
[Allende] cold turkey. Make sure that EXIM [US Export-Import Bank] and the
international organizations toughen up. If Allende can make it with Russian and Chinese
help, so be it – but we do not want it to be with our help, either real or apparent.”583 Two
additional documents demonstrate that the United States carried out Nixon’s directive on
actions taken to destabilize the Chilean economy. NSDM 93 states that “the President
has directed that within the context of a publicly cool and correct posture toward
Chile:…no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the Government
of Chile…existing [economic] commitments will be fulfilled but ways in which, if the
U.S. desires to do so, they could be reduced, delayed or terminated should be
examined.”584 In another document, “Memorandum for the President,” dated January 15,
1972, John Connally of the Treasury Department advised that:
“[Chile has] recently stopped repaying their debts to the U.S. Government and
reportedly most other creditors…we have good reason to believe that far from
keeping the pressure on Chile, they have now been led to believe we have already
agreed to a renegotiation of their debts…As I understand it, this is not our
intention and our principal purpose is to get broad creditor support to isolate
Chile.”585
Nixon’s own notes are visible on this document and they indicate that “This [economic
isolation of Chile] is our policy.”
Kissinger demurs a bit in his memoirs, suggesting that he disagreed with
Connally’s initial approach to the Paris club talks. He contends that, once in the midst of
582

Kissinger, White House Years, 680.
The White House, “Memorandum of Conversation, ‘NSC Meeting – Chile (NSSM 97),’
November 6, 1970,” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 119.
584
NSC, “National Security Decision Memorandum 93, ‘Policy Toward Chile,’ November 9,
1970,” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 130.
585
Treasury Department, “John Connally to President Nixon, SECRET ‘Memorandum for the
President,’ January 15, 1972 (initialed and annotated by Richard Nixon),” in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 132.
583

156
the Paris Club negotiations, the US Treasury representatives, guided by Connally, backed
down from "tough talk" and supported debt rescheduling for Chile in concert with other
Paris Club nations. Kissinger maintains that he supported Connally’s later position more
than Nixon’s hard-line attitude, and argues that he believed the US should have sought to
avoid giving Allende more ammunition for his anti-American rhetoric by adopting a rigid
refusal to reschedule Chile’s debt if no other Paris Club member would agree to maintain
the same policy.586
In a conversation, however, between Kissinger and Nixon on October 5, 1971,
just after Nixon had discussed Allende’s move to charge expropriated American copper
firms with back taxes on “excess” profits that nullified the amount of money the Allende
government offered as a compensation for the expropriated firms, Kissinger stated: “ I
would go to a confrontation with him [Allende], the quicker the better.”587 Kissinger also
advised Nixon that he would work with Connally on Connally’s suggestion that the US
take a hard line approach to Chile. Though policy makers felt it was too risky to be
openly hostile toward the Allende regime, they did what they could behind the scenes to
make life as difficult as possible to Allende and his government; “economic warfare”
seems a relatively fair judgment.
“No senior [US] official considered a coup likely”
To further bolster his argument that the USG did nothing to destabilize Chile,
Kissinger claims that “no senior [US] official considered a coup likely,”588 as quoted
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above. His statement implies that far from encouraging a coup, the USG was completely
out of touch with the Chilean military’s intentions. He notes a 40 Committee decision in
August 1973 to approve another $1 million in funding of opposition groups for the
following year.589 How could the US be accused of support a coup if they were clearly
making plans based on the assumption that Allende would still be in office the following
next year?
Kissinger supports his claim that by noting that he received intelligence on July
10, after the June 29 “Tancazo,” that the military was unlikely to move, despite
indications in May that a coup was being planned.590 Again, at Bill Jorden’s
recommendation, policy makers refrained from action.591 The only document I was able
to locate from July 10 discussing coup possibilities is from the Department of Defense.
The document indicates that, though a coup was not imminent, the military was still
making plans:
“Recent events have apparently strengthened the conviction of some senior air
force and navy officers that President Allende must be removed. They do not,
however, have the necessary army support for a successful take-over. The
military high command opposes any coup plot, but planning continues.”592
If the DOD report is the document to which Kissinger refers, it seems like a stretch to
have inferred that the military was not likely to move when “planning continue[d].” I
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cannot find a document that indicates that Bill Jorden was involved in decision making in
May or June 1973, but his recommendation in August is available593 and is consistent
with Kissinger’s description of his recommendations in May and June.
Kissinger’s claim about the likelihood with which Nixon Administration officials
considered a coup is challenged by the testimony of Ambassador Davis in The Last Two
Years of Salvador Allende. Both men write about their meeting on September 8, 1973,
having each come under fire after the meeting, which, so close to the coup on September
11, invited accusations of US plotting and participation in the coup.594 The two accounts
of the meeting offer an excellent opportunity for comparison and raise questions about
the validity of some of the “evidence” Kissinger offers in his memoirs in support of his
claims. There are similarities in the testimonies. Both men maintain that the purpose of
the meeting was not to “plan the deed,” as Davis quips,595 and they both admit that they
discussed Chile. But Davis disagrees with Kissinger’s argument, described earlier in this
chapter, that US policy makers had no knowledge of a coup in the works.
“Given the state of our knowledge on the afternoon of the eight, it is simply
unbelievable that I [Davis] told Kissinger I could not give him ‘any time frame’
for a coup. I had just finished appealing for the interview to be held on the day
scheduled so I could be back in Santiago as soon as possible.”596
CIA documents support Davis’s claim. Policy makers had indeed received
reports that different groups were either planning or discussing a coup that would happen
in the near future.597 Kissinger was not ignorant of the state of affairs in Chile, Davis
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argues. In fact, Davis states, Kissinger’s conversation opener was, “[s]o there’s going to
be a coup in Chile!”598 Davis himself notes that, “as memory fades,” he may not
remember Kissinger’s precise words about an upcoming coup in Chile, “but [he is]
certain that they convey the meaning of Kissinger’s sardonic remark.”599
Davis also observes that the “transcript” of the conversation that Kissinger
provides in his memoirs is not a transcript at all, but a “write-up” of Lawrence S.
Eagleburger’s notes on the meeting,600 drawing into question the validity of any excerpts
of documents or transcripts Kissinger gives without citing a source. Clearly we, as
Kissinger’s readers, cannot simply take him at his word, highlighting the importance and
usefulness of Browning’s tests in evaluating Kissinger’s testimony when no
corroborating documentation can be located. Davis’s testimony, supported by the
documentary record, refutes not only Kissinger’s claim that Davis could give him no
“time frame for a coup,” but also his claim that “no senior official considered a coup
likely,” as noted above.
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VI.

Conclusion
The documentary record for the period covering Allende’s time in office shows

that the Nixon Administration put more effort into economic action against Chile than
into pursuit of a coup after Allende’s inauguration. US policy makers did not abandon
the thought of a coup altogether, but they did scale back CIA efforts to foment military
action. One explanation to the pullback of US efforts in Chile was that policy makers in
Washington were preoccupied with the distractions of the moment. Kissinger himself
makes this claim in his memoirs. He first argues that he was more concerned with
becoming Secretary of State than with the situation in Chile.601 He also argues that the
Nixon Administration was preoccupied with the “Year of Europe,” the build-up of
tensions in the Middle East, and the Soviet Summit in June.602
Another explanation is that the Administration was simply being more cautious.
One might well ask why, after so deliberate an attempt to foment a coup in 1970, US
policy makers resorted to caution after Allende took office. First, as expressed in Chapter
Two, I contend that one of the reason policy makers decided to use covert means to
achieve their goals in Chile was to avoid the appearance of direct involvement; public
support in the US for large scale, overt intervention, and for the Nixon administration in
general, was waning. In a conversation with John Connally and Bob Haldeman, Nixon
himself acknowledged that, “We can’t send men now, anymore. I mean, as we well
know, I hate fighting these damned wars and things, and so…the major thing we can do

601

Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 375.
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 403. For a discussion of the “Year of Europe,” see Kissinger,
Years of Upheaval, 151-152. For a discussion of the build-up of tensions in the Middle East, see Kissinger,
Years of Upheaval, 195; 207-227. For a discussion of the Soviet Summit in Washington, DC in June 1973,
see Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 286-301.
602

161
is squeeze them economically. And, believe me, that can have one hell of an effect. One
hell of an effect.”603
Second, almost immediately after Allende took office, his government began to
investigate the role the CIA played in the abortive coup in 1970 and the death of General
René Schneider. Though it could be argued that Allende’s investigation into Schneider’s
death was reason enough to intensify efforts against him, the ineffectiveness of Track II
may have inspired a greater amount of caution on the part of US officials. US policy
makers already feared exposure which might further erode domestic support for the
Nixon Administration. The ineffectiveness of Track II and the risk of exposure were two
reasons for caution.
Another explanation is that both the CIA and DOD believed that a coup in Chile
would not be successful without the full commitment of the Chilean military. The CIA
believed that the military lacked the internal unity of purpose for a coup to be successful.
Between November 1970 and August 1973 there were conflicting reports regarding the
readiness of the military to stage a coup. It boiled down to the fact that the military in
Chile had not yet collectively reached the saturation point of frustration with the Allende
regime and that there was not yet enough broad public support for a military move
against the Chilean government. In 1971, the CIA Station in Santiago received reports of
coup plotting. In 1972, CIA informants indicated that the military was very unlikely to
pursue a coup and that plans for a coup were not in the works. In early 1973, CIA
informants indicated that plans for a coup were again in the works. A short while later
the Station in Santiago was informed that there were no plans for a coup. In June,
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however, the “Tancazo” carried out by lower level officers dissatisfied with the Allende
government and the lack of action of their superiors, gave the CIA pause. Not only did
the commanding generals not participate in the attempted coup, they were the leading
elements in the squashing of the rebellion. The CIA could not say with any degree of
certainty that the military was committed to a coup. Furthermore, the US had clearly
been in support of a coup since Allende’s election by popular vote in 1970 and had told
the Chilean military as much, yet the generals continued to vacillate on the subject until
August 1973. It was only after all three branches of the military were unified in their
commitment to a coup that a military move was, indeed, successful.604
Finally, the DOD believed that, when the military finally decided to act, they
would succeed without the direct assistance of the USG and would likely not even ask for
assistance. There was talk among the DOS that if the military commanders decided to act
in pursuit of a coup that they would be able to do so on their own strength without US
assistance.605 So, when the evening before the coup in September 1973, a Chilean
military man came asking for active US support “if the [coup] situation became difficult,”
he was told that the US would make no promises of support, “that the planned action
against President Allende was a Chilean matter,” but that the Chileans’ request would be
made known to policy makers in Washington.606 From other documents that discuss the
attitude of US policy makers at the time, it is clear that it was sufficient for the purpose of
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policy makers to express verbal support for an overthrow. As more was not necessary,
more was not done.
The Nixon Administration got its wish when Allende was overthrown on
September 11. Indeed, the Chilean military proved perfectly capable of affecting a
takeover without US assistance. But the public exposure of US involvement in Chilean
politics the Administration feared was not long in coming and, as was expected, Congress
and the American public were not particularly pleased.

164

CHAPTER FIVE
FALL-OUT IN WASHINGTON AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHILE
“…I am not on the same wave length with you guys on this
business. I just am not eager to overthrow these guys [the
Pinochet regime].”
~ Kissinger, to Bill Rogers, June 3, 1976607
I.

INTRODUCTION
The time period covered in this chapter stretches from the days after the coup in

1973 through the end of the Ford Administration in 1976. Several features of that time
period stood out to me as I conducted my research. First, covert activity in Chile
decreased dramatically after the coup; with Allende removed from power, there was no
reason to continue the same program of action. Second, as the American public and
Congress became aware of CIA activities in Chile through a series of articles by Seymour
Hersh, policy makers were forced to focus on the fall-out from exposure in Washington.
Third, human rights abuses, already a hot button issue in international politics, became
increasingly important to the US Congress. The Pinochet regime’s appalling human
rights record earned the censure of the international community. As Congress put
pressure on the Ford Administration to address the issue, Kissinger was forced to adjust
his public rhetoric on policy toward Chile, though the substance of policy did not change.
After a short history of events closely following the coup, this chapter proceeds more
thematically than chronologically in order to highlight the features listed above.
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II.

BRIEF POST-COUP NARRATIVE
The CIA and DOS both documented thoroughly the first few days and months

following the coup, the CIA covering events on the ground in Chile, the DOS covering
the development of an official policy regarding the recognition of the new regime. A few
months after the coup, CIA documentation drops off sharply. DOS documentation
decreases as well. 608 The subject matter also changes. The primary focus of the
documents shifts from the situation in Chile to the situation in Washington.
CIA documents from 1975 are composed of general briefs of CIA activity and
communications between the CIA and White House about the Church Committee’s
request that documents regarding Chile be made available to their committee. Some
briefs include cover letters indicating that they were written to be used as talking points
for officials who were being questioned by the Church Committee; others were prepared
as background information for the Committee’s review. Still others have no cover letters,
but my operating assumption was that they were written for a similar purpose. The DOS
collection is dominated by documents regarding communications about the deaths of
Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, two American citizens arrested by the Chilean
military or Carabineros and later found dead, presumably executed.
Two days after the coup, a DOS cable indicates that though the desire of US
policy makers was to strengthen the relationship with the new Chilean government, the
United States needed to avoid the appearance of endorsing the regime.609 Public
perception of the US Government’s relationship with Chile was a strong consideration for
608
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the Nixon Administration, causing policy makers to delay public declaration of their
support for the new Chilean government,610 though at the time they were willing to
support the GOC in other ways (monetary support, etc). A memorandum in October
1973 by William Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence, reveals clearly the
Administration’s priorities when considering actions to be taken by the CIA in Chile:
first, the security and risk of each operation; second, coordination between US
government entities and representatives in Chile (CIA and the US Ambassador, etc) in
planning and carrying out operations; and third, cost.611
Two months after the coup the Administration was still trying to decide how to
approach the new Chilean regime and formulate an official policy. CIA Headquarters
had instructed the Santiago Station in September to recommend to the 40 Committee a
restructured Chile program, in tandem with Ambassador Davis, since the coup had
dramatically changed the political situation in the country.612 The CIA did request,
however, that they be allowed to give previously promised financial support to the
PDC.613
A DOS memo from November 1973, records a discussion about continuing PDC
support.614 Department of State officials were glad to be rid of Allende, but were not
quite satisfied with the character of the junta (Pinochet had not yet assumed the role of
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sole dictator). There was a debate over how involved the USG should continue to be,
specifically how much monetary support should be given to the PDC in order to maintain
a political balance in the Chilean government. The PDC did not support Allende, but
neither did its members fully support the junta after the coup. The CIA believed that a
strong PDC could stabilize the political situation in Chile disrupted by the coup as well as
bring legitimacy to, and maintain the governing effectiveness of, the junta.615
The Allende government, US policy makers believed, had presented a significant
enough threat to warrant using the CIA to try to remove Allende from power, but they
debated the necessity of “fine tuning” the political situation in Chile. They did not wish
to anger the junta by supporting a party that might oppose the junta’s actions and
decisions. Neither did they wish to risk public censure for using covert action. As Jack
Kubisch, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, stated at the DOS
meeting, “[W]e [have] to be extremely careful about using [the CIA]…The damage to the
US and to the USG were it to become known that we were engaged in covert operations
could be very great, and across the board, in today’s world. We have been hurt by
publicity about covert programs.”616 Kubich’s comment reflects the importance policy
makers placed on the reputation of the United States, characteristic of Nixon’s and
Kissinger’s foreign policy and rightly so, given that their fears were shortly realized.
It is difficult to determine the exact point at which US policy makers began to
consider Pinochet’s government a permanent fixture, not just a transitional regime. Some
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of the first acts of the junta were to declare a state of siege617 and to dissolve Congress.618
But on September 20, Pinochet stressed that democratic government would be restored
once the political situation in Chile stabilized.619 A week before, Pinochet indicated that
the junta, acting in the “moderator role” as characterized by Alfred Stepan in The
Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil,620 had plans to stay in power for a
year.621 In November, however, though Pinochet advised that the “state of siege” would
last at least another eight months, he stressed that the “state of war,” would last much
longer,622 an indication that the junta saw itself as moving from the role of “moderator” to
the role of “director” of the political system, its goal “shift[ing] from that of systemmaintenance to that of system-change.”623

617

Ministerio de Defensa Nacional y Subsecretaria de Guerra, “Decreto Ley No. 3 – declara un
estado de sitio,” September 18, 1973, Biblioteca de Congreso Nacional de Chile, http://www.leychile.cl/
Navegar?idNorma=215063&idVersion=1973-09-18.
618
Ministerio del Interior y Subsecretaria del Interior, “Decreto Ley No. 27 – disuelve el congreso
nacional,” September 21, 1973, Biblioteca de Congreso Nacional de Chile, http://www.leychile.cl/
Navegar? idNorma=209763.
619
DOS, “Chile At Work,” September 20, 1973, Department of State Freedom of Information Act
Chile Declassification Project, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pinochet/8d47.pdf.
620
Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1971), 63-64. Stepan describes the role of “moderator” as one in which the military is
expected to move against a regime that violates the constitution and return government to civilian rule once
a suitable executive can be elected. As Stepan notes, “After the presidential election in Chile in 1970, the
anti-Allende parliamentary majority predictable adopted the “moderator model” when they implicitly gave
the military the role of maintaining the constitutional status quo, thus checking the executive [Allende].”
See Stepan, the Military in Politics, 79. In an earlier work, Stepan notes five “’ideal-types’ of military role
beliefs,” identified by J. Samuel Fitch in a paper prepared for the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington,
DC, 1987: “From the least to the most interventionist, the ideal-types were (1) classic professionalism, (2)
democratic professionalism, (3) constitutional guardians, (4) guardians of national interest, (5) guardians of
national security.” Fitch’s paper remains unpublished but Stepan’s later description in The Military in
Politics seems to indicate that the Chilean military could be characterized as holding the “constitutional
guardian” role during Allende’s time in power. See Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the
Southern Cone, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 133.
621
CIA, “Central Intelligence Bulletin Chile,” September 13, 1973, U.S. Department of State,
Freedom of Information Act, CIA Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia3/
searchable_0000913C.pdf.
622
DOS, “Pinochet Press Conference,” November 9, 1973, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of
Information Act, State Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pinochet/ searchable_931f.pdf.
623
Stepan, The Military in Politics, 134.

169
The Hinchey Report marks March 1974 as a turning point: “In March 1974, on
the six-month anniversary of the Junta's establishment, Pinochet verbally attacked the
Christian Democratic Party and stated that there was no set timetable for the return to
civilian rule. On 18 December 1974 Pinochet was declared Supreme Leader of the
nation.”624 Pinochet’s attitude persisted into 1975. Talking points for a meeting between
Ambassador Ryan and Frederick Sherman on October 6, 1975 note that the “Military will
leave power when its [sic] convinced that ‘Marxist cancer’ has been completely
eradicated from the Chilean body politic.”625 In January 1976, an article in the Ottawa
Citizen noted that “Pinochet has made it clear that the armed forces will stay in power in
Chile ‘maybe for a generation,’ and that if Chile ever does go to some other form of
government it will be an as yet undefined ‘new democracy.’”626
Ultimately, I would argue, US policy makers were glad to be rid of Allende and,
despite the Pinochet regime’s human rights record, they were not particularly keen for the
Chilean political scene to return to business as usual. Kissinger was angered by
Ambassador David H. Popper’s discussion of human rights at a meeting with Chilean
government officials in 1974 regarding US military aid: “Tell Popper to cut out the
political science lectures.”627 A conversation between Henry Kissinger and Bill Rogers
on June 3, 1976 further illustrates my point:
“Kissinger: “…I am not on the same wave length with you guys on this business.
I just am not eager to overthrow these guys [the Pinochet government].
624
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Rogers: The issues are absolutely separate. Who governs Chile and what they do
about human rights…
Kissinger: I know but I think we are systematically undermining them.”628
Pinochet’s rise to power, though perhaps unfortunate for the Chilean people, was
apparently perfectly fortunate for the United States, from Kissinger’s perspective.
III.

OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS: THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AND THE HINCHEY
REPORT
Nixon departed office on August 9, 1974, resigning in the face of impeachment

proceedings, and Gerald Ford stepped into office the same day. Kissinger stayed on as
Ford’s Secretary of State. Just a few months later, the public became aware of CIA
activities in Chile as well as illegal domestic activities through a series of articles by
Seymour Hersh of the New York Times.629 The American public was outraged by the
revelations. So was the US Congress. In A Season of Inquiry, Loch Johnson lists three
factors that contributed to the “extraordinary outburst on Capitol Hill” after Hersh’s
articles exposing the activities of the CIA hit newsstands: the timing of the articles, the
“pervasive attitude of suspicion” created by the Watergate scandal, and the change in
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public attitude and opinion about Communism with the introduction of détente in USSoviet relations.630
The political atmosphere in the US was already charged. In an article titled,
“Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy
of the Church Committee,” published in Public Administration Review, Loch Johnson
observes that in the early 1970s, the general public began to lose faith in government
institutions.631 The seed of mistrust was only compounded by the breaking open of the
Watergate scandal in 1972. In Realignment in American Politics, Bruce A. Campbell and
Richard J. Trilling argue that Watergate challenged the legitimacy of Executive office.632
John Prados echoes Campbell’s and Trilling’s observation in Safe for Democracy: The
Secret Wars of the CIA, remarking that by 1972 officials in the Nixon Administration had
gained a reputation as “manipulators of information.”633
As discussed in Chapter Two, US involvement in the Vietnam War put an
additional strain on the American public’s faith in its leaders. In Not Without Honor,
Richard Gid Powers argues that Vietnam was a death knell for anti-communism, quoting
Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary magazine: “The revulsion against the Vietnam
war…had led ‘to the idea that the entire policy of trying to check the spread of
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Communism was and always had been morally wrong...’”634 Though the Nixon
Administration’s motivation for deepening involvement in Chile in 1970 was more
complicated than simply pursuing a policy of anticommunism,635 the public was bound to
draw the seemingly obvious parallel between US involvement in Vietnam and Chile.
Powers later adds that “the post-Vietnam public was ready to believe the worst of the
government that had led the country to disaster.”636 Campbell and Trilling offer another
possible factor, noting that, “The year 1973…brought the beginning of a severe economic
downturn, which could only contribute to the already high levels of political conflict.”637
Suddenly, Kissinger and other key policy makers were forced to defend the
actions they had sanctioned. One particularly important document is a memorandum of
conversation from a Cabinet meeting on September 17, 1974. The conversation
transcribed lays out clearly Nixon’s and Kissinger’s defense of US actions.638
“Covert operations are those which can’t be done in any other way. If they are
leaked, we cannot conduct this policy. Not much is being done, but what is, is
being done because they are important and can’t be done in any other way…The
effort of the 40 Committee was not to overthrow Allende but to preserve the
democratic system for the 1976 [presidential] elections.”639
Kissinger goes on to argue that Allende was going to establish a Communist dictatorship,
that the US was therefore defending democracy, that policy makers reduced aid to Chile
but did not engage in economic warfare, and that Allende effected his own downfall by
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mismanaging the Chilean economy,640 claims both Nixon and Kissinger echo in their
memoirs.
Kissinger’s mention of the 40 Committee is somewhat deceptive. The argument
that policy makers were merely supporting the “democratic counterweight” to the
Allende regime, discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, is unsupportable. The Nixon
Administration was clearly interested in Allende’s downfall, though policy makers were
rather more cautious in their approach to relations with Allende’s government than they
had been before his inauguration. Furthermore, though the 40 Committee was officially
in charge of making decisions about how the CIA would conduct its campaign against
Salvador Allende, Nixon and Kissinger were the driving force behind policy making.
Nixon himself attended the 40 Committee meeting on November 6, 1970, something he
rarely did, during which Committee members discussed NSSM 97 and decided official
policy on Chile.641
A few months after Hersh’s articles were published in The New York Times, no
less than three separate committees were created in response to the reaction in
Washington to investigate the activities of the US Intelligence Community at home and
abroad: The Rockefeller Commission, created by President Ford, the Church Committee
in the Senate, and the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives. Hersh continued
to publish articles after the three committees had been formed, further cementing in the
collective mind of the public the issue of the Intelligence Community’s seemingly
unrestricted activity.642
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The President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, known
informally as The Rockefeller Commission, was established by President Ford as an
attempt to stem the tide of discontent in Washington over the revelations of intelligence
activities. Ford appointed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as head of the
investigation.643 In Fighting the Odds: The Life of Senator Frank Church, Leroy Ashby
and Rod Gramer observe that the Rockefeller Commission dodged the assassination
topic. Frank Church, in particular, disapproved of the way the Rockefeller report,
“relegated specifics about assassinations to a secret, eighty-six page supplement for the
president.”644 Church’s frustration over this aspect of the Rockefeller report was the
chief reason the Church Committee tackled the topic.645
The Pike Committee’s report was lacking as well. It was too incendiary, likely as
a reaction to the obstacles the Committee faced in their investigation. The Pike
Committee met with a great deal more frustration than the Church Committee in trying to
obtain classified documents for review. Otis Pike set himself and his committee up for
problems by refusing to compromise when asking for documents from the White House
and CIA. In an article on the Pike Committee and the CIA, Gerald Haines explains the
difficulty:
“[Pike]…refused to allow CIA or the executive branch to stipulate the terms
under which the committee would receive or review classified information. Pike
insisted, moreover, that the committee had the authority to declassify intelligence
documents unilaterally. He appeared bent on asserting what he saw as the
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Constitutional prerogatives of the legislative branch over the executive branch,
and CIA was caught in the middle.”646
The Committee also often made demands for large numbers of documents and insisted
the documents be delivered by the next day. Another cause of tension, Haines observes,
was the different backgrounds the members of each group came from. “An underlying
problem was the large cultural gap between officers trained in the early years of the Cold
War and the young staffers of the anti-Vietnam and civil rights movements of the late
1960s and early 1970s.”647 As Johnson notes, even Frank Church was aware of the
explosive nature of the relationship between the Pike Committee and the White House
and CIA, citing the Senator’s comment that the Church Committee should “avoid the
needless pyrotechnics of the House [Pike] committee.”648 The reports of both the
Rockefeller Commission and the Pike Committee were greatly criticized: the Rockefeller
report because it was lukewarm; the Pike report because it was unnecessarily
inflammatory.
Of the three committees, the Church Committee had the greatest effect on
government policy with respect to the Intelligence Community. As Johnson observes,
“the Church Committee…[brought] about a major power shift,”649 by strengthening
senatorial review of the activities of the Intelligence Community. He also remarks that,
“[t]he scope of the Church Committee investigation was staggering,”650 reviewing not
only the activities of the CIA, in multiple domestic and foreign locations, but those of the
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FBI and NSC as well.651 The Committee had eight months to “probe a multitude of
alleged intelligence abuses that had taken place over the past quarter-century.”652 It took
eight months more for the Committee members to finish their investigation.653 To
complete its mission the Committee, “conducted numerous interviews, held sixty days of
hearings, and accumulated more than eight thousand pages of sworn testimony.”654
As noted in Chapter One of this thesis, what is commonly known as the Church
Report is a staff report on the preliminary findings of the Church Committee prior to the
Committee’s hearings. The report details when discussing the specific covert action
techniques used by CIA in Chile to keep Allende out of power, the programs
implemented to destabilize the GOC after Allende was elected president in 1970, and the
decline of CIA activities after the successful coup in 1973.655
Perhaps the harshest criticism is found in the in-depth analysis of Congressional
oversight of CIA activities. First, the arguments that have been given by the CIA and
government officials to justify CIA activities are examined and criticized, namely, that
the Allende government was a threat because it would 1. likely form relations with
communist and socialist countries (particularly with Cuba), 2. the Soviet Union could
conceivably exert strong influence over the Allende regime, and 3. Chile could become
“a base for Latin American subversion.”656 The report’s authors then argues that,
ultimately, four problems contributed to insufficient Congressional oversight by the 40
Committee: the lack of timely reporting of activities by CIA officials, insufficiently
651
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detailed reporting, lack of reporting regarding funds spent, and the lack of
communication of certain important activities, such as the instigation of a coup in 1970.
657

The writers of the report conclude that policy makers believed that the rise of a
socialist/communist government in Chile posed enough of a security threat to warrant US
involvement in Chilean politics.658 The writers also determined that the CIA did not act
on its own as a “rogue elephant,” but was closely controlled by the executive branch.659
There were, however, “genuine shortcomings” in the established accountability process.
The CIA decided which proposals for action were made to the 40 Committee, based on
“the Agency’s determination of the political sensitivity of a project.”660 There was no
uniform process for obtaining approval of projects by the Ambassador; “[The process]
depended…on how interested Ambassadors are and how forthcoming their Station chiefs
are.”661 The 40 Committee did not generally reexamine projects it had approved unless a
major change was made to the project or the project was up for renewal; projects that
became ineffective or addressed a situation inefficiently or inappropriately were rarely
rooted out. Additionally, the “clandestine projects not labeled ‘covert action’” were
never reviewed by the 40 Committee.662
The writers of the report also concluded that the exclusion of the State
Department and the US Embassy in Chile from any knowledge of or involvement in
Track II created two problems: first, Nixon, Kissinger, and others closely involved in
657
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Track II were “deprived” of the expertise of members of the larger foreign policy making
body on Chile; second, the US Ambassador in Chile had to “deal with” the backlash of
Track II without having knowledge that would have better prepared him to address the
fall out. Finally, the impression that Nixon and Kissinger gave to the CIA in establishing
Track II was that the CIA had carte blanche and operatives at the Station in Santiago felt
they were “under extreme pressure” to keep Allende from achieving the Presidency.
Additionally, no clear direction was given to the CIA regarding what proposals for action
required White House clearance,663 Congressional oversight was lacking,664 and there
was no clear connection between the assessment of political analysts and proposals for
action.665
The writers also argued that unforeseen costs of covert action may have
outweighed the goal achieved. US legitimacy abroad may have been diminished by
reports of US manipulation of Chilean politics. The parties the US Government most
wanted to support, such as the PDC, may actually have been hurt by US involvement.
Instead of building its own strong political support base, the PDC relied on US support.
When US support was reduced, as it was between 1964 and 1970, the PDC suffered.
Furthermore, general revelations of US support of the PDC may itself have undermined
the PDC’s credibility within Chile. Such revelations may also have discredited overt
methods of involvement in Chilean politics and economics. Moreover, the availability of
covert means might in future “postpone the day when outmoded policies are abandoned
and new ones adopted.”666
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The writers of the Report then asked some questions for reflection which set the
stage for the Committee’s hearings: Did the threat posed by the Allende regime as an
established socialist government justify the instigation of a coup? Could the US be held
accountable for the rise of an oppressive dictatorship, with Pinochet at its head?”667
Whether or not the CIA’s activities were harmful or unconstitutional, the writers of The
Church Report also aimed to make recommendations that the Committee could make that
would bring CIA back under the mantle of Congressional oversight.668 This conscious
deferral of judgment shows us why the Church Committee’s reports were so influential
by demonstrating that the committee members were more interested in making viable
recommendations for change than in crucifying the Intelligence Community.
The dispassionate presentation of critiques in the Church Report, as well as the
manner in which the Committee conducted its investigation contributed greatly to the
realization of the major goals of the Committee, chiefly the strengthening of
Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community.669 But the Church Committee
did more than establish a superior mechanism for the review of intelligence activities.
The Committee’s proceedings indirectly influenced the public as well. Johnson notes
two important side effects of the Committee proceedings: the raising of citizen awareness
regarding intelligence abuses670 and, through the creation of the Senate Intelligence
Review Board, the restoration of public confidence in intelligence activities.671 Those
side effects may have been of greater significance than the Church Committee’s stated
aims.
667
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The Hinchey Report
As noted in Chapter One, the Hinchey Report was the CIA’s response to the
Hinchey Amendment, enacted in 2000. Though the Hinchey Report, coming much later,
could have had no effect on what was happening in Washington in 1974 and 1975, it is
fitting to discuss the report in conjunction with the Church Report, as the Hinchey Report
can be considered an official follow-up to the Church Report, and because it discusses
topics addressed later in this chapter. The writers of the Hinchey Report state that what
they produced should not be taken as a “definitive history” of CIA involvement in Chile,
but rather as the “good-faith effort to respond in an unclassified format” to the request of
the Congress. Section 311 of the 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act asked the CIA to
describe in detail the involvement of the intelligence community in three specific events:
“(1) The assassination of President Salvador Allende in September 1973.
(2) The accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency of the Republic
of Chile.
(3) Violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of former
President Pinochet.”672
Given the mandate of the writers of the Hinchey Report, we could have expected
a detailed discussion of US knowledge of DINA and Operation Condor,673 both of which
perpetrated terrible human rights abuses, especially considering that the topic was not
covered in the Church Report. The Hinchey Report, however, is nowhere near as
thorough as the Church Report. DINA is never mentioned by name, though the writers
do discuss the CIA’s relationship with Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, the head of DINA,
672
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seen by the CIA as “the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the
Junta.”674

The only mention of Operation Condor is a short section in the summary of

the report, a few sentences in the discussion of the CIA’s relationship with Contreras, and
a short paragraph on the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit, one of
Condor’s more famous operations.675
The writers of the report do respond, at least in part, to the questions of Congress,
concluding that the CIA was not involved in Allende’s death (the report also notes the
generally accepted conclusion that Allende committed suicide), that the CIA supported
the Junta after the 1973 coup but was not involved in Pinochet’s accession to the
presidency, and that though some of the Chilean officers involved in human rights abuses
were indeed CIA contacts or agents, the Intelligence Community guidelines regarding the
reporting of human rights abuses by Agency contacts were more lax than “[t]oday’s
much stricter reporting standards,” maintaining that “many [Chilean] agents [guilty of
abuses] would have been dropped.”676 Though the section of the report on Contreras is
revealing, the writers of the report leave much unwritten, such as a thorough review of
the CIA’s knowledge of the human rights abuses perpetrated by DINA officials, more
information about the genesis of Operation Condor and its evolution from an intelligence
sharing organization to an assassination operation, and a discussion of other famous
Condor abuses, for example the assassination of Carlos Prats in Argentina in 1974.677
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IV.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE HORMAN AND TERUGGI CASES
While the White House and CIA were dealing with the Church Committee, the

Department of State was under fire from another quarter – the public. Two American
citizens (“AMCITS,” in certain documents), Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, were
arrested by the Chilean military shortly after the coup. Both men were taken to the
soccer stadium in Santiago with hundreds, if not more than a thousand Chileans, and
were never seen alive again outside the stadium. The families of both men actively
investigated their deaths and eventually sought answers from the CIA and the DOS.
Cables from the US Embassy in Santiago to Henry Kissinger indicate that the
Embassy had knowledge of the detention of several American citizens, among them
Horman and Teruggi. The cables list the status of each detainee, as reported to and/or
confirmed by the Embassy. The Embassy reported regularly on detained or missing
Americans and actively pursued their release.678 As one report indicates: “The Embassy
continues attempt locate [sic] missing persons and to visit detained persons and secure
their release.”679 Another document indicates that Embassy officials checked several
locations for possible American detainees, including hospitals and morgues.680

Several

detained Americans were released on September 26,681 and were assisted by the US
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Consulate in making arrangements to leave Chile as soon as possible.682 Horman and
Teruggi were not so lucky. There is some evidence to indicate that the junta was
frustrating Embassy efforts. Handwritten notes suggest that the junta was withholding
information, specifically about Horman’s death.683
Horman was reported missing by a neighbor, Heliette Saint-John, to the US
Embassy, on September 18, 1973. 684 The Embassy recorded that Horman had been
detained, “[w]hereabouts unknown.”685 The report was made to M.T. Perez de Arce, an
official at the US Embassy in Santiago. Perez de Arce advised Heliette Saint-John that
Joyce Horman, Charles Horman’s wife, should register at the Embassy immediately, if
she and her husband had not already done so.686 The testimony of one of Horman’s
neighbors, Mario Carvajal Araya and his wife, Isabella Rastello de Carvajal, indicates
that they received a phone call from the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) advising
that Horman was in custody. The SIM agent asked Mrs. Carvajal whether she knew
Horman to be a radical leftist; to which she replied that she was unaware of Horman’s
political affiliations. Mrs. Carvajal was informed that the conversation was being
recorded and that her life would be in danger if it was discovered that she was not telling
the truth.687 The Embassy did make a concerted effort to locate Horman.688 On October
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18, the Government of Chile advised US officials that Horman’s body had been located
on October 4th or earlier; Horman had apparently died on September 18.689 He had been
buried, was ordered exhumed, and identified via fingerprint.690
Handwritten notes on the US Embassy’s report indicate that Embassy officials
made a concerted effort to locate Teruggi as well. He was reportedly detained by the
Carabineros on September 20; the Carabineros planned to take Teruggi to the National
Stadium, as noted above. The National Stadium was the holding place for many
disappeared victims immediately following the coup; most of those detained in the
National Stadium were never seen again. The initial report that Teruggi was found dead
in a morgue on September 25, killed by a bullet wound,691 turned out to be false. He was
indeed dead, but a later cable indicates that his body was not located until early October
at the Instituto Medical Legal, prepared for transport back to the United States.692 The
official report of his death states that he was reportedly released from the National
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Stadium alive, but was never seen by his friends or family after his release.693 One
document reveals that Teruggi was released from the National Stadium two hours after
the imposed curfew, implying that the he had been shot to death for not complying with
the curfew.694 Frank Teruggi’s father wrote several letters in 1975 requesting the release
of information from the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act and was denied each
time.695 In 1976, at the request of the Church Committee, sanitized copies of documents
were released to the Committee. There is no indication that those documents were
released to Horman’s or Teruggi’s families.696
Charles Horman’s father eventually brought suit against the State Department and
Henry Kissinger, charging that Kissinger and the DOS were involved in Horman’s
detention and subsequent death.697 The Center for Constitutional Rights, the organization
that assisted Horman’s father in filing the suit against Kissinger and the State
Department, gives a description of the case on the organization’s website, citing a DOS
memo dated August 25, 1976 as evidence of the US Government’s complicity in
Horman’s death.698 The writers of the DOS memo do admit that there is circumstantial
evidence that the accusations may be accurate. “U.S. intelligence may have played an
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unfortunate part in Horman’s death. At best, it was limited to providing or confirming
information that helped motivate his murder by the GOC. At worst, U.S. intelligence was
aware the GOC saw Horman in a rather serious light and U.S. officials did nothing to
discourage the logical outcome of GOC paranoia.”699 The Center for Constitutional
Rights notes that the case was “voluntarily dismissed” by the Horman family “due to the
inability to depose key witnesses and to obtain evidence classified as ‘secret,’” though the
Hormans may decide to “reinstate” the lawsuit if more information is declassified in
future.700
Whether the CIA provided incriminating information about Horman and Teruggi
to the Government of Chile or simply refrained from stepping in to save either man from
execution, the US Embassy, at least, seemed to be acting in the interests of both men and
their families. It is clear from one cable that the Embassy made every effort to locate and
identify both Charles Horman and the body of Frank Teruggi.701 Horman and Teruggi
may have simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Whatever the case, the
Horman and Teruggi issue compounded the difficulties the USG experienced in the mid
1970s.
V.

THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS AN ISSUE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE
Jack Donnelly, the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations in the

Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, has written a
primer, International Human Rights, on the history, theories, debates, and case studies of
the issue of human rights on the global stage. He writes that the Holocaust was “the

699

Ibid.
Ibid.
701
DOS, “American Citizens in Chile,” September 27, 1973, U.S. Department of State, Freedom
of Information Act, State Chile Collection, http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pinochet/8d58.pdf.
700

187
catalyst that made human rights an issue in world politics.”702 States were not held
responsible to the international community for crimes against their own citizens until the
Nuremberg Trials introduced the concept of crimes against humanity. The United
Nations did much to move toward codification of human rights throughout the 1940s,
with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948.703
Though great progress had been made, Donnelly argues that the Cold War was a
severe set-back to the development of the global human rights agenda: “human rights
became just another arena of superpower struggle.”704 In the 1950s, The Soviet Union
violated human rights by violently suppressing opposition forces in the states within its
sphere of influence. The United States, meanwhile, deemed human rights violations
acceptable by anticommunist states. Donnelly also notes that “a draft covenant to give
human rights binding force in international law” was nearly completed in the early 1950s,
taking a step further toward codifying human rights standards. The draft, however, was
“tabled for more than a decade, hostage to East-West ideological rivalry.”705
The decolonization of Africa in the late 1950s brought new members to the UN
that “had a special interest in human rights,”706 highlighting the issue of racial
discrimination. As a result, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination became “opened for signature and ratification” in 1965 and the
International Human Rights Conventions (the International Covenant on Civil and
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Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights) were finished a year later.707
Though the UN cannot dictate law to sovereign states, Donnelly writes that there
was an important shift in the 1960s and into the 1970s “from merely setting standards [of
international human rights] to examining how those standards were implemented by
states,” with several “international monitoring initiatives.”708 Specifically in regard to
Chile, Donnelly notes that the UN established the Ad Hoc Working Group on the
Situation of Human Rights in Chile in 1973 to monitor the reported abuses of the military
junta. Three years later, the UN Human Rights Committee was established as the
International Human Rights Conventions came into effect.709
The 1970s also saw the “introduc[tion] [of human rights] into the bilateral foreign
policies of individual countries…beginning in the United States.”710 The US Congress
established the policy that the human rights record of recipient countries must be factored
into the calculation of US foreign aid. “Such legislation,” Connelly writes, “was both
nationally and internationally unprecedented.”711 Outside of government action,
Donnelly notes that the number of nongovernmental organizations devoted to human
rights increased greatly. The increasing importance of human rights both on the
international and domestic stages had a great effect on US foreign policy during the Ford
Administration.
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VI.

THE PINOCHET REGIME’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND US RESPONSE
The Pinochet regime quickly became notorious for its abysmal human rights

record. In The Vicaría de la Solidaridad: An America’s Watch Report, Cynthia Brown
notes the extent of the abuses:
“[C]oncentration camps [were] filled with prisoners, torture of political detainees
frequently resulted in death, supporters of the previous government were killed by
firing squad, disappeared, left by roadsides, taken from their workplaces and
homes, threatened, expelled from jobs and places of study, in a wave of reprisals
of such proportion that it could not be fully documented…
Between September 1973 and the end of 1977, an unknown number of Chileans
disappeared following their arrest by agents of the security police, DINA. Some
660 cases are currently before the courts, filed by the Vicaría. These are only the
most fully-documented cases, however; estimates on total disappearances range
up to 2,500.”712
The international community put pressure on the regime itself to end the abuses and
pressured the United States to use its influence over the new Chilean government. The
importance of human rights in US policy can be seen in the communications among US
government agencies regarding US relations with Chile in May 1975 and beyond. The
discussion of human rights revolved around domestic public opinion and pressures from
the international community. As the writers of a DOS strategy paper for policy toward
Chile argued, “in Chile at this time [the human rights question] is and should be the
dominant factor. There are no other U.S. interests in Chile, individually or collectively,
which outweigh it. Further, the cost to the U.S. of continued identification as the
principal supporter of the present GOC [Government of Chile] significantly outweighs
the benefits received.”713
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The United Nations General Assembly passed resolutions in 1974, 1975, and
1976 condemning the Chilean Government’s flagrant human rights abuses.714 The UN
Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, among others, also condemned the GOC’s treatment of its
political prisoners.715 Amnesty International reported on human rights abuses in Chile in
1974716 and the Organization of American States denounced reports of human rights
violations by the Chilean Government.717 Even Zhou Enlai, first Premier of the People’s
Republic of China, requested that Kissinger “‘exercise some influence’ over the military
junta…‘[the junta] shouldn’t go in for slaughtering that way. It was terrible.’”718
As Donnelly stated, in 1975 the US Congress amended the 1961 Foreign
Assistance Act to include legislation affecting the ability of the US Government to
provide aid to governments known to have committed human rights abuses, putting
pressure on the USG to exert its influence over the junta.719 Outwardly, at least, the
United States needed to distance itself from the Pinochet regime and show that US
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officials were putting pressure on Chile to resolve its human rights issues. In a
conversation with Chilean Colonel Manuel Contreras, CIA officials indicated to the
Colonel that the CIA could not appear to assist the Chilean government with any
questionable activity. CIA officials also stressed the importance of adhering to
international standards for treatment of prisoners:
“Agency [CIA] cannot provide training or support for any activities which might
be construed as ‘internal political repression’…Agency was very pleased by the
17 January 1974 [Chilean] Ministry of National Defense circular giving
instructions for the handling of prisoners which conforms to the norms of the
1949 Geneva Convention. We hope your government will continue to adhere to
these norms.”720
I discussed in Chapter Two the reasoning behind the Ford Administration’s
continued support of Pinochet, but it is well here to review the strategic calculations that
factored in to that policy. Again, it may be beneficial to the reader to reference Table
1.2.721 There was no need to intervene in order to maintain or re-establish the world
balance of power, Pinochet’s government was friendly to the United States and open to
US influence, and the Chilean regime presented no challenge to US authority and
leadership in the region. But, as I argued in that chapter, pressure from the US Congress
and the international community to address the issue of human rights with Pinochet’s
regime demanded a response. One conversation, in particular, demonstrates the
dichotomy between rhetoric and policy:722
[Kissinger to Pinochet] “I am going to speak about human rights this afternoon in
the General Assembly [of the OAS]. I delayed my statement until I could talk to
you. I wanted you to understand my position…I will say that the human rights
issue has impaired relations between the U.S. and Chile…I can do no less,
720

CIA, “Intelligence Memorandum [Col. Contreras Luncheon at CIA Headquarters],” March 4,
1974, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 253.
721
See Table 1.1.
722
DOS, “Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Kissinger and Augusto Pinochet, ‘U.SChilean Relations,’” June 8, 1976, in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, 264-273.

192
without producing a reaction in the U.S. which would lead to legislative
restrictions. The speech is not aimed at Chile….My evaluation is that you are a
victim of all left-wing groups around the world…But we have a practical problem
we have to take into account, without bringing about pressures incompatible with
your dignity, and at the same time which does not lead to U.S. laws which will
undermine our relationship.”723
In the same meeting, Pinochet assured Kissinger that the human rights issue was
being addressed: “We [Chile] have freed most detained prisoners…we have only 400
people who are now detained.”724 Later in the conversation, Kissinger recommended that
Pinochet release larger numbers of prisoners together: “If you could group the releases
[of prisoners], instead of 20 a week, have a bigger program of releases, that would be
better for the psychological impact of the releases. What I mean is that you should not
delay…”725 Kissinger seemed curiously uninterested in Pinochet’s offer of information
and his later comment about grouping releases together was quickly followed by a return
to other subjects in their conversation, as if his suggestion were merely a side note.
Perhaps he suspected that Pinochet would not have been eager to discuss the reports of
abuse and wished to avoid an uncomfortable conversation.
It is clear that Kissinger’s June 8 speech does not reflect the Ford
Administration’s actual policy on human rights; neither does it reflect Kissinger’s own
beliefs, as described in the DOS memo, discussed above. Some excerpts from the speech
seem appropriate:
“Clearly, some forms of human suffering are intolerable no matter what pressures
nations may face or feel…As we address this challenge in practice, we must
723
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recognize that our efforts must engage the serious commitment of our societies.
As a source of dynamism, strength, and inspiration, verbal posturing and selfrighteous rhetoric are not enough…a government that tramples on the rights of its
citizens denies the purpose of its existence…
[T]here are standards below which no government can fall without offending
fundamental values, such as genocide, officially tolerated torture, mass
imprisonment or murder, or the comprehensive denial of basic rights to racial,
religious, political, or ethnic groups.”726
Kissinger discusses both Chile and Cuba specifically. He dwells little on the
abuses in Chile, affirming that Chile was a friend of the United States and that the US
Government hoped Chile would continue to make strides toward clearing its human
rights record so that good relations between the two countries could continue. Cuba,
however, he condemns for being uncooperative with the OAS Human Rights
Commission in its investigation of abuses in Cuba. It is curious then that, in his own
speech, Kissinger censures “those who hypocritically manipulate concerns with human
rights to further their political preferences… [and] who single out for human rights
condemnation only those countries with whose political views they disagree.”727 It also
seems ironic that he rails against “verbal posturing and self-righteous rhetoric,” having
already told Pinochet that the purpose of the speech was to placate the US Congress, not
to criticize the Chilean government.
VII.

OPERATION CONDOR

The Chilean regime’s human rights abuses were not confined to its own borders.
In 1976 five countries in the Southern Cone, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay,
Bolivia, and Brazil came together to form Operation Condor, a joint intelligence and
covert action group created for the purpose of eliminating the political opponents of its
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member countries at home and abroad.728 For example, if one of Chile’s political
dissidents was living in exile in another Condor country, the host country would provide
information on the dissident’s whereabouts and would allow Chile to then assassinate the
dissident while he remained in the host country. Assassinations were not restricted to
member countries.
Perhaps the most famous Condor related assassinations were the killing of
General Carlos Prats in Argentina and Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC. Both were
Chilean citizens. Prats had been head of the Army before stepping down prior to the
coup.729 Letelier was Allende’s Foreign Minister.730 The assassination of Prats predates
the formation of the organization731 but later Condor assassinations followed the same
pattern of intelligence sharing and host country cooperation. A “CIA Information
Report” indicates that the Chilean government was keeping tabs on Prats in Argentina as
early as late November 1973.732 A later report notes that Prats was leading a fairly quiet
life in Argentina, making no trouble for the Pinochet government.733 But when reports
that Prats was planning to write about the Allende government in his memoirs reached
Pinochet, Prats was immediately marked for assassination by the regime.734
Michael Townley, a US citizen working as DINA’s cross-border hit man,
received the “assignment” to assassinate Prats in August 1974.735 John Dinges notes
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Townley’s testimony before a federal court in Alexandria, VA.736 “DINA operations
chief Pedro Espinoza gave him the assignment, but he didn’t want to call it an ‘order’…‘I
[Townley] would use a term more like inveigled…hoodwinked, tricked….I eventually
said, well, I’ll try.’”737 Townley monitored Prats throughout September 1974, “waiting
for the opportunity to kill him.”738 The opportunity came late that month. Townley
detonated the car bomb by remote on September 29. He and his wife sat in their own car
near the entrance to Prats’s garage, waiting for an appropriate time. Prats and his wife
returned home just before 1:00am on September 30. Townley detonated the bomb as
Prats left the car.739 Prats was thrown “thirteen feet into the air,” landing on a sidewalk,
“killed instantly.”740 His wife, Sofia, was “carbonized” as the car burned.741 Though the
Chilean press immediately fingered DINA as the organization behind the Prats
assassination, Ambassador Popper at the US Embassy in Santiago dismissed the idea that
the Pinochet regime could be involved, and the US chose not to investigate the
assassination any further.742
The lead up to the assassination of Orlando Letelier demonstrates the depth of
knowledge US policy makers had regarding Condor operations. US policy makers were
aware of Chilean cross-border attempts to eliminate leftist exiles in Europe in 1974.743
Political dissidents were still disappearing or turning up dead in 1975.744 The first
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official Condor convention was held in November of that year, organized by Contreras.745
The “Minutes of the Conclusions of the First Interamerican Meeting on National
Intelligence” laid out Condor’s “three phases of implementation”: Phase One, the
coordination of the intelligence services of the member government; Phase Two, increase
in information exchange; Phase Three, “Approving the Feasibility Project of the [Condor]
System” and establishing funding. The document was signed by representatives of
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay. 746
Condor’s next meeting was held in June, 1976 in Santiago,747 simultaneously or
immediately preceding the 6th meeting of the General Assembly of the OAS, also held in
Santiago, from June 4-18.748 Kornbluh describes Condor’s second meeting:
“This meeting, monitored by U.S. intelligence, produced several decisions:
Condor nations would receive numerical designations, with Chile holding the
distinction of being “Condor One”; Brazil would officially join, becoming the
sixth full-fledged member of the Condor organization; DINA would house a
computerized databank on known and suspected subversives; and Chile,
Argentina, and Uruguay would undertake covert operations against members of
the JCR living in Western Europe…Those covert operations, the CIA quickly
learned, would include assassination missions against militants and civilians
living in France and Portugal.”749
A few days before his speech to the OAS on June 8, Kissinger cabled the US
Ambassadors to Condor’s member countries asking the Ambassadors’ thoughts regarding
the “violent deaths” of political exiles in their host countries and whether the
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Ambassadors believed the governments of the host countries to be linked to the deaths.750
By August 1976, the State Department had detailed knowledge of Condor’s capabilities
and intent. The “ARA Monthly Report (July)” is a brief addressed to Henry Kissinger
about the Condor situation and the ARA’s recommendations. It outlines Condor’s
ongoing activities to the Secretary:
“The security forces of the southern cone
- now coordinate intelligence activities closely;
- operate in the territory of one another’s countries in pursuit of
‘subversives’;
- have established Operation Condor to find and kill terrorists of the
‘Revolutionary Coordinating Committee’ [JCR] in their own countries and
in Europe. Brazil is cooperating short of murder operations.”751
On August 23, a cable went out to the US Ambassadors of Condor’s member
countries with direct orders from Kissinger.
“You are aware of a series of [redacted] reports on ‘Operation Condor.’ The
coordination of security and intelligence information is probably understandable.
However, government planned and directed assassinations within and outside the
territory of Condor members has most serious implications which we must face
squarely and rapidly.”752
For the Ambassadors in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, the instructions were to
communicate, “preferably [to] the Chief of State,” that the US supported their efforts to
share intelligence information but that we would not support assassination plots: “plans
for the assassination of subversives…would create a most serious moral and political
problem.”753
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The Ambassador to Argentina was authorized to offer exchanges of intelligence
between the US Government and Government of Argentina. The Ambassador to
Uruguay was authorized to approach General Vadora with a similar offer of information
exchange, as “either the Acting President or President Designate…know nothing about
Operation Condor.”754 The Ambassador to Chile was asked to “discuss [redacted] the
possibility of a parallel approach by him.”755 Kornbluh and John Dinges shed light on the
extra instruction for the Ambassador to Chile. The Ambassador was being asked to talk
with the CIA Station Chief in Santiago, Stuart Burton, about approaching Manuel
Contreras as well as Pinochet.756 The Ambassador to Bolivia was only authorized to
discuss an increase in information exchange between the Government of Bolivia and the
US Government. Though in the case of Argentina, Uruguay, and Bolivia, the US
Government was willing to share information, it was not willing to be party to
assassination plots. “Even in those countries where we propose to expand our exchange
of information, it is essential that we in no way finger individuals who might be
candidates for assassination attempts.”757
John Dinges notes that the Ambassador to Bolivia, William P. Stedman, cabled
back to Washington on August 26 that he had met with Bolivian officials and
communicated Kissinger’s offer of information exchange, which the Bolivian
Government was happy to accept.758 The Ambassador to Paraguay, George Landau, met
with the Paraguayan dictator, Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda, personally. “[Stroessner]
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heard Landau out, said nothing in reply, then changed the subject.”759 Ambassador David
Popper in Chile, however, cabled back to Kissinger on August 24 with the
recommendation that he not approach Pinochet personally. The Ambassador expressed
some doubt that Pinochet was even aware that Condor had been established and believed
that the warning would deeply offend the Chilean President; the Ambassador’s influence
with Pinochet would suffer greatly. He did recommend, however, that Burton approach
Contreras. Popper ended the cable with question about the urgency of the situation. “I
note that the instruction is cast in urgent terms. Has Department received any word that
would indicate that assassination activities are imminent.”760 Popper was clearly
“unaware,” Kornbluh writes, “that Contreras had already set the Letelier operation in
motion.”761
The irony, as both Kornbluh and Dinges observe, is that the US Government had
knowledge that could have potentially prevented Orlando Letelier’s death, but the
connection was never made between that information and what they knew about Condor;
if it was, the connection was never documented. Kornbluh notes that on August 5,
Ambassador Landau in Paraguay cabled to the State Department that two Chileans had
obtained false Paraguayan passports and had applied for and been granted visas for travel
to the US.762 Dinges identifies the two men as Michael Townley and Lieutenant
Armando Fernández Larios, both of whom had already been to the US to surveil
Letelier.763 According to State Department documents, the names under which Townley
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and Fernández obtained Paraguayan passports were Juan Williams and Alejandro
Romeraln.764 State Department officials were immediately suspicious and, having
discovered that the two were Chilean nationals (which, in Townley’s case, was not
entirely correct),765 forwarded copies of the passport pictures to the INS and advised that
INS officials may wish to question the travelers when they entered the country.766 The
visas were eventually revoked767 and Townley and Fernández traveled to the US with
official Chilean passports “identifying them,” Dinges writes, “as government
employees.”768
In response to Ambassador Popper’s cable, Department of State and the CIA
officials discussed his recommendations at their weekly meeting on August 27.769 Harry
Shlaudeman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs decided in favor of
Popper’s recommendation not to approach Pinochet.770 It is not clear that any decision
was made at that meeting regarding the approach to Manuel Contreras, but a cable dated
August 30 from Shlaudeman indicates that he had “authority from above” to give the go
ahead to contact Contreras.771 But new instructions were never issued to the US Embassy
764
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in Santiago. Kornbluh notes that “over the next four weeks, no additional instructions are
recorded.”772 Dinges notes that “DCM Boyatt says he remembers distinctly that no
message endorsing Popper’s alternative approach was received at the Santiago
embassy.”773
Two reports, dated September 10 and September 16, indicate that the State
Department was keeping tabs on Letelier, but there is nothing in the reports that indicates
why the Department was collecting Letelier’s biographical information.774 On September
11, the Department received news that Letelier had been stripped of his Chilean
citizenship.775 Deputy Assistant for Latin American Affairs, William H. Luers, cabled
Shlaudeman on September 19, in preparation for a meeting that US Ambassador to
Argentina, Charles Hill, had scheduled with the Argentine junta leader, General Jorge
Videla, presumably to deliver Kissinger’s message. Kornbluh notes that the cable “has
not been recovered” but that Luers indicated in an interview that “he must have asked
‘how should we proceed?’”776 The next day, Schlaudeman sent a reply:
“Unless there is some complication I am unaware of, there would seem to be no
reason to wait my return. You can simply instruct the Ambassadors to take no
further action, noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an
intention to activate the Condor scheme.”777
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On September 21, Letelier and Michael and Ronnie Moffit were killed when another of
Michael Townley’s car bombs detonated as Letelier drove down Embassy Row. Letelier
died almost instantly. Ronni Moffit’s carotid artery and windpipe were severed by
shrapnel. “She drowned in her own blood,” Dinges describes. Michael Moffit received
minor injuries in the back seat. 778 Had the matter been pursued further, US officials may
have made the connection between the two suspicious Chilean officials traveling to the
US and the information the USG had regarding Condor assassination plans.
An FBI report several days after the assassination indicates a good deal of
knowledge of Condor’s structure and assassination intentions, describing Condor and its
three “phases” in detail. But the connection between the Letelier/Moffit assassination
and Condor was then only a suggestion.779 A CIA cable from October 6 implicates
Pinochet in the assassination. “[Redacted] believes that the Chilean Government is
directly involved in Letelier’s death and feels that investigations into the incident will so
indicate…[redacted] has pointed to comments made by Chilean President Augusto
Pinochet Ugarte to the effect that Letelier’s criticism of the Chilean Government was
‘unacceptable.”780 On October 4, Shlaudeman had finally replied to Ambassador Popper
with a cover letter:
“I have authority from above for this…We agree that our purpose can best be
served through [redacted] approach to Contreras and that the issue should not
repeat not be raised with Pinochet. [Redacted] is receiving instructions to consult
with you on manner and timing of approach.”781
The instructions came too late to save the lives of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffit.
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Dinges argues that the US sent a confusing volley of green lights and red lights to
the Condor countries. J. Patrice McSherry notes in Predatory States that officers from
within the Condor system have indicated that the CIA assisted in the establishment of
Condor’s communications system, Condortel, and that Condortel’s “parent station” was
“in a U.S. facility in the Panama Canal Zone.”782 The State Department clearly indicated
their support of Condor’s intelligence sharing activities and offered to increase US
intelligence sharing with Condor’s member countries (green light). But when US policy
makers learned that Condor was planning assassinations outside of its member countries,
“the U.S. attitude changed from support to opposition,” (red light).783 Kornbluh argues
that the US Government could have prevented the Letelier/Moffit assassination, but did
too little too late because of a general attitude of support toward Pinochet, an
unwillingness to acknowledge the true depth of the abuses perpetrated by the Chilean
government, the desire to maintain good relations with the Southern Cone countries, and
“bureaucratic aversion to proactive diplomatic postures.”784
It may seem strange to the reader that US policy makers were suddenly opposed
to violence, when the US spent so much energy encouraging a coup. It is perhaps less
strange when one remembers that the larger policy making community shied away from
the prospect of a coup. The coup scenario they did consider - the Frei Reelection Gambit
- would have necessitated little violence. Conversely, the individuals aware of and
involved in Track II clearly had no qualms about encouraging violence. There may,
however, have been some distinction in their minds between the violence inherent in
782
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military action and the targeted assassination of political dissidents. As Saul Landau
notes:
“[p]roblems [in relations with some third world military governments arose]
because the military rulers of nations such as Chile, Taiwan, and the Philippines
did not understand the rules governing appropriate national security behavior
outside their own countries. Pinochet, for example, did not understand that one
ought not carry violence to U.S. or Western European territory.”785
Additionally, Kissinger appears to have been concerned about the fallout from the
exposure of such activities. He clearly feared the “serious implications” of “government
planned and directed assassinations,”786 as noted earlier in this chapter in his cable to US
Ambassadors to several countries in the southern cone.787 I tend to agree with Kornbluh.
The desire to treat the situation with diplomatic delicacy kept policy makers from
expressing US aversion to political assassination strongly enough and soon enough.
In review, though the documentary record thins a bit for the years between the
coup and the end of the Ford Administration, the interactions between Congress, the
White House, and the Pinochet government make several points clear. First, there were
no major policy shifts with the transition from the Nixon to the Ford Administration since
Kissinger remained in control of foreign policy as Secretary of State. Second, though
there was a slight shift in policy in support of human rights beginning in 1974 and
certainly a change in public rhetoric,788 the substance of US policy remained the same.
As result of both public censure of policy and tightened Congressional oversight of U.S.
intelligence activities, and the rise of human rights as an important issue both
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domestically and internationally, Kissinger altered his strategy, paying public lip service
to human rights but assuring Pinochet behind closed doors that the substance of US
policy had not changed and the Ford Administration still supported Pinochet’s regime.789
A real change in policy toward Chile did not occur until 1977, when Jimmy Carter took
office and Henry Kissinger was replaced by Cyrus Vance.790
VIII. PERPETRATOR TESTIMONY
There is little comparison of testimony with documents possible in the third volume
of Kissinger’s memoirs, Years of Renewal. Kissinger concerns himself chiefly with
arguments about the propriety and effectiveness of the intelligence investigations and the
motives that shaped US policy toward the Pinochet regime. He is surprisingly candid
about his disagreement with the attitude of the US Congress toward the GOC and his own
preference for US strategic interests over human rights. The specific events he does cite
are not subject to dispute, such as the dates the intelligence investigation committees
were established, etc. Thus, Browning’s tests are not particularly useful in evaluating the
testimony discussed here.
Overall, Kissinger paints a nightmarish picture of the intelligence investigations;
the Ford Administration could not seem to catch a break. Kissinger first argues that
Senators and Congressmen equated the CIA with "America's Cold War role, which they
were determined to end,"791 and the Church Committee, in particular, was out to change
the bent of American Foreign Policy. “Assaulting the CIA,” Kissinger contends, “turned
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into a surrogate for reducing the country's international role.” 792 He concedes that the
Church Committee “redeemed itself” by offering constructive criticism and workable
suggestions about the operations of the Intelligence Community as a whole.793
Kissinger then argues that too many documents were declassified, maintaining
that William Colby went beyond his mandate as Director of Central Intelligence and
released everything the committees asked for without consulting the White House.794
Colby also “formally absolved his subordinates of the secrecy oaths they had sworn upon
entering the [CIA].”795 The intelligence committees recklessly and unnecessarily
exposed national security secrets in their eagerness.796 The Pike Committee, keen to get
their hands on anything Colby would give up, were sloppy and indiscreet, releasing
extremely sensitive documents for public review against the protestations of both Colby
and the White House.797 Were Kissinger writing today, he might draw parallels to
WikiLeaks.
Third, it was impractical for the White House to insist on reviewing all documents
before release, chiefly because the Administration did not have the manpower to review
thousands of documents. The White House could not, then, establish control over which
and how many documents were released without either taking the issue of "the
classification of documents" to the courts or by replacing Colby. Ford was loath to do
either,798 though he did eventually replace Colby. Congress itself reigned in the Pike
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Committee, but, Kissinger laments, not before a year and half of damage was done to the
IC.799
Finally, Kissinger argues, the changes brought about by the intelligence
investigations weren't worth the damage they caused the IC. In the aftermath of the
investigations, the Agency was caught between the Executive Branch and the Congress.
CIA officers lacked confidence in their orders and their actions for fear that they would
be personally scrutinized and were demoralized by "[f]requent internal organizational
changes and drastic personnel reductions.”800 The CIA's covert operations, he writes, no
longer remain secret, "defeating the very reason for their being covert."801 Ultimately,
Kissinger argues, "[T]he American intelligence community was torn apart in our nation's
historic quest for moral purity…In a democracy, [intelligence] service must, of course, be
accountable. But there are ways to achieve this without institutionalizing paralysis and
self-flagellation."802
In a later chapter, Kissinger discusses Chile’s human rights abuses and US
attitudes toward the Pinochet regime. But before launching into that discussion, he argues
that several major conflicts added to the complexity of the situation, namely, "…the Cold
War...Watergate, a presidential transition, the Middle East War, and the Cuban
challenge."803 In the South, Latin America was experiencing a wave of leftist
movements, but, "[o]f all the leaders of the region, we considered Allende the most
inimical to our interests" because, as he argues, “[Allende’s] internal policies were a
799
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threat to Chilean democratic liberties and human rights."804 The takeover by the Chilean
military was a welcome relief to the Nixon Administration. "[W]e thought [the military
coup] saved Chile from totalitarianism and the Southern Cone from collapse into
radicalism."805 To complicate the matter further, the executive branch and Congress were
not working in tandem on policy toward Chile. "Human rights advocates in Congress
accused the administration of moving on human rights only in response to pressure. We,
in turn, believed that Congress was reflecting single-issue ideological and political
agendas, pushed to a point that the administration considered inimical to broader United
States strategic or geopolitical interests, or oblivious to them."806
Kissinger later discusses his response to pressures within the US government and
abroad to address Chile’s human rights record. Kissinger acknowledges that the Pinochet
regime's abuses "exceeded acceptable moral norms."807 He argues, however, that "the
brutalities in Chile were those of a continuing civil war."808 He quotes part of a speech
by Frei after the coup in which Frei indicated that the junta had found "hideouts and
arsenals" and accused the Allende regime of planning a civil war.809 Furthermore, the
Pinochet regime’s repression had to be considered in the context of the “radical
upheaval” occurring throughout the continent. Policy makers thus "sought to moderate
and democratize [Pinochet's] conduct"810 rather than overthrow him.
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Ultimately, Kissinger admits that the Ford Administration felt the strategic
interests of the US lay in support of the Chilean government, and that those strategic
interests trumped the issue of human rights.811 The “radical upheaval” in Latin America
was more important to US policy makers than Chile's human rights record. "We were
prepared to press the junta to maintain Chile's democratic institution and to improve its
human rights performance, but we did so from the position of recognizing that the forces
of radical upheaval in South America posed a greater threat."812 The Cold War
atmosphere on the world stage rendered it politically expedient to maintain a
"constructive relationship" with the new Chilean government in order to "advance the
cause of democratic institutions…without damaging fundamental United States interests
or unleashing the radical violent left."813 "We did so,” Kissinger writes, “through
engagement with regimes compatible with or supportive of our national security interests,
rather than through confrontation, as we were being urged."814
It was with this attitude that Kissinger approached his speech to the OAS General
Assembly in June. The US Congress was about to cut off aid to Chile in the lead up to
the meeting.815 Unable to simply ignore the pressure from Congress, 816 Kissinger had to
find a way to balance the issue of human rights and "broader United States strategic [and]
geopolitical interests."817 Prior to the meeting, policy makers, including Kissinger,
encouraged Chile to improve its human rights record. "The Chilean government
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responded by announcing that three hundred political prisoners would be freed."818
Seeking that balance, Kissinger claims, explains his conversation with Pinochet before
the OAS speech, in which Kissinger warned Pinochet that he was going to come down
hard on the issue of human rights to satisfy the US Congress so that US aid could
continue to flow to Chile. He assured Pinochet, however, that the Ford Administration
was in support of the Chilean government,819 and that his speech was merely a formality
so that the US Congress would be satisfied.
Gerald Ford’s testimony is quite different from Kissinger’s, and much shorter.
Ford devotes barely four pages to the intelligence investigations, and never mentions
Chile or Pinochet. He notes that he first learned that Seymour Hersh was writing a story
exposing CIA activities in Chile from William Colby, who assured the President that the
CIA was no longer in the business of illegal activities. On January 3, 1975, Ford writes,
Colby advised him of the CIA’s famous “family jewels,”820 a collection of CIA reports
“detailing 25 years of Agency misdeeds.”821 The Rockefeller Commission was created,
he argues, in order to prevent accusations of a "cover up" while avoiding any
"unnecessary disclosures" that could jeopardize the Agency. Rockefeller was a man he
felt he could trust with the job.822
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In contrast to Kissinger's testimony, Ford makes little comment about the Pike
Committee and argues that the Church Committee was "sensational and irresponsible."823
The Congressional investigative committees, he writes, were out to "dismantle the CIA."
"They were trying to eliminate covert operations altogether, and if they didn't succeed in
that, they wanted to restrict those operations to such an extent that they would be
meaningless."824 Ford also argues that the committee staffs were the driving force behind
"the push to continue these probes [into US intelligence activities]."825
There is not much to argue with in either Kissinger’s or Ford’s memoirs. Their
memoirs reflect the shift in focus from monitoring political developments in Chile to
addressing the fallout of US action in Chile between 1970 and 1973. Kissinger’s memoir
does, however, confirm arguments about Kissinger’s philosophy of foreign policy.
Security was paramount. Human rights abuses were acceptable so long as they helped
stem the tide of “radical upheaval.” Given that philosophy, his acknowledgement of the
GOC’s human rights abuses “exceed[ing] moral norms,” seems rather empty.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION
As described in Chapter One, I set out to answer three questions in this thesis:

How did the US Government arrive at the decision to deepen US involvement in Chile in
the 1970s? Why use the CIA as a means to achieve the Nixon Administration’s goal?
Why did the Ford Administration continue to support the Pinochet regime when the
Administration was well aware of the regime’s human rights abuses? In sum, what can
we conclude about the motivations and methods behind US involvement in Chile during
the Nixon and Ford Administrations? How did we get to a place where our actions were
fundamentally discordant with what would appear to be core values? This chapter first
pulls out the elements of the narrative of US involvement in Chile that illustrate the
characteristics of the Nixon Administration and the Administration’s policy making
process, reviewed in Chapters Three through Five. I then review the theories of US
intervention in Chile, as discussed in Chapter Two, using examples from the narrative to
explain which theories I reject and which I endorse. I finish with some reflections on the
impact of the Nixon and, later, Ford Administrations’ policy.
II.

THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY MAKING PROCESS IN
ACTION

Several hallmarks of the Nixon Administration’s, and later the Ford Administration’s,
foreign policy are evident in US actions in Chile between 1970 and 1976. The present
study has identified five themes that run through US behavior: ethnocentrism; the idea
that the US was being “tested;” the inconsistency between policy and public rhetoric;
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centralization of the policy making process; and a desire to maintain the world balance of
power and the international reputation of the United States as a great power. We can see
the more traditional hallmarks of US ethnocentrism manifest in Kissinger’s comment
during a 40 Committee meeting on June 27, 1970, noted earlier but re-quoted here, “The
Chairman [Kissinger]’s comment was, I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a
country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”826 A rearticulation of
that ethnocentrism can be seen in Kissinger’s comment to Gabriel Valdés that “ history is
never produced in the South…[w]hat happens in the South is of no importance.”827 In a
conversation on March 5, 1971, Nixon himself stated that “Latin countries” could not
handle democracy.
“…most Latin countries [you kind of need]—not dictators; that’s a horrible word,
and a reprehensible word to most Americans—but, that strong leadership is
essential…If even France, with all of its sophistication, couldn’t handle a
democracy, you can’t. The Italians? That’s their problem. They can’t afford the
luxury of democracy. Neither can Spain, and no country in Latin America can that
I know of.”828
Another Nixon quote from 1971 is also revealing:
“If, on the other hand, you show me some cesspool like, well, like some of these
Latin American countries like Colombia, and the rest, that are trying to make it
the other way, they can be very bad risks [for lending nations].”829
Clearly both men had a great deal of contempt for Latin America. That contempt was
worked out in policy toward Chile. Kissinger acknowledged that the USG was “strongly
826
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on record in support of self-determination and respect for free election…”830 Yet he and
Nixon chose deliberately to “violate those principles.”831 The “cesspools” to the South
were not worthy enough for the US to respect those rights.
The idea that the third world was a “testing ground” is evident in the Nixon
Administration’s reaction to events in Chile; US resolve was being tested. As noted in
Chapter Four, Kissinger warned Nixon in the November 5, 1970 memo that, “our failure
to react to this situation risks being perceived in Latin American and in Europe as
indifference or impotence in the face of clearly adverse developments in a region long
considered our sphere of influence.”832 Nixon’s comments at the November 6 meeting
also indicate a sense that the willingness to act of US policy makers was being tested,
arguing that failure to respond to the situation in Chile would set an undesirable
precedent:
“If we let the potential leaders in South America think they can move like Chile
and have it both ways, we will be in trouble…We’ll be very cool and very correct,
but doing those things which will be a real message to Allende and others…No
impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this,
that it’s safe to go this way…There must be times when we should and must react,
not because we want to hurt [foreign nations] but to show that we can’t be kicked
around.”833
Several quotes from conversations between Nixon, Kissinger, Bob Haldeman, and
John Connally also demonstrate the idea that Chile was another test of US resolve:
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“Nixon:…everything we do with the Chilean Government will be watched by
other governments and revolutionary groups in Latin America as a signal as to
what they can do and get away with.”834
“Kissinger: I think, unless we become too dangerous to tackle, there’s going to
be a constant erosion of our international position.”835
“Kissinger: —and that there’s no doubt whether the Chileans—I’ve always felt—
we need to take a stand on. And if we take it from that, if they wind up being as
well-off as their neighbors, what incentives do their neighbors have not to yield to
the—to their domestic Left?”836
The inconsistency between the Nixon Administration’s policy and public rhetoric
about policy is demonstrated in several instances noted in previous chapters; in the case
of Chile, that inconsistency was deliberate. In the November 6 NSC meeting, even
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird argued that it was necessary to maintain a publically
“correct” posture toward the Allende regime, though the Administration should “take
hard actions.”837 The November 20, 1970 NSC public position statement noted in
Chapter Four states that US policy would be formulated in reaction to the Allende
regime’s actions, though the Administration’s position had already been firmly decided at
the November 6 meeting, prior to action by the Allende government.838 Nixon carried
that idea into the November 6 meeting. “A publicly correct approach is right. Privately
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we must get the message to Allende and others that we oppose him.”839 That rhetoric is
echoed in Nixon’s 1972 Foreign Policy Report to the Congress.840 Nixon expresses
distaste for the idea of intervention in the Chilean election in an interview in January,
1971, also noted in Chapter Four, despite his knowledge of the CIA’s continued
involvement.841 The inconsistency between rhetoric and policy carried into the Ford
Administration, as demonstrated in Chapter Five in the deliberate discrepancy between
stated policy in Kissinger’s 1976 speech to the OAS and his profession of actual policy to
Pinochet before the speech.842
The tendency to centralize the policy making process can be seen in the
elimination of input from the State Department, Department of Defense, and the US
Embassy in Chile when Track II was initiated, as noted in Chapter Three. Later, when
Allende was in office, Nixon deepened centralization. In June, 1971, he instructed John
Connally and Kissinger to dialogue directly, bypassing the Peterson Committee843 on
important political and economic matters regarding the Allende government:
“Nixon: Here’s what we want to do, John. What I—what I really want to do is
this: Basically, this kind of a thing, normally, would be handled through the
Peterson Committee…I want to set up a procedure whereby—if you would, I
want you to—and just do it on a basis of where you send your guy in, of course,
with your recommendations, John. Well, where this—where these economic and
839
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political problems are involved at the highest level and you [unclear] pick up the
phone and ask Henry. And, Henry, I want you, in your turn, to ask him. You
understand?”844
Finally, the importance to the Nixon Administration of maintaining a world
balance of power and the international reputation of the United States can be seen in
Henry Kissinger’s November 5, 1970 memo to Nixon. What happened in Chile, he
argued, would have far-reaching ramifications. Chile would “become part of the
Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics.”845 The
CIA had warned that an Allende government would have a definite and negative
psychological impact for the US and positive psychological impact “for the Marxist
idea.”846 The US would need to intervene, but do so stealthily. The Administration’s
value for the international reputation of the US can also be seen in Kissinger’s November
5, 1970 memo to Nixon, urging the need for secrecy: “- - we do not want to risk turning
nationalism against us and damaging our image, credibility and position in the world.”847
The Administration ultimately chose a policy that put the maximum amount of pressure
possible on the Allende government without damaging the reputation of the United
States, or so it was assumed.848
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III.

THEORIES OF INTERVENTION
To recap briefly Chapters One and Two of this thesis, there are several theories

that have been put forth to explain US involvement in Chile in the 1970s. One theory is
that traditional US anti-communist ideology was the impetus for action. Another is that
the CIA was a “rogue elephant,” acting of its own accord with its own agenda. A third is
that the US was promoting democracy in Chile by supporting opposition political parties
and media outlets independent of government influence. A fourth is that a socialist
government in Latin America posed a threat to national security. Another is that policy
makers were protecting US economic interests jeopardized by Allende’s rise to power.
Lastly, a sixth is that domestic politics and ethnocentrism combined economic and
security interests as factors in US policy decisions toward Latin America, as well as a
quest to maintain regional hegemony. The below graph will help the reader organize
these competing theories and my own position, revisited in the following section.

1970, in “National Security Decision Memoranda, Nixon Virtual Library, http://nixon.archives.gov/
virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_093.pdf.
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Table 6.1 Theories of Intervention
Theories of Intervention
Competing Theories of Intervention in Chile:

Agree

Disagree
X

Socialist/Communist threat
X
Rogue CIA
X
Promotion of democracy
X
Perceived (indirect) threat to national security
X
Protection of corporate interests
Combination of domestic politics, ethnocentrism, economic interests, and
security interests

X

Additional Factors:
X
High economic and political costs of military action
X
Predominant concern over maintaining the world balance of power

IV.

INTERPRETING THE CHILEAN CASE
To the casual observer it might appear that US action in Chile boiled down to no

more than traditional hard line anti-communism; indeed, that was my reaction when I
began to study US involvement in Chilean politics as an undergraduate. But although
that threat did play a role, policy was in actuality much more complicated. As detailed in
Chapter Two, Kissinger’s “philosophical deepening” required a shift from a focus on a
foreign country’s current ideology to an emphasis on the actions of that nation as the
basis for policy decisions. As noted in Chapter Two, Kissinger declared that “‘[W]e have
no permanent enemies…we will judge other countries, including Communist
countries…on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic
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ideology.’”849 Though Nixon and Kissinger broke with that policy in their relations with
the Allende government, formulating a plan of “economic strangulation” before Allende
had been in office for a month, they were more concerned with the potential upset in the
balance of power and the international reputation of the United States than with the
Allende government’s ideology.
One cannot, however, fully dismiss the argument that ideology was the impetus
for action; so much of the language in the documentary record suggests a preoccupation
with the socialist/communist threat. Though I disagree with an oversimplified
understanding of this theory, it does have merit when paired with other factors, notably
the “perceived (indirect) threat to national security.” One might also see it as further
evidence of the traditional ethnocentric attitude toward Latin America: the considerations
the Administration gave the great powers in tolerating their socialist/communist ideology
were not extended to nations that were less strategically important.
The US Congress suspected that the CIA was a rogue institution, acting without a
mandate from a higher authority in government. That suspicion led, in part, to the
intelligence investigations in the mid 1970s. The Church Committee’s own report on
covert action in Chile concludes that the CIA was not a “rogue elephant” at all, but was
tightly controlled by the executive branch. As I read through CIA and DOS documents, I
found the same, especially after Track II was established. When it seemed as if the
Station in Santiago was proceeding beyond its mandate, CIA Head Quarters in
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Washington sent instructions to clarify the limits of the Station’s role, per instructions
from a higher authority, with which the Station complied.850
Henry Kissinger claims more than once in his memoirs that policy makers merely
sought to support the “democratic counterweight” to the Allende government by
supporting the PDC and El Mercurio, a well established Chilean newspaper. But Nixon’s
orders were to “prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him,” as noted in
Chapter Three.851 The CIA was given orders to foment a coup in 1970, hardly an action
in support of democracy. Furthermore, El Mercurio had long-standing, strong ties to the
CIA and was one of the Agency’s chief propaganda channels. Though the paper was not
under the influence of the government, it can hardly have been called a “free” news
source devoted to the principles of free speech, devoid of outside influence.
Lubna Qureshi argues that US economic interests were jeopardized by the
Allende regime and Lars Schoultz argues that foreign policy decisions toward Latin
America are sometimes influenced, at least in part, by economic interests. But though
policy makers, specifically Nixon, Kissinger, and John Connally, were concerned about
Allende’s expropriation of US firms, their concern had more to do with political interests.
Allende was testing the boundaries of US patience. When Nixon, Kissinger, and
Connally discussed the expropriation issue on June 11, 1971, Connally suggested that the
White House issue “a statement of policy” advising that the USG would neither “vote for,
nor favor” loans to countries that did not prove that “satisfactory payment” had been
made to expropriated US firms. Kissinger replied that he would issue a directive to halt
850
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the loan process to any country expropriating US firms until the issue could be reviewed
by the NSC, to which Nixon and Connally both agreed. Nixon wanted to make sure that
Peter G. Peterson, whom he had named Assistant to the President for International
Economic Affairs, 852 was informed of the decision, but only as a formality. His
statement implies that disputes over multi-national corporation expropriation were not
central to the decision.
“Nixon: Basically, [the decision] goes beyond [Peterson’s] provenance, though,
because this does involve our attitude toward these damn countries politically—
Connally: Oh, I think, basically, it’s a political decision you’re making—
Nixon: Yeah.
[Unclear exchange]
Connally: The economic part of it—
Nixon: Yeah?
Connally: —is purely incidental.
Nixon: That’s right.”853
Moreover, had the fate of US business interests been the driving force behind
policy, the issue would have come up more in 40 Committee meetings. Discussions,
however, centered on the political cost to the US of a socialist government in Chile,
evident in Kissinger’s memo to Nixon November 5, 1970. Kissinger lists seven
“Dimensions of the Problem,” only one of which had anything to do with economics:
“Everyone agrees that Allende will purposefully seek:
-- To establish a socialist, Marxist state in Chile;
-- to eliminate US influence from Chile and the hemisphere;
-- to establish close relations and linkage with the USSR, Cuba,
and other Socialist countries…
-- US investments…may be lost, at least in part; Chile may default
on debts…owed the US Government and private US banks.
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-- Chile would probably become a leader of opposition to us in the
inter-American system, a source of disruption in the hemisphere, and a
focal point of support for subversion in the rest of Latin America.
-- It would become part of the Soviet/Socialist world, not only
philosophically but in terms of power dynamics…
-- …the imitative spread of similar phenomena elsewhere would in
turn significantly affect the world balance and our own position in it.”854
Though I reject the above stated theories, I generally agree with Schoultz and
would add some theories of my own, based on my analysis of the Nixon Administration’s
foreign policy. Schoultz argues that security interests are often a factor in US foreign
policy decisions toward Latin America. I contend that, though Chile did not pose a
security threat in the traditional sense (there was no fear that the Chile would start a war
with the US), it posed an indirect threat. As laid out in Kissinger’s November 5, 1970
memo to Nixon, noted above. A Socialist government in Chile would have meant a
potential Soviet satellite, a threat to the world balance of power, and a loss of US prestige
and the international perception of US power and influence. Such a loss of perception of
influence might encourage enemies to take advantage of apparent US weakness.
Schoultz cites a traditional attitude of ethnocentrism as another factor in US
foreign policy toward Latin America. I would argue that the traditional paternalistic
attitude of US statesmen toward Latin American countries was echoed in statements
made by both Nixon and Kissinger, as noted earlier in this chapter, and rearticulated in
their estimation of the strategic importance, not only of Latin America, but of the “third
world” in general. As I demonstrated in Chapter Two, third world nations were merely
“episodically important” to the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy grand strategy,
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“insofar as they impinged upon the traditional focus of the Nixon Doctrine.”855 Chile
was one of those “episodically important” nations, impinging on the Nixon
Administration’s quest to achieve and maintain a balance of power which, as noted
above, was essential to the Administration’s foreign policy strategy. We can see this
concern for the balance of power again in Kissinger’s November 5 memo, the November
6 NSC meeting and the final policy decision in National Security Decision Memorandum
93, also noted above. The paternalistic and disparaging attitude toward Chile and its
people removed the moral element from US policy makers’ decisions. Nixon and
Kissinger never seemed to question whether or not the US Government had a right to
intervene in and destabilize Chile, though they did acknowledge that public knowledge of
such action might produce undesirable political backlash. The assumption that the
United States did have that right facilitated decision making based on balance of power
politics.
Domestic politics, another of Schoultz’s four factors, also played a role,
particularly in determining the mechanism the Administration used to achieve its ends in
Chile - covert action via the CIA. As I argued in Chapter Two, public support for large
scale military conflict was waning. Since covert action is by nature secret, the public and
Congress didn’t have a chance to dissent, protecting the Administration from a public
backlash. After Ford took office, domestic politics again played a role in policy making
toward Chile. Though the substance of policy remained the same, public outcry and
pressure from Congress over revelations of US involvement in Chile in the early 1970s
forced Kissinger to alter his rhetoric, as evidenced in his speech to the OAS in 1976.
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Schoultz also argues that US policy makers sought to maintain regional
hegemony as a marker of US prestige and, during the Cold War, of US credibility and
appearance of strength on the international stage. Landau argues that the Nixon
Administration in particular was concerned about the appearance of strength to mask the
diminished real power of the United States. Nathan and Oliver note that the
Administration was deeply concerned about the international reputation of the USG.856
As noted above, that concern for reputation can be seen in Kissinger’s November 5
memo to Nixon and the decision to protect the reputation of the United States by a “cool
and correct” policy toward the Allende government.
To those theories, I would add that in addition to domestic politics, the
Administration chose to use the CIA to achieve its goal in Chile for several reasons.
First, the same lack of resources that caused Kissinger to move away from a foreign
policy of superiority to a policy of sufficiency made the CIA an attractive tool for action
in Chile. CIA programs, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, were cheap compared large
scale military action. Furthermore, the CIA was efficient, requiring less money and man
power than a US military intervention.
Additionally, the CIA had already established a presence in Chile; contacts and
mechanisms for action were already in place. Furthermore, the CIA had been successful
in influencing the 1964 Presidential election in their favor; if they did it once, they could
conceivably do it again. I would also add that Nixon and Kissinger believed that Chile
was a “testing ground,” and the prospect of Allende’s election, and later his presidency,
were a test of the Administration’s willingness to act. Those sentiments can be found in
the quotes from Nixon and Kissinger noted earlier in this chapter. They felt that a lack of
856
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will to respond to a challenge would jeopardize the perception of US strength and resolve
which would in turn encourage enemies to further challenge the US.
V.

CONCLUSION
There are three planes along which we can evaluate US actions in Chile: the

success or failure to achieve policy goals, the impact on the US Government’s domestic
and international image and the resulting consequences, or adherence to fundamental
principles. In terms of the success or failure to achieve policy goals, Kristian Gustafson
argues that covert action in 1968 and 1969, connected to the 1970 presidential election,
had little impact.857 Kissinger himself argues that 40 Committee efforts to influence the
election in 1970 were “too little” to have any real impact and that a strong plan of action
came “too late.”858 By his standards, I agree with him. Before September 1970, the 40
Committee’s indecisiveness, especially the decision not to support either of Allende’s
opponents, greatly limited the effectiveness of CIA action. By the time Track II
developed, it was too late for those plans to have much effect. The goal of keeping
Allende from power was not met.
Evaluating the success or failure of covert action after Allende’s inauguration is
more difficult. The outcome US policy makers desired – Allende’s removal from power
- did materialize, but whether that outcome can be attributed to US intervention, in whole
or in part, is hard to determine. After Allende’s inauguration, the CIA’s covert action
program diminished. Active efforts to foment a coup were considered dangerous because
of the risk of exposure. CIA activity, therefore, was limited to observing and reporting.
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When it came down to it, the US Government refused to commit to active support of the
coup, though it conveyed its political support through various liaisons.
The Nixon Administration did, however, expend a good deal of energy trying to
destabilize Allende’s government through economic warfare. As I discussed in Chapter
Four, the decline of the Chilean economy was, in my view, due chiefly to the Allende
government’s own economic policies. Had the United States continued to extend the
same level of aid to Chile it had extended in the past, that aid may have slowed Chile’s
economic decline but it would not have saved the economy. Ultimately, we can never
know what would have happened had the United States stayed out of Chilean politics.
Whether or not it had anything to do with US efforts to destabilize Allende’s government,
Allende was indeed removed from power with little inconvenience to the US Government
in comparison to other international entanglements.
What of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s fear that inaction would be perceived as
weakness, an invitation to challenge further the power of the United States? Both before
Allende’s inauguration and after, the Administration pursued policies designed to meet
what they deemed a challenge. Indeed, US leadership in the Americas does not appear to
have been questioned at the time. Even when the Ford Administration suffered criticism
for its reaction to the issue of human rights abuses by the Pinochet government, the
international community looked to the US to provide authoritative censure to the Chilean
government, as evidenced by Zhou Enlai’s request that Kissinger reign in the Pinochet
regime’s abuses, noted in Chapter Five.859 In that respect, the Nixon Administration’s
policy toward Chile was successful.
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We may not yet have experienced the potential long term consequences to the
impact of US action in Chile on the international reputation of the US Government, as I
discuss further below. The impact of US intervention in Chile on the domestic image of
the USG was certainly negative. The Administration suffered greatly from revelations of
US action in Chile, affecting public perception of the Administration’s legitimacy.
Though Nixon was no longer in office at the time of the revelations, the uproar over US
involvement in Chile and the resultant investigations by the Rockefeller, Pike, and
Church Committees were a headache for the Ford Administration, ultimately forcing the
Administration into a deeper dissonance between policy and rhetoric.
The domestic public outcry after the exposure of US actions and the public
perception of legitimacy is tied to the issue of adherence to fundamental principles – what
Samuel Huntington calls the “American Creed,” as discussed in Chapter One of this
thesis. Americans believe that government “should be egalitarian, participatory, open,
non-coercive, and responsive to the demands of individuals and groups.”860 Those
principles make us who we are and should therefore be considered as a core element in
the national identity. At the very least the perception of a government’s legitimacy – a
foundational factor in an effectively functioning government - is inextricably linked to
the extent to which its policies adhere to the foundational political principles of its
nation. Though Kissinger and Nixon may have perceived the balance of power
arrangement they sought to be a long-term goal that would ensure a measure of stability,
they were willing to deliberately “violate” the principles of “self-determination and
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respect for free election”861 to achieve their goal. US action in Chile further damaged the
legitimacy of the Nixon Administration, already affected by the Watergate scandal, and
tainted public perception of the Ford Administration’s legitimacy as well.
Huntington argues that the American body politic cycles through periods of
“Creedal Passion” - times of passionate attachment to fundamental principles leading to
or springing from public outcry over violations of principle by the US Government or
public institutions - and Creedal complacency - times of less passionate attachment to
principles in which some departure from principle is tolerated. It can be expected, then,
that the United States will eventually recover from the deviation from principle displayed
by both the Nixon and Ford Administrations, if it has not done so already.
One may question the extent to which we can know what the American Creed
actually is. Huntington clearly connects the Creed with values espoused by the Founding
Fathers in our government’s founding documents. Schoultz and Hunt paint a somewhat
different picture. US officials throughout our history have held attitudes and pursued
policies at variance with Huntington’s idea of the American Creed. If our actions are
consistently discordant with our stated values, perhaps our stated values are not truly our
values. But if Huntington’s definition of the Creed and his argument about the cyclical
nature of domestic politics hold true, perhaps the domestic fallout over revelations of US
action in Chile was a blessing in disguise, giving the American public, primed for
change, a final push toward a period of Creedal Passion that brought about a return, at
least in part, to accountability and to principle.
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I do have one strong reservation about Huntington’s arguments in American
Politics. In contending that government can never achieve the perfection demanded by
the American Creed, Huntington implies that the American Creed cannot effectively
address the realities of the international system of states – American Government must
deviate from the Creed in order for the nation to survive. Huntington may deem me a
moralist but I cannot agree with that assumption. Government cannot be a fair-weather
friend to principle. If we agree that our principles must needs be violated at times, we
cannot call them principles. Furthermore, the idea that strength of government
necessarily requires deviation from principle is questionable. I would argue that it takes
more fortitude to adhere to principle when it is inconvenient than it does to violate
principle when it is politically expedient.
I do not disagree with the observation of an official of the Obama Administration
that “[a]ll policies encounter reality,”862 but surely some, if not many, unpleasant realities
are of our own making and could have been avoided had US policy makers been more
circumspect. Our uncomfortable alliance with the Pinochet regime, for example, was at
least in part of our own making. Policy makers in the early 1970s did not have the
benefit of hindsight, but had the US been less invested in Allende’s downfall, US
officials would perhaps have felt less need to support the Pinochet regime in spite of its
human rights record.
Furthermore, there are long term costs to the US Government’s reputation on the
world stage that I believe outweigh the benefits of a government made stronger by
deviation from principle. It is not only the American public that holds the US
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Government to a high standard; the international community does as well. Having tooted
its idealistic horn and attempted to assert global leadership based in part on the virtue of
its commitment to democratic principles, the US Government is expected to adhere to the
standards it promotes. Even if Kissinger was able to satisfy at the time the concerns of
the international community over US support of the Pinochet regime by modifying his
rhetoric, as in his speech to the OAS in 1976, later revelations of the depth of US
involvement in Chile and of the Nixon and Ford Administration’s policy behind closed
doors have lifted the veil of deception. If we have not already felt the consequences,
what might we expect to face in future?
In Blowback, The Costs of and Consequences of American Empire, Chalmers
Johnson argues that the US has created an informal empire that is in danger of imperial
overstretch, both militarily and economically; the increasing costs of maintaining that
empire are unsustainable.863 In addition to the dangers of overstretch, US military and
economic activity abroad has created situations that add to a growing international
resentment toward the United States. He argues that two distinct but related types of
blowback will result.864 The first is blowback in the traditional sense, terrorist action
against innocent American citizens in an attempt to draw attention to and in retaliation for
unpopular US actions abroad. The second is what Johnson calls “the tangible costs of
empire,”865 which include “the hollowing out of American industry,” “the growth of
militarism in a once democratic society,”866 and ultimately the breakdown of the
international system, citing David Calleo’s reflection that “the international system
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breaks down not only because unbalanced and aggressive new powers seek to dominate
their neighbors, but also because declining powers, rather than adjusting and
accommodating, try to cement their slipping preeminence into an exploitative
hegemony.”867
Johnson’s argument does not directly relate to the Chilean case. Kissinger
himself perceived the dangers of overstretch and it was his recognition that the US could
not maintain, let alone increase, military involvement abroad due to lack of public
support, manpower, and economic resources that led him to seek alternative methods of
maintaining the US position on the international stage. Those methods included
partnering with Western Europe and Japan, opening relations with China, and pursuing
détente with the USSR to establish a trilateral power relationship, as well as choosing
non-military methods of intervention in other situations the Administration deemed
important, as in US action in Chile.
Johnson’s more traditional description of blowback, however, may be indirectly
applicable to the Chilean case. No scholar has argued that US involvement in Chile
resulted in terrorist action against the United States, but US intervention in other
sovereign nations on the level of CIA action in Chile has contributed to some instances of
the more violent types of blowback.868 That alone is reason enough to understand why
and how the USG deepened involvement in Chile in the 1970s so that we may avoid
making similar policy mistakes, preventing the potential for blowback in future.

867

Ibid, 224.
Johnson notes as an example Osama bin Laden, a important partner in efforts to “[drive] the
Soviet Union from Afghanistan,” that later “turned against the United States.” See Johnson, Blowback, 1011.
868

233
The most direct blowback of action in Chile, however, might have been a
consequence that Johnson doesn’t consider: the diminished soft power of the United
States, as defined by Joseph Nye in Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
Nye describes soft power as the ability to convince others that they want what you want,
“affecting behavior without commanding it.”869 Nye contends that soft power is the often
overlooked “second face of power”870 that can and should be used as a means to meet
challenges unsuited to coercion or inducement.871 “In international politics,” Nye argues,
“the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization
or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and
policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others.”872 In light of that statement,
US involvement in Chile in the 1970s takes on new significance.
Public knowledge of US action in Chile and support of the Pinochet regime in the
face of human rights abuses certainly tarnished the USG’s reputation abroad, contributing
to the international community’s perception of US hypocrisy and damaging our ability to
take a leadership role among the international community on the basis of moral authority.
Kissinger himself was aware of that danger, as evidenced by his warning to Nixon about
violating the principles of free election and self-determination when deciding policy
toward Chile.873 Yet, as noted above, Kissinger and Nixon moved forward with plans for
CIA intervention, a clear indication that they valued hard power above soft power. That
should not, perhaps, come as a surprise given the Administration’s, particularly
869
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Kissinger’s, realist bent. What is not so much surprising as it is ironic is that Kissinger’s
inclination toward hard power led policy makers to undermine the basis for US soft
power, the strategies of which had the potential to be extremely useful tools in meeting
the challenge of protecting US interests despite diminishing resources. In that sense, the
Administration’s strategy in Chile – intervention in the name of maintaining the world
balance of power in order to reduce the costs of protecting the national interest - might be
considered self-defeating.
Overall, I would argue, the Nixon Administration would have done better not to
intervene in Chile, in keeping with its articulated principles of respecting democratic
elections. The CIA’s program for action in Chile prior to Allende’s inauguration was
unsuccessful, the effectiveness of the CIA’s program after Allende’s inauguration is
questionable, and the domestic and international impact of deviation from stated US
principles did more damage than good. The legitimacy of the US Government suffered
which, if not sufficient reason to act in accordance with the American Creed as a matter
of principle, has been made a matter of practicality by the potential for blowback. It is
my hope that the lessons to be learned from the study of US action in Chile in the 1970s
and other similar cases would inspire US policy makers to seek solutions that uphold
rather than violate the American Creed as a matter both of principle and practicality.
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